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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON EXPORT CONCENTRATION, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF
TRADE
A common finding in the international trade literature is that economic integration
leads to export diversification. By documenting a positive link between joining the
European Economic and Monetary Union and bilateral export concentration, the
leading essay shows that this is not always the case. Using a panel data approach, I
find that exports between the Eurozone members are on average more concentrated
than those among countries which do not share the euro. Central to this outcome
is that some economic integration agreements, such as the European Economic and
Monetary Union, may lead to a drop in not only trade but horizontal FDI costs
as well. Theoretically, the results can be explained by the substitutability between
exporting and horizontal FDI within a two-sector, two-firm type model which allows
for sectoral trade cost heterogeneity.
Since the early 1970s, a series of international environmental agreements (IEAs)
were signed, ratified, and enforced throughout the developed and developing nations.
Regarding IEAs as potential barriers to trade, the second essay seeks to quantify their
impact on industry-level exports by using a gravity regression approach. I proceed by
classifying industries into dirty and clean based on their average emission intensities
and find that the ratification of IEAs is associated with a significant reduction in
export flows. The decrease is more pronounced for industries which are classified as
dirty or for those which are characterized by high emission intensities per unit of
output. Additionally, climate change IEAs bring about a compositional shift towards
cleaner exports. Lastly, climate change and acid rain IEAs are found to engender
leakage effects. No such evidence is recovered for ozone depletion accords.
The third essay adds to the literature on the Kyoto protocol and the carbon
content of bilateral trade. It does so by analyzing the effect of ratifying the Kyoto
protocol on exports, the carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity of exports, and the CO2
emissions embodied in exports within a novel dataset of 149 countries. For parties
that took on binding emission caps, the ratification of Kyoto protocol leads to (i)
lower CO2 emissions embodied in exports, (ii) lower CO2 emission intensities, but
(iii) higher overall exports. For the same group of countries, a year-by-year analysis
underlines a permanent decline in both the CO2 emission intensity and the CO2
content of their exports. Furthermore, the analysis also points out to a short-run
decline in exports. In the long run, however, exports are estimated to recover. Also,
the commitment type or whether a party was designated as a transition economy at
the time of ratification are found to shape the above three outcomes.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
This dissertation contributes to two major branches of the international trade re-
search. The first essay is aimed at better understanding the response of exporting
activities to engagement in economic integration agreements (EIAs). This analysis
may be of added importance given the growing tendency of sovereign nations to par-
ticipate in this particular type of accords. For instance the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), a trade agreement, was signed earlier this year and expected to enter into
force no later than 2018. Even more, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP), a trade and investment arrangement, is currently being negotiated
by the United States and the European Union. The second and third essays add to
the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) and their competi-
tiveness effects. The third essay also contributes to the small, but rapidly growing,
body of literature concerning IEAs and their effect on the emission content of trade.
The results it brings forward may also carry additional value for Kyoto parties which,
under the protocol’s Doha amendment, took on emission targets for the 2013-2020
period.
The first essay evaluates the link between economic integration agreements (EIAs)
and export diversity. Since 1950 world trade has increased by a factor of twenty seven
(Hoekman, 2015). To a large extent, this unprecedented pattern owes itself to global
and regional economic integration efforts which lowered trade and investment costs
alike. Between 1958 and 2015 more than 263 trade agreements, covering both goods
and services, have entered into force. Even more bilateral investment agreements,
2270, were enforced over the same period (UNCTAD IIA Database). In 1983, 68
countries were part of currency unions. This figure remained relatively unchanged for
the next two decades only to increase starting in 1999, when the euro was introduced
in eleven European countries1. Since then, an additional eight nations have adopted
the euro currency and others are likely to join in the near future. These international
arrangements can be simply categorized as trade and financial integration accords or
more generally as economic integration agreements. With these trends set to continue
it is important to further evaluate the effects of integration on economic activities.
Often times, economic integration is associated with increased export diversity.
However, the first essay shows that this is not always the case, and that whether
integration leads to export diversity depends on each EIA type in part. This essay
contributes to the international trade literature in two major ways. (i) It develops
a theoretical framework in which, aside from trade costs, the EIAs’ effects on the
diversification pattern of bilateral exports are also shaped by horizontal foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) costs. In turn, the model yields two testable predictions. On
one hand, if the decline in investment costs exceeds the drop in trade costs, the EIA
under scrutiny should induce bilateral export concentration rather than diversifica-
1The count of trade agreements and currency unions are based on the Regional Trade Agreements
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tion. Deeper integration agreements such as the formation of economic and monetary
unions should square well with this description. For example, the European Economic
and Monetary Union (i.e., the Eurozone) has been found to reduce horizontal FDI
costs relatively more. On the other hand, EIAs which engender a relatively larger
reduction in trade costs should lead to a diversification of export flows. Shallow in-
tegration accords such as free trade agreements are most likely to fit this depiction.
This key theoretical insight should not be at all surprising given that, more often than
not, horizontal FDI is regarded as a substitute for trade. But despite this, horizontal
FDI costs as a potential determinant of export diversification has been overlooked by
previous studies. (ii) Guided by the theoretical insights, the first essay also shows
that the Eurozone formation had a negative effect on bilateral export diversification.
Specifically, exports between Eurozone members are, on average, more concentrated
than similar flows between countries which do not share the euro. Conversely, joint
membership within regional trade agreements leads to more diverse exports. This
evidence suggests that export diversification responds differently to each EIA type
and that a case-by-case evaluation of EIAs goes a long way in accurately assessing
their effects on the diversity of trade. To the best of my knowledge, this represents
the only study which quantifies the effect of joining the Eurozone on bilateral export
diversification.
The second essay seeks to evaluate the potential competitiveness effects of in-
ternational environmental agreements (IEAs). The adoption of IEAs by national
governments started to gain momentum during the early 1970s. However, the envi-
ronmental policies pursued post-ratification are often publicized as sources of addi-
tional production costs (e.g., investment expenditures with energy efficient machinery,
acquisition of filters, or adjustment of production processes) and comparative disad-
vantage. Moreover, the classic theory of trade postulates that nations specialize in the
production and exportation of goods at which they have comparative advantage. The
scenario in which trade classics are correct coupled with that in which environmental
regulation is a source of comparative disadvantage lie at the heart of the arguments
linking IEAs with losses of international competitiveness. This kind of logic was in-
voked numerous times throughout the recent past. In fact, the arguments made by
the United States for not adopting the Kyoto protocol, or by Canada to back out of it,
were based on this very idea. The second essay evaluates this reasoning by estimating
the effect of IEAs adoption on industry-level exports. This analysis differs, however,
from those in other studies along two important margins. (i) The focus is placed onto
the count of adopted IEAs as a measure of a country’s environmental commitment.
This way, thirteen air pollution IEAs spanning three major categories (i.e., climate
change, acid rain, and ozone depletion) are investigated. (ii) The present work con-
siderably expands the data universe of previous studies to 163 nations and 36 years,
1976-2011.
In doing so, a number of potentially interesting results are revealed. These are
broadly summarized in three points. First, the ratification of IEAs is found to be
and Currency Unions Datasets constructed by José de Sousa (de Sousa, 2012).
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a relatively large source of comparative disadvantage for pollution-intensive sectors.
Second, different types of IEAs are found to bring about composition and/or scale
effects2. For example, climate change IEAs involve a strong export composition effect.
This kind of IEAs (i.e., the Kyoto protocol) is found to be a rather modest source of
comparative disadvantage for pollution-intensive industries but a notable source of
comparative advantage for their least polluting peers. Acid rain and ozone depletion
IEAs appear to entail export scale effects. In this regard, acid rain IEAs show up
as a large source of comparative disadvantage for pollution-intensive industries. It is
not clear whether they harm or benefit the least pollution-intensive sectors. Ozone
depletion IEAs are found to generate even larger effects. Last but not least, only
climate change and acid rain IEAs are found to engender "leakage"3 effects. Evidence
of "leakage" is not found with regards to ozone depletion IEAs. This very last set of
results is in line with the international trade rules aimed at reducing "leakage" and
included within the ozone depletion accords.
The third essay assesses the effect of the Kyoto protocol on the carbon content of
exports. World trade has been growing at unprecedented pace over the past 65 years
but, with it, so did the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions embodied in exports and
import flows. Potentially worrisome, these gains are found to be rather large and to
increase rapidly (Hertwich and Peters, 2008a; Peters et al., 2011; Sato, 2012). On a
related note, the Kyoto protocol is an IEA designed to tackle GHG emissions with the
end objective of limiting and reversing climate change. As part of the accord some
parties took on quantitative emission reduction or limitation commitments (QERLCs)
and pledged to meet these targets by the end of 2012. The third essay evaluates the
effect of adopting Kyoto QERLCs on the carbon dioxide (CO2) content of exports.
It also evaluates the commitment effect on exports and their CO2 intensity. This
work complements the literature on the Kyoto protocol and the carbon content of
bilateral trade in several ways. (i) It extends the scope of Aichele and Felbermayr
(2015) by using the relatively new EORA26 dataset. This way, the effect of Kyoto
commitment on the carbon content of exports is estimated in a sample comprising
149 nations, observed between 1995 and 2012. It is worth mentioning that Aichele
and Felbermayr (2015) benefit from a sample comprising only 40 countries during
the 1995-2007 period. The inclusion of the 2008-2012 time frame is of paramount
importance as the QERLCs become legally binding during this time span. Also,
any long-run effects are most likely masked by disregarding this time window. (ii)
A year-by-year analysis is used to evaluate any adjustments that may prevail post-
ratification. (iii) It investigates whether the outcomes of interest (i.e., carbon content
of exports, exports, and the CO2 intensity of exports) are determined by the QERLC
type or by whether a party undergoes the process to transition to a market economy.
The analysis of QERLC type gains even more importance as parties have committed
2The composition effect refers to changes in the export bundle brought about by the adoption
of IEAs (e.g., exports from "clean" industries increase whereas those from "dirty" sectors decline).
The scale effect refers to the changes (increase/decrease) in overall level of exports.
3"Leakage" refers to the situation in which an environmentally committed jurisdiction increases
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to future targets that are to be met by 2020. On a secondary note, this work also
adds to the literature on IEAs and their competitiveness effects.
The expansion of the data universe leads to a series of novel and interesting re-
sults. First, the inclusion of the 2008-2012 time frame brings to light a significant
and positive effect of Kyoto commitment on export flows. Meanwhile, the effect re-
covered by disregarding this time period is virtually null. Furthermore, both the CO2
intensity of exports and the carbon content of exports are found to decrease notably
for committed parties. This set of results points out to an export "clean-up" effect
that is attributable to the Kyoto protocol. Second, the time series analysis brings
into view an export adjustment process that prevails throughout the post-ratification
period. Specifically, exports are found to decline during the first three years, only to
rebound thereafter. Of potential importance to policy-makers, this finding suggests
that committing under the Kyoto protocol entails only a short spell of competitive-
ness loss. The CO2 intensity of exports and the carbon content of exports, on the
other hand, are found to decrease continuously after ratification. Third, the ratifica-
tion effect on the outcomes of interest is larger for parties which pledged to reduce
emissions. Additionally, and contrary to prior beliefs, the final set of results suggest
that the transition economies significantly reduced both the CO2 intensity and the
carbon content of their exports.
Copyright© Mihai Paraschiv, 2016.
its imports of pollution-intensive wares.
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Chapter 2 Economic Integration and Bilateral Export Concentration:
The Case of the Eurozone
2.1 Introduction
Do economic integration agreements (EIAs) always foster bilateral1 export diver-
sification? As this paper will show, the answer is ’it depends on each EIA type’.
To the best of my knowledge there exists only one other study Regolo (2013) which
documents the connection between economic integration and bilateral export diver-
sification both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, she finds that exporter-
importer economic integration is positively associated with bilateral export diversity.
However, this finding is to some extent incomplete. Theoretically, this is due to the
omission of horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) costs as determinants of export
diversification. Empirically, the finding originates in the use of an aggregate bilateral
integration measure2 which implies that all EIAs have the same effect on bilateral
export diversification. Ultimately, this ends up masking important dynamics con-
cerning the concentration pattern of bilateral commerce flows. In this regard, I show
that economic integration in the form of regional trade agreements (RTAs) fosters
export diversification, just as in Regolo (2013). However, the formation of economic
and monetary unions such as the Eurozone (EZ)3 accomplishes the opposite.
I start by theoretically documenting that the effect of international EIAs on bilat-
eral export concentration is a function of not only trade Regolo (2013) but horizontal
FDI costs as well. In this context, an EIA which leads to a relative drop in trade
costs should promote bilateral export diversification. At the same time, the exact
opposite is true for an EIA which entails a relative decline in horizontal FDI costs4.
As a consequence, each EIA may have a different impact on the diversification pat-
tern of bilateral exports. Although novel, this key theoretical insight should not be
at all surprising given that horizontal FDI is often regarded as a substitute for trade
(Brainard, 1997; Yeaple, 2003; Helpman, 2006). Despite this, horizontal FDI costs
as potential determinants of export diversification have been overlooked by previous
1The term "bilateral" is key in differentiating the current work from the rest of the literature.
Most of the work regarding the link between economic integration and export diversification has been
focusing on a "country year" instead of a "country-pair year" analysis. The current study is aimed
at filling this gap. Note that studies on the intensive or extensive margins of trade can also be seen
as inquiries into bilateral trade concentration/diversification. The current work and that of Regolo
(2013) differ from these in that the dependent variable is an index of bilateral export concentration
which simultaneously comprises both the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
2This variable ranges from 0 to 6 and represents a collection of EIAs. Level 0 signals no inte-
gration whatsoever whereas level 6 denotes participation in economic and monetary unions; in this
case the Eurozone.
3European Economic and Monetary Union, adopting the euro, Eurozone or simply EZ are used
interchangeably throughout
4See Flam (2009); Coeurdacier et al. (2009)) for empirical evidence regarding such asymmetries.
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studies.
According to the theoretical model developed in this paper, an EIA which gener-
ates a relatively larger decline in horizontal FDI costs should induce bilateral export
concentration; not diversification. One economic integration agreement that seems to
fit this profile is the European Economic and Monetary Union. Studies by Petroulas
(2006); Schiavo (2007); Dinga and Dingova (2011); de Sousa and Lochard (2011) em-
phasize a positive and statistically significant impact of adopting the euro on intra-
Eurozone FDI flows5. Moreover, Coeurdacier et al. (2009) uncover a sizable, positive,
and statistically significant effect of switching to the euro on bilateral horizontal FDI
flows. These estimates are substantially larger than those found within studies aimed
at quantifying the Eurozone effect on bilateral trade (Flam, 2009). A possible ex-
planation for these findings is that joining the Eurozone generated a relatively larger
drop in horizontal FDI costs as opposed to trade costs. If this is the case, does joining
the Eurozone lead to bilateral export concentration; as the theoretical model points
out?
The current work answers the above question by using the recently updated Eco-
nomic Integration Agreement Dataset; a newer version of the one used in Regolo
(2013)6. Empirically, I find that the European Economic and Monetary Union had a
positive effect on bilateral export concentration. Specifically, exports between Euro-
zone members are on average 4.2%-7.5% more concentrated than those among coun-
tries which do not share the euro. Conversely, joint membership within regional trade
agreements leads to more diverse exports. This evidence suggests that bilateral ex-
port concentration responds differently to the EIA type under consideration, and that
a separate assessment of EIAs goes a long way in accurately assessing their impact
on export concentration patterns.
The present work adds to the international trade literature in two major ways.
First, to the best of my knowledge, this represents the only study which quantifies
the effect of joining the Eurozone on bilateral export concentration. Contrary to the
common belief that economic integration stimulates export diversity, the current es-
say finds that joint Eurozone participation accomplishes the exact opposite. Second,
I theoretically show that, in addition to trade costs the concentration of bilateral
exports also depends on horizontal FDI costs. In this regard, the empirical results
discussed above can be explained by the substitutability between exports and hori-
zontal FDI as means of serving foreign markets. I am not aware of any other work
that considers this trade-off when analyzing export concentration patterns. Along
these lines, EIAs which lead to a relatively larger drop in horizontal investment costs,
such as the European Economic and Monetary Union, are expected to generate ex-
port concentration. The empirical and theoretical results outlined above complement
the study of Regolo (2013). Specifically, these suggest that EIAs should be consid-
ered separately, rather than bundled, when assessing their effect on bilateral export
concentration and that bilateral export concentration is a function of both trade and
5These studies do not distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI.
6This dataset is assembled by Jeffrey Bergstrand as part of the NSF-Kellogg Institute Database
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horizontal FDI costs.
Analyzing how EIAs shape export concentration patterns is important for several
reasons. Nations are becoming more integrated from an economic perspective and
this pace has accelerated during the past two decades7. Since 1999, when the first 11
European Union (EU) members adopted the euro, an additional 8 countries joined
the economic and monetary union and others are likely to follow in the near future.
The primary goals of these transnational arrangements are underlined by reductions
in both international trade and investment costs. In the light of the above, there is no
doubt that national economies have become more integrated over the past 20 years.
And, with these trends set to continue, it is of prime importance to further scrutinize
the effects of integration on economic activity. The importance of diversification
has been emphasized by the modern portfolio theory and is nested within the idea
that "placing all eggs into one basket is risky". Economists and policymakers alike
adopted the idea in order to emphasize the benefits of a diversified export base.
Evidence linking export concentration with lower growth prospects and increased
output volatility is discussed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Cadot et al. (2013).
According to Samen (2010), employment, price stability, capital flows and foreign
exchange reserves may also be adversely affected by the lack of export diversification.
A United Nations Development Programme (2011) report identifies trade links as the
primary shock propagation channel with the degree of export concentration governing
its amplitude. From this perspective, export diversification should be regarded as a
defensive buffer against such imbalances. A concentrated export structure would
accomplish the exact opposite Haddad et al. (2013). The topic has even deeper
implications for the Eurozone as a whole, mainly due to its design. Should members be
asymmetrically exposed to economic shocks, the European Central Bank’s monetary
policy would be significantly harder if not impossible to implement on an equitable
and equidistant basis.
Traditionally, the connection between economic integration and export concentra-
tion has been analyzed at the country rather than country-pair level. Rose and Engel
(2002) analyzed the connection between common currencies and country-level export
concentration and concluded that members of currency unions are not more special-
ized in comparison to non-members. Since their dataset spans the period between
1970 and 1995 no inferences can be made with regards to the Eurozone. Furthermore,
Agosin et al. (2012) underline economic remoteness, trade openness and distance as
key determinants of export concentration. Using trade-weighted tariffs as a measure
of trade integration between Canada and the U.S., Beine and Coulombe (2007) un-
cover an inverse relationship between trade costs and export diversification. Making
use of a similar approach, Crabbe and Beine (2009) reach a rather different conclusion
on Economic Integration Agreements Project and available at www3.nd.edu/ jbergstr/ The dataset
was updated on September 30th, 2015 to include the 2006-2012 period. It was previously available
for the 1950-2005 interval. A complete description of this dataset is provided in section A.1.2.
7Between 1958 and 2015, 263 international trade agreements have entered into force. 83% of
these have been implemented since 1995. Even more bilateral investment agreements were enforced
over the same period. Out of the 2,270 agreements that entered into force, 90% did so during
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when investigating a set of Central and Eastern European nations between 1989 and
2000. More specifically, a 1% decline in tariffs is linked with a 1.3% increase in export
concentration in the long run. In contrast, this paper studies the effect of EIAs on
export concentration at the country-pair rather than country level. This is important
because trade is a bilateral rather than a unilateral process for which country-pair
and importer characteristics matter just as much as those of the exporter. Under-
standing the overall export concentration/diversification pattern of a nation requires
knowledge about the concentration/diversification of its bilateral exports.
Other studies have focused on export diversification as defined by variations of
the intensive or extensive trade margins. Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008) analyze
the topic of diversification by decomposing trade flows into combinations of new/old
products and new/old destination markets. Along these dimensions, trade activity
seems to be notably shaped by trade costs and destination’s market size. Beverelli
et al. (2015) provide similar results by emphasizing that trade facilitation exhibits a
positive effect on the extensive margin of trade and thus on diversification. Follow-
ing a similar methodology, Dennis and Shepherd (2011) reach comparable results8.
According to their findings, export diversification is influenced negatively by market
entry costs, exporting fixed costs, and distance. Conversely, sectoral demand and
supply capacities as well as per capita GDP within the origin and destination coun-
tries positively affect the diversity of outflows. More specifically, they found that a
reduction of exporting costs by 10% leads to 3-4% more diverse exports. The direc-
tion of this effect is also in line with the findings of Cadot et al. (2013) who survey a
positive link between trade liberalization and export diversification. This paper how-
ever focuses on concentration indexes9 as opposed to either the intensive or extensive
margin of trade, as the primary objective consists in analyzing overall diversification
patterns. From a definitional perspective, bilateral concentration indexes combine
the two margins and offer a more complete picture on the concentration pattern of
bilateral exports. Disentangling the effect of economic integration on export diver-
sification becomes even more important in the light of Baier et al. (2014) and Soete
and Van Hove (2015). Both studies emphasize an asymmetric effect of EIAs on the
extensive and intensive margin of trade.
The current essay consists of a theoretical section and its empirical application.
Specifically, section 2.2 introduces a theoretical model of bilateral export diversifi-
cation in the presence of economic integration. The data, empirical methodology,
and the results are shown in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is aimed at demonstrating the
robustness of these findings while section 2.5 concludes.
or after 1995 (UNCTAD IIA database; http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA). In 1958, the
number of countries sharing a common currency stood at 120. This dropped to 68 by 1983, remained
unchanged for the next two decades only to start rising since 1999, when the euro was first introduced.
Information on bilateral trade agreements and joint currency union membership were obtained from
Jose de Sousa’s website (http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm).
8This study also considers a Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, but does so very briefly.
9A consensus on how to accurately measure export concentration has not yet been reached.
In order to mitigate this issue Hirschmann-Herfindahl, Theil, and Gini indexes of bilateral export
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2.2 Theoretical Framework: Economic Integration, Exporting, and Hor-
izontal FDI
In what follows, a theoretical model of bilateral export concentration is introduced.
The purpose of this framework is to place more structure on the link between eco-
nomic integration and concentration of bilateral trade flows. This is accomplished by
emphasizing the substitutability between exports and horizontal foreign direct invest-
ment as means of serving external markets10. The starting point is the premise that
economic integration agreements are likely to lower both trade and horizontal cross
border investment costs11. This aspect is important because, as shown throughout, a
drop in the two cost categories can generate opposite effects on export concentration
patterns. Along these lines, an integration agreement which leads to a larger drop in
horizontal FDI costs relative to trade costs is expected to entail more concentrated
exporter-importer trade flows. Conversely, a larger drop in trade costs is expected
to foster export diversification. The theoretical contribution therefore consists in
showing that bilateral concentration is a function of not only trade but horizontal
FDI costs as well. The proximity-concentration trade-off is then used to explain the
impact of economic integration on bilateral export concentration.
In setting up the model I draw on the work of Krugman (1980) and Markusen
and Venables (2000). I start by considering two symmetric countries Home (H ) and
Foreign (F). Additionally, there are two industrial sectors which are assumed to only
differ in trade costs (τ) and the fraction of exporting firms (γ). More specifically,
I distinguish between sectors characterized by low and high trade costs. Horizontal
FDI costs (f) are incorporated in the model such that γ(τ, f)12. Without the loss of
generality, the fraction of exporting firms in the low-τ sector (γl) is assumed to be
113,14. Each sector’s output is characterized by one differentiated good that is being
produced in n varieties using a single factor of production, labor. As it is common
for this type of models, within each sector s, each firm produces one unique variety, i.
The array of sectoral characteristics introduced above will ultimately determine how
the typical firm in each sector decides to serve foreign consumers. On one hand, by
engaging in horizontal FDI a firm may duplicate its production activities in a foreign
country by incurring a set of fixed costs. Since exporting is a costly activity, this
strategy allows the multinational firm to avoid any trade related costs. On the other
hand, firms can choose to supply foreign markets by exporting. In this case, the firm
is bound to incur the trade costs mentioned above.
concentration are considered. Of course, many other indexes are available but these are the most
common. For a survey on concentration/diversification indexes see Palan (2010).
10In the literature, this is also known as the proximity-concentration trade-off.
11A significant amount of evidence exists in this regard and part of it is discussed in section 2.3.1.
12 ∂γ
∂τ < 0 and
∂γ
∂f > 0. Allowing the fraction of exporting firms to depend on trade and horizontal
FDI costs, by explicitly accounting for the latter, is one of the main differences between the current
theoretical framework and that of Markusen and Venables (2000).
13Parameters associated with the low trade cost sector are denoted by subscript l whereas those
pertaining to the high trade cost sector are marked by subscript h, respectively.
14Trade costs in the low-τ sector are assumed to be low enough such that every firm in this sector
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In the light of the above, the model yields two predictions, both with profound
implications regarding the concentration pattern of trade flows between H and F 15.
First, as trade costs between H and F drop, more firms in the high-τ sector will seek
to engage in exporting activities. As a result, the share of this particular sector in
total exports will rise relative to that of its counterpart. Given that exports within the
high-τ sector are relatively low to begin with, this dynamic will lead to a convergence
in export shares and, as a result, a more diverse export basket. Second, as horizontal
FDI costs drop, the incentive for firms within the high-τ sector to serve external
markets this way will increase, while exporting becomes less desirable. Ultimately,
this is equivalent to lower sectoral exports and a divergence in sectoral export shares.
As a direct consequence, exports flowing from H to F are expected to become more
concentrated overall. The decision about how individual firms serve domestic and
foreign markets (e.g. exporting or horizontal FDI) is outlined by solving the demand
and supply side optimization problems.
2.2.1 Preferences
As it is common, the demand side is underlined by consumers with identical pref-
erences. More specifically, it is represented by a standard upper-tier Cobb-Douglas
utility function and a Dixit-Stiglitz, constant elasticity of substitution, sub-utility
function. Without the loss of generality, total expenditure shares allotted for each of
the two sectors are set at 12 . The consumer ends up solving the constrained maxi-
mization problem in (2.1) by choosing among a set of varieties i = 1, n in each sector
s = {l, h}. Intuitively, qi,s represents the quantity of variety i manufactured in sector
s whereas pi,s denotes its price. Moreover, given that H and F are symmetric, the
































By solving the above for either H and F, the optimal consumption bundle of any
given variety (i,s) is shown in (2.2). Here, Ps represents the "ideal" price index and
can be regarded as the average price across all varieties produced in sector s and







is engaged in exporting activities. For the same reason γl does not respond to changes in horizontal
FDI costs (i.e., ∂γl∂f = 0).
15For clarity purposes and without the loss of generality, exports are considered to flow from
Home to Foreign and so are horizontal investments. In this regard, trade costs refer to the cost of
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For instance, F ’s optimal demand for any domestically produced variety (i,s) is
denoted by (2.3)16. The price index is detailed in (2.4) where γHs represents the
fraction of exporting firms within H ’s sector s. nFs = nHs = n represent H ’s and F ’s
total number of firms activating within sector s. Similarly, the very same demand
function holds for F ’s imported varieties (qH,Fi,s ) with only one difference; the price






















The production side is characterized by increasing returns to scale within a mo-
nopolistic competition framework as in Krugman (1980). The total cost function
for any variety (i,s) is depicted in (2.5)17. Since the model distinguishes between
multinationals and exporters, the cost function is discussed separately for each firm
type.
wli,s = w(αi,s + φif) + wβτsqi,s (2.5)
According to (2.5), the marginal production cost faced by the multinational firm
is given by wHβH , for those plants located in H, and wFβF , for those situated in F.
However, since H and F are assumed to be symmetric in wages and technology the
marginal cost can be rewritten as wβ. This is because multinationals do not engage
in any exporting activities and therefore τs = τH,Hs = τF,Fs = 1. In other words,
multinationals are not incurring any trade costs. However, the multinational firm
experiences additional fixed costs generated by setting up and operating a secondary
production plant abroad. For those headquartered in H, this is represented by fH,F .
Each firm is assumed to offset the cost of engaging in horizontal FDI differently ac-
cording to the firm-specific parameter φi ∈ (0, 1]. For exporters, goods manufactured
in H and shipped to F are subject to iceberg trade costs, τs = τH,Fs > 1. As a result,
the marginal cost faced by an exporter located in H is given by wβτH,Fs .
Pricing by applying a constant mark-up over the marginal cost represents a key
feature of models based upon monopolistic competition and CES preferences. In this
exporting from H to F. Similarly, horizontal investment costs denote the costs incurred by a firm in
H in order to set up and maintain production in F. This aspect is also important for the empirical
and theoretical sections which make use of unidirectional export flows.
16Single superscripts are intuitive as they denote country specific variables. Double superscripts
such as H,F are aimed at emphasizing the idea of direction. For example, one should read pH,Fi,s as
the price of variety i from sector s that is manufactured in H and sold/consumed in F. Similarly pF,Fi,s
should read as the price of variety i in sector s that is manufactured in F and sold/consumed in F.
17Here w, α and β represent the wage, fixed cost and marginal cost of production whereas φi is
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2.2.3 Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment or Exporting?
Based on the discussion in subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, calculating the profit stream
faced by a multinational firm is intuitive and the result is shown in (2.7). More
specifically, this is obtained by summing up the profits generated from producing and
supplying variety (i,s) locally, in both H and F. Applying a similar rationale, the





























F − wHαHi,s (2.8)
Intuitively, exporter’s profits depend on the relative price of a given variety (i,s),
the expenditure on sector s goods in each of the domestic and foreign markets, trade
costs between H and F, wages in H, and the fixed cost of production (αi,s). In addition
to the above, profits for the multinational firm are defined by wages in F, the fixed
costs of establishing a plant in F (fH,F ), and the firm’s capacity to offset these costs
(φi). It is worth noting that the profits of the multinational firm are independent
of trade costs. In order to decide which strategy to pursue, exporting or horizontal
foreign direct investment, a firm compares the payoffs introduced previously. By
subtracting (2.8) from (2.7) and rearranging, the firm will decide in favor of horizontal
FDI as long as:
ΠFDIi,s − ΠXi,s = 1−
(
τH,Fs











firm i’s capacity to offset the horizontal FDI costs.







wβ for those goods produced
and sold in H and F respectively. Despite being equal, I keep distinguishing between these prices




wβτH,Fs for each variety exported to F.
19Recall that H and F are symmetric in wages and technology and for that matter wH = wF = w,
βH = βF = β and αHi,s = αFi,s = αi,s. I distinguish between country-specific variables for clarity and
exposition purposes.
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The decision rule depicted in (2.9) is fairly intuitive and similar to the one which
could be derived using the payoff functions presented in Markusen and Venables
(2000). However, when compared to their profit functions, the explicit inclusion of

































1−σ]− φi < 0 (2.11)
where,
z1 =
(σ − 1) 12Y F
σ τH,Fs P Fs
1−σ z2 =
(σ − 1) 12Y F
σ fH,F P Fs
1−σ
The partial derivatives of the profit wedge with respect to trade costs and the cost
of engaging in horizontal FDI are shown in (2.10) and (2.11)20 where both z1 and z2
are positive. Intuitively, a drop in cross-border investment costs will incentivize firms
to engage in horizontal foreign direct investment. Similarly, as trade costs decrease,
firms will seek to engage in exporting activities as means of serving foreign markets.
2.2.4 Economic Integration and Bilateral Export Concentration
Recall that the aim of the current work is to scrutinize how economic integration
affects the concentration of bilateral trade flows. Whether or not export flows from
H to F are becoming more concentrated or more diversified is measured through
a normalized Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (henceforth HHI)21. For the two sector
model, the index is given by (2.12) where sH,Fs represents the share of industrial
sector s={l, h} in total exports from H to F, and is computed as shown in (2.13).
Each sector is modeled as discussed in (2.1) through (2.11).
HHIH,F =
√











20Given that σ>1 both inequalities are holding with strict inequality as long as pH,Hs ≤ pF,Fs ≤
pH,Hs τ
H,F
s . This latter condition is easily satisfied since pH,Hs = pF,Fs and τH,Fs > 1. As discussed










21As opposed to the usual Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, the normalized version is constructed
such that its values lie between 0 and 1. When the index records a value of 0 the export shares are
equally distributed among sectors. Conversely, a value of 1 indicates that outflows are accounted by
only one sector.
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Considering equations (2.7) and (2.8), in the context of economic integration two
types of dynamics are emerging. First, as trade costs between the two countries drop,
firms will seek to serve foreign markets through exporting rather than cross-border
horizontal investing. In turn, holding everything else constant, this is expected to
generate bilateral export diversification. Second, as costs of engaging in horizontal
FDI decrease, the payoff of serving external markets this way increases while exporting
becomes less desirable. Furthermore, this should lead to more concentrated bilateral
exports. Although it has been touted as having little to no theoretical basis (Dennis
and Shepherd, 2011) the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index performs well in explaining
diversification patterns, under one assumption: the two sectors are assumed to be
heterogeneous in trade costs and as a consequence the sector with lower trade costs
accounts for a larger share in total exports. Under these conditions, all that is needed
for the index to underline diversification is a convergence in export shares. Conversely,
a divergence in export shares leads to concentration of outflows. Overall, export
diversification is about whether other sectors can catch up with the ones at the top.
Proposition 1. Export flows between H and F will become less concentrated as




Proof: See section A.1.1 of the appendix.
To form an idea about how trade liberalization22 affects the concentration of bi-
lateral trade flows, it is important to recognize that the two sectors (e.g. low-τ and
high-τ) are impacted differently. This asymmetric effect is generated by existing dif-
ferences in sectoral trade costs. Equally important is how the fraction of exporters in
each sector responds to changes in trade costs. Provided the model assumptions23,
it is sensible to acknowledge that a drop in trade costs will increase the fraction of
exporting firms in the sector characterized by high trade costs. At the same time,
the fraction of exporting firms within the low-τ sector will remain unaffected. As
a consequence, exports originating in high-τ sector are expected to grow relatively
more. This way, the associated export shares of the two sectors will converge, leading
to increased diversification of exports and a drop in the HHI.
Proposition 2. Export flows between H and F will become more concentrated
as horizontal foreign direct investment costs between the two countries, fH,F , are
22Trade liberalization represents an important part of the economic integration process. Here,













Proof: See section A.1.1 of the appendix.
Another consequence of economic integration is represented by lower horizontal
FDI costs between H and F (fH,F ). Just like the drop in trade costs, this dynamic
also has the potential of altering the concentration of bilateral trade flows as the two
types of sectors are likely to respond differently to a change in foreign investment costs.
Firms within the high-τ sector will be inclined to substitute exporting activities with
horizontal FDI, just as (2.10) predicts. Also, recall that the drop in foreign investment
costs has no impact on those firms operating in the low-τ sector, provided that these
costs are sufficiently low such that exporting is still regarded as the profitable choice.
This leads to reduced exports within the high-τ industry and thus a lower sectoral
share in total exports. Combined, these two dynamics entail a divergence in sectoral
export shares, and in turn an increased index of bilateral export concentration.





































Horizontal FDI costs = 1000; Trade Costs = 4
Horizontal FDI costs = 1000; Trade Costs = 1.5
Figure 2.1: FDI vs. Exporting Decision: The Model Prediction
Summarizing, if an economic integration agreement leads to lower horizontal FDI
costs relative to those of engaging in trade, firms in the high-τ sector will be inclined
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to substitute exporting activities with cross border investment as means of serving
external markets. This shift entails lower exports and a reduced share of this par-
ticular industry in total exports. This implies a divergence in sectoral export shares
and, in turn, a larger concentration of bilateral exports. As shown in figure 2.1, the
same dynamics prevail even if horizontal FDI and trade are dropping by the same
magnitude. Naturally, the incentive to serve foreign nations by engaging in horizontal
FDI is larger for those firms within the high-τ industry. This is also depicted in figure
2.4 of the appendix.
This very aspect is at odds with the findings of Regolo (2013) who, empirically,
uncovers a negative effect of economic integration on bilateral export concentration.
However, the empirical support for these findings may be the result of how economic
integration was accounted for. Specifically, the aggregated nature of the integration
measure24 has the potential of masking important dynamics of export concentration
patterns within an economic and monetary union, such as the Eurozone. As a take-
away, the effect of economic integration agreements on export diversification should
be assessed individually rather than as a sum.
2.3 Empirical Application: The Case of the Eurozone
2.3.1 Trade and FDI Costs within the Eurozone and European Union
The overarching theme of the two propositions outlined in section 2.2.4 is that
economic integration may not always foster bilateral export diversification. Just as
easy, it can entail trade concentration. As noted previously, the ambiguity originates
within the asymmetric effect that each EIA may have on horizontal FDI and interna-
tional commerce costs at sectoral level. EIAs such as preferential trade agreements,
free trade agreements or customs unions are by design aimed at lowering and/or elim-
inating trade costs. Similarly, common markets such as the European Union (EU) are
also contributing to a significant reduction in trade costs and are therefore expected
to foster export diversification. Although it contributed to a drop in investment costs
as well, the EU effect on FDI seems to have been propagated along the vertical margin
Coeurdacier et al. (2009). Since this type of FDI acts as a complement for trade, one
can expect membership in the EU (and other similar EIAs) to be accompanied by
higher levels of export diversification. Conversely, joining the Eurozone seems to have
lowered trade and FDI costs as well. However, it seems that the reduction in FDI
costs is much larger and concentrated along the horizontal margin Coeurdacier et al.
(2009). At the same time, there are reasons to believe that the reductions in trade
costs are small, and concentrated in a fraction of industries25. The current section
proceeds by discussing the empirical evidence on how economic integration impacted
FDI and trade across Europe. The focus is placed on why joining the Eurozone might
have contributed to a relatively larger drop in horizontal FDI costs.
24For more details consult section A.1.2 within the data appendix.
25Regarding the asymmetric Eurozone effect on sectoral-level trade see Flam and Nordstrom
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Adhering to the Eurozone is conditional on satisfying the convergence criteria
specified in the Maastricht Treaty. These emphasize exchange rate and price stability
as well as tractable budget deficits and national debt caps26. Members’ commitment
to these requirements represents a strong signal regarding international cooperation
and macroeconomic stability. In turn, this may have the potential of stimulating
investors’ confidence and thus intra-Eurozone FDI flows. Reductions in FDI costs are
believed to be carried out through a series of channels such as harmonization of mon-
etary policies, elimination of exchange rate volatility, increased price transparency,
integration of banking and payment systems as well as that of the financial system in
general27. The positive impact of adopting euro on financial integration has also been
documented by Lane (2006); Lane and Wälti (2006). Although episodes of relative
currency depreciation in the host country have been shown to foster FDI inflows, the
literature on exchange rates and FDI does not provide a clear consensus in this regard
(Kiyota and Urata, 2004). Dinga and Dingova (2011) find no significant effect of short
term volatility on FDI. However, they find that the impact of long term volatility is
economically large, negative, and significant28. Additionally, FDI is found to be in-
versely linked with other types of uncertainty, such as that related to interest rates
and inflation (Carruth et al., 2000). As shown in figures 2.2 and 2.3, these two series
remained relatively stable after the introduction of the euro in 199929. These devel-
opments may have had the potential of rendering investments which were previously
risky as feasible ex-post. Furthermore, increased price transparency may have facil-
itated factor price comparisons thus enhancing the process of decision making with
regards to cross border investment. Empirical evidence regarding the positive effect
of adopting the euro on intra-Eurozone FDI activity has been uncovered by Petroulas
(2006); Schiavo (2007); Dinga and Dingova (2011); de Sousa and Lochard (2011). It
is important to note that the above studies do not distinguish between vertical and
horizontal FDI. However, the literature emphasizes that the bulk of foreign direct
investments is horizontal in nature Flam (2009).
Not only horizontal FDI costs were affected by joining the Eurozone but also the
costs of engaging in exporting activities. The reduction in trade costs is believed to
stem primarily from the removal of exchange rate volatility, which inevitably generates
hedging and other related costs. However, there are reasons to believe that trade costs
were marginally affected at best. Before joining the Eurozone, nine out of the initial
(2006); De Nardis et al. (2008); Di Nino (2009); Badinger and Türkcan (2014).
26More details can be found within Article 121(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity.
27For example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) emphasize that joining the Eurozone promoted finan-
cial integration among members through elimination of foreign exchange market risks and legislative
harmonization.
28Short term volatility is defined as the variance in the ratio of real effective exchange rate indices
over a 2 year period. Long term volatility is defined by the variance of the same ratio over a 5 year
period.
29The pattern vanished for interest rates with the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in
early 2010. Since the latest year available within the dataset is 2011, this aspect is not expected to
significantly affect the empirical analysis.
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eleven signatory nations were part of the European Monetary System (EMS)30 or had
their currency pegged to the Deutsche Mark or the European Currency Unit (ECU).
Given its mechanics, this program significantly dampened exchange rate volatility.
Also, there are no solid reasons to believe that hedging opportunities were scarce,
inexistent or extremely costly for exporters across the European space. Besides, ex-
change rate fluctuations can also be managed through contractual terms; a feasible
alternative given the European institutional framework. Citing the Commission of
European Communities, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) note that the costs associated
with currency conversion in Europe are small and hover in the vicinity of 0.5%-1% of
EU’s GDP. Moreover, there seems to be a considerable amount of evidence empha-
sizing little to no impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows. First, Tenreyro
(2007) finds that nominal exchange rate volatility, which the Eurozone completely
eliminates, exhibits no noticeable effect on trade. Broda and Romalis (2011) find
evidence of a negligible effect of exchange rate volatility on trade in differentiated
goods31. A study by (Berger and Nitsch, 2008) emphasizes no effect of joining the
Eurozone on trade whatsoever while others, Micco et al. (2003); Faruqee (2004); Bald-
win and Taglioni (2006); Bun and Klaassen (2007); Baldwin et al. (2008); Brouwer
et al. (2008); Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)32 uncover positive but small effects at
best. In the light of this evidence, Eurozone participation is expected to affect trade
only slightly.
Surveying both literature strands, Flam (2009) provides evidence of a relatively
larger Eurozone effect on bilateral FDI. On aggregate, the effect of European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union on intra-Eurozone FDI has been found to situate between
16% and 200%. At the same time, the effect on bilateral trade was concluded to lay
between 10% and 30%. Based on this evidence, the Eurozone seems to have promoted
bilateral FDI more than trade. It is also important to note that joint membership in
the EU also affects bilateral FDI as well as trade flows33. However, Coeurdacier et al.
(2009) emphasize a key difference between the EU and the Eurozone effects on bilat-
eral FDI activity. Using sectoral data on mergers and acquisitions they estimate that
joint EU membership promoted more investment across sectors whereas the Eurozone
stimulated investment within sectors34. Much of the same results are uncovered by
Herger and McCorriston (2014). This evidence lines up well with the theory on verti-
30EMS required participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This was designed to
limit exchange rate volatility against the European Currency Unit (ECU) which was defined by
a basket of participating members’ currencies. ERM specified upper and lower bands in which
partaking currencies were allowed to fluctuate relative to the ECU. National Central Banks were
then committed to keep their currencies within the specified interval. See De Grauwe (2012). After
1999 the ERM was replaced with ERM II and the ECU was replaced with the euro. Prospective
countries are now required to take part in ERM II for at least two years prior to joining the Eurozone.
31"A doubling of real exchange rate volatility reduces trade in differentiated products by 2 per-
cent."
32All estimates range between 2% and 10%.
33Regarding FDI see Flam and Nordstrom (2008b). As for trade, most studies reveal a positive
and statistically significant effect.
34Coeurdacier et al. (2009) use data on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the manufacturing
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cal foreign direct investment. Since the EU encompasses a relatively more diverse set
of countries in terms of factor endowments and factor prices, it is expected to foster
more vertical investment. Also in line with the theory, joining the Eurozone is ex-
pected to encourage more cross-border investment of the horizontal type, which was
shown to occur mainly between similarly endowed nations (Markusen and Venables,
1996).
As per the above, separately assessing the effect of joint Eurozone membership
on bilateral export concentration pattern seems imperative. An empirical framework
that allows for this distinction is introduced within the next subsection.
2.3.2 Data and Variable Construction
The dataset covers all European Union (EU) members as of 2011 from 1995 to
201135. The typical observation describes an exporter-importer pair at a given point
in time. With 27 countries considered, there are 702 of such pairs. The dependent
variable is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of bilateral export concentration. In
theory, this index’s lower and upper bounds are 0 and 1 respectively. Larger values
denote higher degrees of bilateral export concentration.
Traditional trade theory points out to differences in factor endowments as being
responsible for determining the pattern of trade across countries. From a country-level
perspective, Cadot et al. (2013) also emphasize the importance of factor abundance
in governing the diversification aspect of country-specific export structures. From a
country-pair point of view, Regolo (2013) shows that the degree of bilateral export
concentration is to a large extent shaped by differences in factor endowments. The
larger these differences are, the higher the degree of export concentration. Follow-
ing her work, exporter-importer differences in factor endowments are constructed as
shown in section A.1.2 of the data appendix. These are given by absolute differences
in the natural logarithms of physical capital to labor ratios (dK/L,x,m), human capital
(dH/L,x,m) and land capital to labor ratios (dA/L,x,m)36.
Often underlining asymmetries in preferences, exporter-importer differences in
GDP per capita (dGDPpc,x,m) have the potential of molding export diversification pat-
terns. Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) found that wealthier countries are net-exporters of
high quality goods and net-importers of lower quality wares. For exporter-importer
pairs comprising nations of similar per capita income (North-North/South-South)
this is suggestive of lower export diversification. Based on the same logic, higher
export diversification should characterize North-South/South-North pairs. Empirical
sector. Nevertheless, their study is relevant to the current analysis because M&As account for 70-
80% of foreign direct investment within the OECD according to Head and Ries (2008). Furthermore,
mergers within sectors are characterized as horizontal whereas mergers across sectors are seen as
vertical in nature.
35Baldwin and Di Nino (2006) underline that the Eurozone effects on trade may be better inves-
tigated within a sample of European Union countries. I follow their reasoning for analyzing export
diversification.
36Cadot et al. (2011) and Agosin et al. (2012) also emphasize the importance of human capital
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evidence in this regard is outlined by Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008) and Re-
golo (2013). Jaimovich and Merella (2012) found that wealthier importers tend to
consume goods for which they do not possess comparative advantage. Since compar-
ative advantage is shaped by a nation’s development stage along with many other
factors (e.g. factor endowments), this would also indicate less diversified exports
within North-North/South-South origin-destination pairs. The impact of productiv-
ity differentials on country-pair export diversification is emphasized empirically by
Regolo (2013). Larger exporter-importer productivity differences, dTFP,x,m, are con-
sistent with higher degrees of bilateral trade concentration. Exporter-importer GDP
per capita and productivity differentials are constructed as shown in A.1.2.
Trade costs are also found to determine the degree of international commerce con-
centration. Regolo (2013), Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008), Dennis and Shepherd
(2011) and Beverelli et al. (2015) clearly emphasize a negative association between
the degree of bilateral export diversification and trade costs. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, these measures are the very same as those used within the gravity model of
international trade. Among the most common, one can count the exporter-importer
distance and whether or not the origin and destination share a common border as well
as a common language. Here, the coefficient associated with distance is expected to
carry a positive sign whereas those attached to the contiguity and common language
variables are expected to be negative. The argument regarding the sign of coeffi-
cients is as follows. Trade between neighboring countries or among nations which
share a common language, is less costly and as a result commerce flows are expected
to be more diversified; along both the extensive and intensive margin. Conversely,
as the distance between the origin and the destination becomes larger, international
commerce costs are also becoming larger. There is a clear consensus throughout the
literature that distant partners are trading less in both monetary terms and num-
ber of varieties/sectors. It thus follows that exports among them should be more
concentrated. In sum, trade costs are expected to impede trade and lead to more
concentrated export flows. An extended discussion on EIAs and their effect on trade
and horizontal FDI costs follows.
2.3.3 Empirical Model
The effect of joint Eurozone (EZ) membership on bilateral export concentration is
analyzed by modifying the empirical framework advanced by Regolo (2013). The spec-
ification obtained is depicted in (2.14), where (x,m,t) denotes an exporter-importer
pair at a given point in time, t. Here, Sx,m,t represents the pair-specific index of
bilateral export concentration. Following the theoretical setup presented in section
2.2, the index of choice is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index37. Dx,m,t represents a
5 × 1 column vector which contains pair specific differences in per worker physical
as a determinant of export diversification.
37When this index equates unity, bilateral exports are concentrated in one, 3 digit SITC Rev. 3,
industrial sector. Conversely, a value of zero indicates that exports from x to m are equally spread
across industries. Provided the lack of consensus with regards to the appropriate concentration
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and land capital, human capital, GDP per capita and total factor productivity. In
their above order, these are denoted by dK/L,x,m,t, dA/L,x,m,t, dH/L,x,m,t, dGDPpc,x,m,t,
and dTFP,x,m,t respectively. Zx,m represents a 3 × 1 vector of trade costs which con-
sists of pair characteristics such as distance, whether or not the two nations share a
common official language, and geographic contiguity. These variables do not exhibit
any time variation and in consequence the associated time subscripts are omitted.
Finally, µx,m,t represents the error term.
ln(Sx,m,t) = α′Dx,m,t + β′Zx,m + γ1RTAx,m,t + γ2EZ11x,m,t + µx,m,t (2.14)
How exporter-importer economic integration is accounted for, represents the key
difference between the empirical specification shown above and that of Regolo (2013).
Recall that the integration measure used in her study represents a collection of EIAs38.
In contrast, I define bilateral integration in terms of dual membership within a regional
trade agreement and joint participation within an economic and monetary union; in
this case the Eurozone. Within the international trade literature, these are by far
the most commonly used economic integration indicators. And jointly, both are valid
candidates for capturing the degree of integration between nations within a given
exporter-importer pair. The added benefit of measuring integration this way is the
possibility of separately estimating their impact on bilateral export concentration.
Joint affiliation within the same trade agreement generates a decline in bilateral
trade costs, mainly through the phase-out or the removal of tariffs. According to the
first proposition, more diverse export flows are expected between nations which are
part of the same trade agreement. This country-pair characteristic is captured by
RTAx,m,t. This is constructed based on the NSF-Kellogg Institute Economic Inte-
gration Agreements (EIA) Database39. Specifically, RTAx,m,t takes values between
0 and 5 according to the type of integration agreement in which the exporter and
importer find themselves at time t40.
Joint membership within an economic and monetary union represents another de-
terminant of trade costs. However, the only economic and monetary union considered
here is the Eurozone, and whether or not the exporter and importer are sharing the
measure, S will also be defined as a Theil or Gini index. The results obtained this way are discussed
within section 2.4.5.
38See variable TA within section A.1.2 of the data appendix.
39Refer to section A.1.2 of the data appendix for more details.
40This variable is referred to as regional trade agreements for simplicity purposes only. This is due
to the fact that besides trade agreements it also includes customs unions as well as common markets.
A correct way of referring to these integration stages would be as shallow (stages 1 through 4) and
deep (stages 5 and 6) integration Frankel et al. (2012). For example, levels of 1 through 5 indicate that
x andm at time t are jointly part of the same non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement, preferential
trade arrangement, free trade agreement, customs union or common market respectively. Splitting
the RTAx,m,t variable two-way, into joint membership in common markets (e.g. the European
Union) and other regional trade agreements, does not alter the results quantitatively or qualitatively.
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euro is accounted for by EZ11 x,m,t41,42. This binary variable equals unity as long
as pair members share the euro and 0 otherwise. Despite the renewed attention it
received since Rose (1999), formation of currency unions, and more specifically the
Eurozone, received little to no consideration as a determinant of bilateral export
concentration43.
Joint enrollment within the Eurozone may reduce not only trade costs but horizon-
tal FDI costs as well. Based on the evidence discussed in section 2.3.1, the reduction
seems to be relatively larger for the latter category of costs. Should this be the case,
according to the second proposition sharing the euro is expected to entail bilateral
export concentration rather than diversification. This follows naturally as this par-
ticular type of economic integration may induce exporters, especially those within
sectors characterized by high trade costs, to substitute cross border trade with hori-
zontal FDI. This dynamic was discussed within section 2.2 where bilateral horizontal
FDI costs were shown to be a key determinant of bilateral export diversification.
By taking into account the two propositions outlined earlier, and allowing the
empirical model to separately account for joint Eurozone membership and joint en-
rollment within regional trade agreements, one should expect that EIAs do not nec-
essarily lead to export diversification. On the contrary, sometimes they may generate
more concentrated flows. In Regolo (2013), the coefficient attached to the aggregate
integration measure exhibits a negative sign. In turn, this is indicative of an inverse
relationship between bilateral export concentration and economic integration. How-
ever, by including RTA and EZ11 variables separately, only γ1 is expected to display
the negative sign while γ2, the coefficient of interest, should be positive. The mechan-
ics of these effects have been extensively discussed within the previous sections.
2.3.4 Estimation Approach
Specification (2.14) is similar to the gravity models often used to analyze bilateral
trade flows. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the empirical issues (and
their associated fixes) which surfaced within this strand of literature, since they may
41For completeness purposes five definitions of joint Eurozone membership are considered. EZ11
comprises the initial euro adopters. EZ12 adds Greece. EZ13 counts in Slovenia whereas EZ15 in-
cludes Malta and Cyprus. Finally, EZ16 incorporates Slovakia. See table 2.1 for more details. Ex-
perimenting with these definitions does not change the direction of the Eurozone effect. However,
the coefficients on EZ12-EZ16 are less robust and decline in magnitude; but remain positive. Nev-
ertheless, this outcome is expected, since countries that joined after 1999 are small and therefore
less attractive to horizontal FDI (Head and Ries, 2004). Estimations conducted while including ex-
porter and importer GDP figures yield positive and statistically significant coefficients on four out
of the five Eurozone definitions. Results are shown in table 2.9. This very dynamic also emerges
from equation 2.9. Interactions between Eurozone binary indicators and importer’s GDP also point
out the importance of destination’s market size. In the light of these aspects, only estimations in-
volving EZ11 are presented.
42For more details, see section A.1.2 within the data appendix.
43Studies related to evaluating the Eurozone effect on bilateral export concentration are those
analyzing its effect on the intensive or extensive margins of trade. Nonetheless, the current study
differs from these, in that the dependent variable simultaneously captures both the extensive and
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easily apply here. First on the list is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity which
left uncorrected leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Concerning the gravity
models of trade, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) as well as Head and Mayer (2013)
suggest the use of importer-year, dm,t, and exporter-year, dx,t, effects44. Regolo (2013)
follows suit and applies this technique for analyzing bilateral export diversification.
However, the inclusion of time-varying origin and destination effects may soak up some
of the explanatory power of the two integration measures considered here. Instead, I
include exporter, dx, and importer, dm, fixed effects. In addition to these, year fixed
effects, dt, are included to capture unobserved, time specific characteristics. The error
term is thus modeled as µx,m,t = dx + dm + dt + νx,m,t where νx,m,t is assumed to be
well behaved. The current study also shares common ground with those analyzing
the effect of EIAs on the extensive margin of trade. Among these, Baldwin and Di
Nino (2006), Flam and Nordstrom (2008a), Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008), Di
Nino (2009) also implement the exporter and importer fixed effects approach depicted
above. Remaining unobserved heterogeneity issues are addressed in section 2.4.1.
Given the nature of the analysis and the structure of the dataset, it seems rea-
sonable to call into question the issues of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional de-
pendence in addition to that of residual serial correlation. Note that the presence
of these issues does not imply any biases on the estimated coefficients. However,
by addressing these concerns, standard errors and the validity of statistical inference
would be greatly improved. In this regard, two estimation techniques are employed.
An initial set of results is delivered using ordinary least squares. A secondary set of
estimates is obtained by using generalized least squares with panel corrected standard
errors. This approach has the added virtue of adjusting the standard errors for within
panel AR(1) residual correlation, in addition to heteroskedasticity and spatial depen-
dence. Hoechle (2007) emphasizes feasibility concerns that are associated with this
particular estimator. This issue occurs when standard errors are adjusted for cross-
sectional dependence while the ratio of panels to time periods is small as it is the
case here. Nonetheless, specifying an independent panel structure and allowing any
cross-sectional dependence to be absorbed by the year dummies will yield consistent
standard errors.
2.3.5 Empirical Results
The current study crosses paths with those estimating the Eurozone effect on
the extensive margin of trade. For example, Flam and Nordstrom (2007); Baldwin
et al. (2008); Di Nino (2009); Badinger and Türkcan (2014) emphasize a positive
overall effect of joining the Eurozone on the extensive margin of trade. However, by
performing a similar analysis I observe an opposite effect. Results are shown in table
2.345 and are quite indicative with regards to the Eurozone effect on bilateral export
intensive margins.
44An alternative estimation technique is considered in section 2.4.1.
45Here, the dependent variable is the origin’s number of, SITC 3 Rev. 3, sectors characterized by
non-zero export flows to destination.
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concentration.
The results in columns 1 and 2 are obtained by estimating a standard gravity
model where the dependent variable is the number of industrial sectors which export
from origin to destination. Provided the nature of the outcome variable, negative
binomial and Poisson PML estimators are used. The evidence presented in table
2.3 suggests that Eurozone exporter-importer pairs are, on average, characterized by
fewer exporting sectors. After controlling for an array of other determinants, joining
the Eurozone is equivalent to a 7% drop in the number of exporting industries46.
Conversely, pairs of nations which are concomitantly part of the same regional trade
agreement should see an increase in the number of origin’s exporting sectors. It is also
important to note that all other factors such as distance, common border, and origin
together with destination GDPs are correctly signed and statistically significant. By
augmenting the standard gravity specifications in columns 1 and 2 with differences
in factor endowments, GDP per capita, and total factor productivity, the coefficients
on joint Eurozone membership drop but remain negative, statistically meaningful and
in the vicinity of 5%.
Recall that the integration measure used in Regolo (2013), TA, represents a col-
lection of EIAs47. The results obtained by estimating (2.14) while replacing RTA
and EZ11 with TA, as a sole measure of economic integration, underline a clear and
negative relationship between the latter and export concentration. This outcome is
presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 2.4. However, provided the asymmetric effect
that each EIA type may have on horizontal FDI and international trade costs, it is
important to analyze this determinant in a more disaggregated fashion. The results
shown in table 2.3 are also supporting the disaggregation thesis.
Results central to the current work are obtained by estimating (2.14) and are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 2.4. The estimates presented here line up well
with the two propositions outlined in subsection 2.2.4. Recall that dual participation
within the same trade agreement is expected to generate more diversified exports. At
the same time, joint membership in the Eurozone should accomplish the opposite.
Both coefficients attached to the variables of interest, RTA and EZ11, exhibit the
expected signs and are significant from a statistical point of view. Sharing the euro is
linked to bilateral export flows which are on average 4.2%-7.5% more concentrated.
Conversely, joint affiliation within the same trade agreement entails exports which are
on average more diversified. Both sets of results follow naturally as long as joining
the Eurozone is equivalent to relatively lower horizontal FDI costs. This outcome
emerges partly due to the substitutability between exporting and horizontal FDI and
partly because of trade cost heterogeneity across origin’s industrial base. Since trade
cost asymmetry involves disparity in terms of sectoral exporting shares, a further
divergence of these shares is expected as a result of joint membership in the Eurozone.
The exact opposite prevails with regards to the common adoption of regional trade
46The formula needed to quantify this effect is (eγ − 1) ∗ 100, where γ represents the estimated
coefficient.
47Details regarding this measure are discussed within section A.1.2 of the data appendix.
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agreements.
According to the decision rule shown in (2.9), horizontal investing should be more
prevalent for country pairs with large destination markets. To test this, I include the
EZ11×log Importer’s GDP interaction term when estimating (2.14). The last two
columns of table 2.4 report the results. The estimates presented here line up well
with this prediction. In this regard, Eurozone pairs with larger importers tend to
be characterized by higher degrees of export concentration. Remaining coefficients
are statistically significant, economically meaningful, and in line with the findings of
Regolo (2013) and those of other studies listing trade costs as an impediment to export
diversity48. Specifically, larger exporter-importer differences in factor endowments
and productivity as well as higher bilateral trade costs lead to more concentrated
bilateral export flows. Conversely, a larger GDP per capita differential represents a
catalyst for more diversity.
The key point delivered by the results in tables 2.3 and 2.4 is that joint mem-
bership in the Eurozone leads to more concentrated bilateral exports. This happens
due to two reasons. First, as shown in section 2.2, in addition to trade costs export
concentration is also a function of horizontal cross-border investment costs. Second,
as noted in section 2.3.1, different international EIAs may have different effects on
horizontal FDI and trade costs. As a consequence, an integration agreement which
leads to a relatively larger drop in horizontal FDI costs, such as the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, is expected to entail more concentrated bilateral exports.
Conversely, a larger decline in trade costs, achieved by joint membership within the
same trade agreement, is expected to foster export diversification. Equally impor-
tant, analyzing the effect of international EIAs on export diversification separately,
rather than combined, matters. Bundling the two categories into one variable, aimed
at capturing the overall degree of bilateral integration, ends up masking the positive
Eurozone effect on the concentration of bilateral export flows.
2.4 Robustness Checks
2.4.1 Possible Endogeneity Issues and the Importance of Unobserved
Trade and Horizontal FDI Costs
Recall the empirical specification shown in (2.14) and the error structure proposed
in section 2.3.4, µx,m,t = dx+dm+dt+νx,m,t. Because trade and horizontal FDI costs
vary over time, this error structure may not be suited to generate unbiased coefficients
on RTA and EZ11 variables (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Head and Mayer, 2013)49.
While any exporter and importer-specific time-invariant trade and FDI determinants
are accounted for by using the above error structure, their time-variant counterparts,
not captured by year dummies, remain. As a result E(EZ11x,m,tτ˜x,m,t) 6= 0 and
48The one exception is the coefficient on human capital differential. However, given the sample
at hand, the statistical meaningless of this result is not striking. It is well-known that European
Union members are similar with respect to this particular type of endowment.
49Their discussion is aimed at bilateral trade costs but it can easily be extended to bilateral
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E(EZ11x,m,tf˜x,m,t) 6= 0. Here τ˜x,m,t and f˜x,m,t represent the unobserved, time-variant
components of trade and horizontal FDI costs which are contained in νx,m,t. A similar
argument can be made for the RTA variable. As a fix, the above two studies suggest
the use of time-varying exporter and importer effects. Estimating (2.14) this way
still yields correctly signed coefficients on EZ11 and RTA variables. However, the one
attached to the Eurozone variable is statistically not different from zero. Nevertheless,
since the use of time-varying exporter and importer effects soaks up much of the
explanatory power associated with this pair-specific, binary, variable, this finding is
not at all surprising.
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provide a theory consistent way to approximate these
unobserved components, also known as multilateral resistance terms (MRTs)50. This
approach represents an alternative to the inclusion of exporter and importer time-
varying effects. However, while MRTs have been empirically and theoretically well
documented for trade costs not the same can be mentioned with regards to horizontal
FDI costs. Nonetheless, given the theoretical similarities between trade and FDI
gravity frameworks, the rationale which applies to trade costs can easily be extended
to horizontal FDI costs51. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2009), investment-specific
multilateral resistance terms are generated52. The results are shown in column 1 of
table 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. The coefficients attached to the variables of interest,
RTA and EZ11, hardly change. Despite the slight drop in magnitude the coefficients
remain statistically significant and bear the expected signs.
2.4.2 The Importance of Market Size and Development Level
Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008), Dennis and Shepherd (2011) and Beverelli
et al. (2015) emphasize exporter’s economic mass as a determinant of export diversi-
fication. In this regard, larger exporters are characterized by more diverse outflows.
Also, import baskets seem to be more diverse for larger destinations. The results
obtained by estimating (2.14) while including these measures are shown in column 2
of tables 2.5 and 2.6. Contrary to the above, the coefficient on the destination’s GDP
is statistically insignificant within the OLS setup. The GLS estimates are in line with
the three studies outlined previously and point to a negative impact of exporter and
importer GDPs on bilateral export concentration. Based on these one can conclude
that exports flowing between large origin and destination markets are more diverse.
Nevertheless, the coefficients associated with joint membership in the Eurozone and
trade agreements are robust to the inclusion of exporter and importer GDPs.
horizontal FDI costs.















where θk represents the
share of country k’s GDP in world GDP and ω ∈ {distance, common language, contiguity, common
legal origin, exchange rate}.
51Determinants of bilateral trade flows often included in gravity regressions are also checking the
list of factors which shape the pattern of foreign direct investments Brakman et al. (2010).
52In calculating these terms, the investment component of country k’s GDP is used instead of its
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As noted in section 2.3.2, export diversity may be a function of origin and desti-
nation development levels. Results obtained by incorporating GDP per capita terms
within (2.14) are shown in column 3 of tables 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Although
lower in magnitude, coefficients on RTA and EZ11 are similar to those in columns 1
and 2 and are significant from a statistical viewpoint.
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2007) find a clear, non-
monotonic relationship between production diversification and development. As they
develop, nations tend to diversify in terms of production only to start re-concentrating
again after a certain income per head threshold is passed. Cadot et al. (2011) find
a similar pattern for exports, although with a higher turning point. To this extent,
accounting for exporter’s GDP per capita and its squared counterpart becomes imper-
ative. The results are shown in column 4 of tables 2.5 and 2.6. The non-monotonic
relationship between exporter’s income per head and bilateral export concentration
is clear and in line with the one emphasized by the studies above. In this regard, it
is worth mentioning that Cadot et al. (2011) are analyzing the impact of income per
head on export concentration in a country rather than country-pair context. Along
these lines, the present findings can be viewed as a contribution to this particular
strand of literature. The coefficient associated with joint membership in the Euro-
zone is robust to the specification employed only in the OLS setup. It is difficult,
however, to explain why the effect becomes statistically zero when using the alterna-
tive estimation approach.
2.4.3 The Effect of Trade and Financial Openness
According to the traditional theory of trade, countries become more specialized as
they open to trade. Since Eurozone members are, on average, characterized by larger
degrees of trade openness, it is essential to account for this factor when estimating
the Eurozone effect on bilateral trade diversification53. The results obtained this way
are presented in column 5 of tables 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Coefficients attached
to EZ11 and RTA variables are statistically significant and exhibit signs which are
in line with the two propositions outlined earlier. Not surprisingly, importers more
open to trade are receiving a more diverse export basket. At the same time, exporter’s
trade openness does not seem to influence the concentration of bilateral exports.
Cappiello et al. (2006) and Lane and Wälti (2006) found that joining the Euro-
zone positively influenced the degree of financial openness across members. However,
financial integration and financial openness in general, have been found to facilitate
industrial/production specialization Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Bos et al. (2011)
which, in turn, may lead to less diverse exports. The results obtained by incorporat-
ing a measure of financial openness54 within (2.14) are shown in column 6 of tables
2.5 and 2.6. The coefficients associated with joint membership in the Eurozone and
GDP.
53Trade openness is measured as the ratio of exports and imports to GDP. Over 1995-2011, the
average trade openness is 1.09 for EZ11 nations and 0.87 for non-members.
54See section A.1.2 of data appendix for details regarding this variable.
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regional trade agreements remain significant and maintain the expected signs. Es-
timates also underline that exports originating in financially more open economies
are more diversified while importer’s financial openness does not seem to affect the
diversity of these flows. The sign on exporter’s financial openness seems to be at odds
with the findings of the studies introduced above, but this may easily be due to the
sample of countries included in the analysis.
2.4.4 The Concentration of National Production Structures
Since exports are a "product" of national industrial structures, the current work
shares common ground with the literature on production specialization. In this re-
gard, Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1996)55 document a positive rela-
tionship between economic integration and the specialization of national production.
In turn, more concentrated industrial structures may lead to less diverse exports.
Omitting this particular factor from the empirical specification may therefore lead to
biased results. A nation-specific export concentration measure is therefore used as a
measure of production structure diversity56. The results obtained this way are shown
in column 7 of tables 2.5 and 2.6. As expected, the attached coefficient carries a posi-
tive sign, itself emphasizing the direct link between nation and pair specific measures
of export concentration. The coefficient on joint Eurozone membership is robust to
the addition of this variable. Similarly, the coefficient associated with dual partici-
pation within the same trade agreement is also robust while all other coefficients are
displaying theory consistent signs.
2.4.5 The Choice of Concentration Index
It can be argued that the results obtained thus far may be the artifact of the
index choice. In order to address this, Gini and Theil indexes of bilateral export
concentration are constructed and used as dependent variables57. Both measures
are strongly and positively correlated with the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index. The
correlation coefficients are 0.77 for the Gini and 0.96 for the Theil index, respectively.
Table 2.7 presents the results obtained by estimating (2.14) when using Gini and
Theil indexes as outcome variables. From here one can clearly observe that estimates
are robust to the index choice under the GLS setup. Two issues appear in columns
1 and 2, where Theil and Gini indexes are used as the dependent variables. In this
case, the coefficient attached to EZ11 is still positive but statistically not different
from zero. In the latter case, this should not be surprising since Gini indexes are
often found to display very small degrees of variability.
55Both studies point to geographical concentration of sectoral production as the degree of eco-
nomic integration becomes large enough.
56For more details on this variable see data appendix section A.1.2.
57See section A.1.2 of the data appendix for more details on the construction methodology.
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2.4.6 The Bounded Nature of the Concentration Indexes
Unlike the Theil index, Hirschmann-Herfindahl and Gini indexes are reaching their
respective ceilings at 1. The 0/1 bounded nature of the HH and Gini indexes calls
for an additional step in order to insure analytical robustness. I thus follow Baum
(2008) who proposes a logistic transformation of such censored variables. The results
obtained this way are presented in table 2.8. Note that all coefficients, including those
on EZ11 and RTA, are robust to this particular transformation of the dependent
variable. A relatively small caveat prevails when transforming the data this way as
the logistic transformation is not defined for indexes equal to 0 or 1. While index
values of 0 are not present within the dataset values of 1 do exist. However, these
account for only 0.016% of observations.
2.5 Conclusions
International trade literature suggests that economic integration leads to export
diversification. Similarly, Regolo (2013) finds that this argument holds for bilateral
export diversification as well. Both of these outcomes originate in the idea that
economic integration lowers trade costs which in turn fosters export diversification at
the country and country-pair level. However, the current paper shows, theoretically
and empirically, that the latter finding is, to some extent, incomplete.
To start, I theoretically document that bilateral export diversification does not
depend only on trade costs but on horizontal FDI costs as well. The reason for
which export diversification is a function of both cost types is underlined by the
substitutability between exporting and horizontal investment, as means of serving
foreign markets. In this regard, the model suggests that a relative decline in trade
costs generates bilateral export diversification, just as emphasized by Regolo (2013).
However, the exact opposite holds with respect to a relative drop in horizontal FDI
costs. Since economic integration agreements (EIAs) may have asymmetric effects
on horizontal FDI and trade costs, integration may not always foster bilateral export
diversification. For example, an EIA which leads to a relatively larger decline in
horizontal FDI costs entails bilateral export concentration, not diversification.
I then empirically show that this is exactly the case by considering two of the
most common EIA types. More specifically, I show that joint membership within
trade agreements does indeed deliver a more diversified export bundle. However,
joint membership within the European Economic and Monetary Union accomplishes
the exact opposite. The results are robust to the concentration index choice and the
inclusion of other potential factors which may govern export diversity at the country-
pair level. It is also worth pointing out that these dynamics are more noticeable for
Eurozone exporter-importer pairs which are characterized by large destinations. In
this regard, the results carry a policy flavor. Let’s consider, for instance, the case of
Poland and Romania, both large, European Union, members which are likely to join
the Eurozone in the future. Should this be the case, imports from other Eurozone
members (e.g. Portugal) are expected to become more concentrated. However, not
the same can be said with regards to Bulgaria, a smaller European Union member
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and also a candidate to joining the Eurozone.
The evidence presented here underlines that bilateral export diversification is a
function of horizontal FDI costs just as much as it is a function of trade costs. Given
the asymmetric effect of various EIAs on these types of costs, some integration ar-
rangements may not always lead to export diversification. Moreover, the effect of
EIAs on bilateral export diversification should be analyzed separately, by consider-
ing each agreement type in part. In doing so, the current study finds that, despite
being more integrated, Eurozone exporter-importer pairs are characterized by more
concentrated, rather than more diverse, export flows.
Copyright© Mihai Paraschiv, 2016.
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Table 2.1: European Union (EU) and Eurozone (EZ) Membership Timetable




























Note: For completeness purposes, it is worth noting that Latvia
and Lithuania joined the European economic and monetary
union in 2014 and 2015 respectively. However, since these
events took place after 2011, the latest year available within the
dataset, these countries are not regarded as Eurozone members.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
HH index of bilateral export concentration 11927 0.24 0.17 0.04 1.00
Theil index of bilateral export concentration 11927 2.15 0.94 0.64 5.54
Gini index of bilateral export concentration 11927 0.86 0.09 0.59 1.00
Capital stock (bil. USD) 11934 1510.69 2304.31 14.47 10405.76
Avg. years of schooling 11934 10.08 1.06 6.98 12.75
Arable land area (mil. ha.) 11934 4148.98 4799.63 8.00 18517.00
Persons employed (mil.) 11934 7.96 9.98 0.15 41.38
Real GDP (bil. USD) 11934 455.63 658.19 4.56 2840.95
Real GDP per capita 11934 23436.31 10682.13 5524.77 65123.80
Total factor productivity index (USA=1) 11934 0.80 0.20 0.33 1.54
Distance (km.) 11934 1431.65 745.64 59.62 3766.31
Contiguity (=1 if x and m share land border) 11934 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Common language (=1 if x and m share official language) 11934 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
TA (Integration measure of Regolo (2013)) 11934 4.16 1.62 0.00 6.00
RTA 11934 3.98 1.45 0.00 5.00
EZ (=1 if x and m share the euro) 11934 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Trade openness 11934 0.91 0.46 0.21 2.77
Financial openness 11934 5.38 17.40 0.22 119.94
Origin’s export concentration index 11934 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.53
Note: Capital stock, real GDP per capita and real GDP figures are expressed in constant 2005 USD at current PPPs. Given
the country-pair setup of the dataset, the descriptive statistics pertaining to the exporter are also valid for the importer.
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Table 2.3: The Average Eurozone Effect on the Number of Exporting Sectors
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4)
log Distance -0.356∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.066)
Common Border 1.412∗∗∗ 2.014∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.385)
Common Language 0.108 0.126
(0.210) (0.233)
RTA 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
EZ11 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010)
log. Exporter’s GDP 0.643∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.047) (0.014) (0.046)
log. Importer’s GDP 0.413∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.040) (0.013) (0.042)
diff. GDPpc -0.033∗ -0.053
(0.017) (0.041)
diff. TFP -0.143∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.041)
diff. K/L -0.021∗∗ -0.003
(0.008) (0.022)
diff. HC 0.003 0.047
(0.013) (0.039)
diff. A/L 0.114∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.023)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
Note: The dependent variable is the number of SITC 3 Rev. 3 sectors in which
the origin ticks positive export values towards the destination. Coefficients
in columns (1) and (3) are estimated by using the conditional, fixed effects
negative binomial estimator. Coefficients in columns (2) and (4) are estimated
using the fixed effects Poisson PML estimator. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and clustered at the country-pair level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1. Specifications within the first two columns represent simple gravity
equations. The last two columns include differences in factor endowments,
productivity and GDP per capita as in Regolo (2013).
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Table 2.4: The Average Eurozone Effect on Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index of
Bilateral Export Concentration
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
diff. K/L 0.088∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.030)
diff. HC -0.152 -0.097 -0.152 -0.112 -0.158 -0.099
(0.126) (0.105) (0.126) (0.106) (0.126) (0.102)
diff. A/L 0.049∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
log Distance 0.180∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.020)
Common Border -0.217∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.022) (0.049) (0.023) (0.049) (0.024)
Common Language -0.148∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.158∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.151∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.039) (0.084) (0.039) (0.084) (0.033)
diff. GDPpc -0.228∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.039) (0.056) (0.039) (0.056) (0.041)
diff. TFP 0.180∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.047) (0.078) (0.048) (0.078) (0.049)
TA -0.035∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
RTA -0.036∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
EZ11 0.072∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.577∗∗ -0.248∗
(0.034) (0.018) (0.273) (0.139)
EZ11 x log Importer’s GDP 0.050∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.021) (0.011)
log Importer’s GDP -0.050 -0.102
(0.070) (0.066)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
R-Squared 0.656 0.762 0.657 0.758 0.658 0.479
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index
of bilateral export concentration. Results within columns (1), (3), and (5) are obtained
by using OLS. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-
pair level. Estimates in columns (2), (4), and (6) are obtained by using generalized least
squares. Standard errors are corrected for panel specific heteroskedasticity, cross sectional
dependence, together with serial correlation and are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Exporter, importer, and year effects are included but not reported.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks (OLS)
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
diff. K/L 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
diff. HC -0.180 -0.158 -0.152 -0.147 -0.151 -0.155 -0.152
(0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.126)
diff. A/L 0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
diff. GDPpc -0.231∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
diff. TFP 0.181∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.155∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
log Distance 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Common Border -0.216∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Common Language -0.157∗ -0.158∗ -0.158∗ -0.158∗ -0.158∗ -0.158∗ -0.158∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
RTA -0.033∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
EZ11 0.070∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.059∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
log Exp.’s GDP -0.416∗∗∗
(0.065)
log Imp.’s GDP -0.106
(0.069)
log Exp.’s GDPpc -0.413∗∗∗ -1.831∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.611)
log Imp.’s GDPpc -0.127∗
(0.067)
log Exp.’s GDPpc sq. 0.077∗∗
(0.032)
log Exp.’s trade open. -0.010
(0.036)
log Imp.’s trade open. -0.076∗∗
(0.038)
log Exp.’s fin. open. -0.050∗
(0.030)
log Imp.’s fin. open. 0.005
(0.034)
logistic Exp.’s HHI exp. 0.197∗∗∗
(0.024)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
R-Squared 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.658 0.657 0.661
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of bilateral
export concentration. Coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Exporter, importer, and
year effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at
the country-pair level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. (1) Multilateral trade and investment resistance
terms as in Baier and Bergstrand (2009) w.r.t. country-pair characteristics (e.g. distance, contiguity,
common language, exchange rates, and common legal system) are included but not reported. Exporter
and importer real GDP is included in (2). Per capita real GDP figures for exporter and importer are
included in (3). Exporter real GDP per head and it’s squared counterpart are included in (4). In (5),
exporter and importer trade openness are added whereas financial openness is controlled for in (6).
Overall exporter’s concentration of exports is accounted for in (7).
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Table 2.6: Robustness Checks (GLS)
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
diff. K/L 0.109∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
diff. HC -0.141 -0.124 -0.115 -0.097 -0.102 -0.119 -0.109
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105)
diff. A/L 0.051∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
diff. GDPpc -0.253∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
diff. TFP 0.222∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
log Distance 0.206∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Common Border -0.229∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Common Language -0.147∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
RTA -0.015∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
EZ11 0.040∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.029 0.039∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
log Exp.’s GDP -0.314∗∗∗
(0.057)
log Imp.’s GDP -0.159∗∗∗
(0.054)
log Exp.’s GDPpc -0.324∗∗∗ -1.833∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.631)
log Imp.’s GDPpc -0.192∗∗∗
(0.054)
log Exp.’s GDPpc sq. 0.080∗∗
(0.033)
log Exp.’s trade open. 0.020
(0.035)
log Imp.’s trade open. -0.077∗∗∗
(0.028)
log Exp.’s fin. open. -0.078∗∗∗
(0.028)
log Imp.’s fin. open. -0.015
(0.023)
logistic Exp.’s HHI exp. 0.129∗∗∗
(0.018)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
R-Squared 0.754 0.755 0.757 0.758 0.760 0.759 0.759
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of bilateral
export concentration. Estimates are obtained using generalized least squares. Standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence, together with serial correlation and shown
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Exporter, importer, and year effects are included but
not reported. (1) Multilateral trade and investment resistance terms as in Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
w.r.t. country-pair characteristics (e.g. distance, contiguity, common language, exchange rates, and
common legal system) are included but not reported. Exporter and importer real GDP is included in
(2). Per capita real GDP figures for exporter and importer are included in (3). Exporter real GDP per
head and it’s squared counterpart are included in (4). In (5), exporter and importer trade openness are
added whereas financial openness is controlled for in (6). Overall exporter’s concentration of exports
is accounted for in (7).
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Table 2.7: Controlling For Index Choice
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4)
diff. K/L 0.072∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003)
diff. HC -0.019 0.016 -0.006 0.019∗∗
(0.073) (0.017) (0.044) (0.008)
diff. A/L 0.025∗∗ 0.000 0.023∗∗ 0.001
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002)
diff. GDPpc -0.140∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.008) (0.020) (0.004)
diff. TFP 0.144∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.011) (0.026) (0.005)
log Distance 0.168∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003)
Common Border -0.164∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.008) (0.016) (0.004)
Common Language -0.090∗ -0.014 -0.068∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.013) (0.021) (0.005)
RTA -0.026∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
EZ11 0.028 0.000 0.022∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.019) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
R-Squared 0.791 0.851 0.848 0.828
Note: The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the Theil index
in columns (1) and (3) and Gini index in (2) and (4). Coefficients in columns
(1) and (2) are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair level. Estimates in
columns (3) and (4) are obtained using generalized least squares. Standard
errors are corrected for panel specific heteroskedasticity, cross sectional de-
pendence, together with serial correlation and are shown in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Exporter, importer, and year effects are
included but not reported.
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Table 2.8: Controlling For Index Boundness
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4)
diff. K/L 0.201∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.051) (0.046) (0.031)
diff. HC -0.299∗ 0.015 -0.236 0.037
(0.180) (0.149) (0.170) (0.100)
diff. A/L 0.115∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.026) (0.038) (0.022)
diff. GDPpc -0.360∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.069) (0.072) (0.050)
diff. TFP 0.195∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.100) (0.089) (0.063)
log Distance 0.252∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030)
Common Border -0.209∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.064) (0.044) (0.039)
Common Language -0.275∗∗ -0.233∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.115) (0.062) (0.059)
RTA -0.074∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006)
EZ11 0.117∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.040) (0.028) (0.018)
Obs. 11,925 11,925 11,925 11,925
R-Squared 0.599 0.808 0.473 0.899
Note: The dependent variables are the logistic transformation (Baum,
2008) of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index in columns (1) and (3) and Gini
index in (2) and (4). Coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are estimated
using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
clustered at the country-pair level. Estimates in columns (3) and (4) are
obtained using generalized least squares. Standard errors are corrected for
panel specific heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence, together with
serial correlation and are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. Exporter, importer, and year effects are included but not reported.
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Table 2.9: Controlling For The Economy Size
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
diff. K/L 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
diff. H/L -0.124 -0.117 -0.116 -0.116 -0.115
(0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
diff. A/L 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
diff. GDPpc -0.272∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
diff. TFP 0.235∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
log Distance 0.207∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Common Border -0.230∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Common Language -0.150∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
RTA -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗











log Exporter’s GDP -0.314∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
log Importer’s GDP -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Obs. 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927 11,927
R-Squared 0.755 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index
of bilateral export concentration. Estimates are obtained using generalized least squares.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence, and serial
correlation and shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Five definitions of the
Eurozone dummies are employed. First, EZ11 takes a value of 1 for the exporter-importer
pairs formed by the initial euro adopters and 0 otherwise. EZ12 adds Greece to the group of
11 initial adopters. EZ13 comprises Slovenia while EZ15 adds Malta and Cyprus. Finally,
EZ16 adds in Slovakia. Exporter, importer, and year effects are included but not reported.
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Chapter 3 The Effect of International Environmental Agreements on
Trade: An Industry Level Approach
3.1 Introduction
Since the early 1970s national governments have engaged in an array of interna-
tional environmental agreements (IEAs). The IEAs are diverse in their scope, means
of achieving the outlined objectives, and the substances targeted. Time and again,
national engagement in IEAs is met with distaste by the supply side of the market,
as these were, and still are, a perceived source of additional production costs and
an inhibitor of competitiveness. For example, the environmental regulation brought
about in the 1970s is believed by some to have contributed to the deterioration of
the United States trade balance (Jaffe et al., 1995). Thus, it should not be surprising
that firms and sometimes entire industrial sectors oppose this kind of international
commitment. But, are IEAs a source of comparative disadvantage and an inhibitor
of competitiveness? Starting from the premise that nations trade based on compara-
tive advantage differences, and that environmental regulation may represent a source
of comparative disadvantage (at least for "dirty" industries1,2), this essay seeks to
provide an answer to the above question by analyzing the effect of IEAs’ adoption
on industry-level exports3. The rationale behind testing this hypothesis within the
context of international trade is simple. If sovereign enrollment in IEAs is indeed a
source of additional production expenditures, such costs should be then passed along
to consumers in the form of higher prices which, in turn, should generate lower ex-
ports. Of course, the degree to which exports respond to price changes depends on
an array of factors such as the degree of market competition, the elasticity of sub-
stitution (i.e., product homogeneity), or transportation costs that prevail within a
given sector. However, given the scope of this analysis these factors are not explicitly
addressed here.
In a broader context, the current work belongs to the literature strand on the
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin theories of trade which postulate that international
trade patterns are driven by comparative advantage differences. Comparative advan-
tage differentials may arise along the lines of geography, endowments of production
factors, productivity, financial and economic development, institutional attributes,
1Industries defined as "dirty" display a high ratio of emissions to output. This ratio is referenced
throughout as "emission intensity". Refer to table 3.10 for sectoral rankings by emission intensity.
For the ease of exposition, I classify industries into "dirty" and "clean" using the 75th percentile
cut-off relevant to the CO2 emission intensity distribution. As a result, the following sectors are
identified as "dirty": other non-metallic minerals, coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, basic
metals and fabricated metal, and chemicals and chemical products. This split is consistent with
previous studies (Jänicke et al., 1997; Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Ederington et al., 2005; Kellenberg,
2009; Grether et al., 2012).
2Refer to figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 for unconditional trends.
3The analyzed IEAs span three major categories: climate change, acid rain, and ozone deple-
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and quality of contract and property rights enforcement4. Since the 1970s, envi-
ronmental regulation has been added to the list, but as a source of comparative
disadvantage rather than advantage5. Differences in environmental regulation, across
nations, can arise from differences in the demand for, and supply of, environmental
quality. The former is found to be shaped by differences in per capita income levels
(Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Antweiler et al., 2001) while the latter may be influ-
enced by factors such as population density (Frankel, 2009) or pollution dispersion
capabilities (Broner et al., 2012). More narrowly, this essay adds to the literature on
the pollution haven effect (PHE) and its special case of "leakage". The PHE hypoth-
esizes the loss of comparative advantage (and thus exports) in "dirty" industries to
jurisdictions with laxer environmental standards. Meanwhile, "leakage" denotes the
displacement of domestic production by relatively cheaper imports originating within
jurisdictions characterized by more lenient environmental rules.
For the most part, studies linking the environmental policy choice with compara-
tive advantage losses focused on regulation such as enforcement stringency, pollution
abatement costs, or fuel standards (Kalt, 1985; Tobey, 1990; Grossman and Krueger,
1991; Ederington and Minier, 2003; Ederington et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor,
2008; Kellenberg, 2009; Broner et al., 2012). This paper contributes to this literature
strand by directing attention onto the adoption of IEAs and their effects on industry-
level comparative advantage patterns. The analysis conducted here is comparable to
those in De Santis (2012) and Aichele and Felbermayr (2015)6. It differs, however,
from these along two important margins. First, the focus is placed on the stock of
adopted IEAs rather than on a single IEA at a time. This study considers 13 air
pollution agreements, therefore broadening the scope of previous studies. Second,
the present work benefits from a much larger data universe which encompasses 163
nations and 36 years, 1976-20117. In line with the recommendations of Head and
Mayer (2013)8, and similar to the approach of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), I ac-
count for the non-random selection into IEAs by including exporter, and importer,
tion. Refer to section 3.3 for details. Unless otherwise specified the term "IEAs" refers to all three
categories.
4Refer to Helpman et al. (2004); Romalis (2004); Costinot (2005); Bernard et al. (2007) for the-
oretical discussions on comparative advantage at the country, industry, and firm levels. For empir-
ical evidence see Chor (2010); Chor and Manova (2012); Jaimovich and Merella (2012); Levchenko
(2004); Manova (2008, 2012); Nunn (2007); Regolo (2013); Fajgelbaum et al. (2011). The negative
impact on geographic remoteness on international commerce is underlined by virtually every study
that uses the gravity model of trade. Refer to Head and Mayer (2013) for a survey of estimates.
Nunn and Puga (2012) also discuss the role of geography in determining trade patterns.
5Refer to Pethig (1976); Robison (1988); McGuire (1982) for early theoretical discussions re-
garding environmental regulation as a source of comparative disadvantage.
6De Santis (2012) considers the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) along with its Kyoto protocol, and the Montreal protocol to the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL). Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) assess the Kyoto
protocol.
7De Santis (2012) observes 24 countries between 1988-2008. Aichele and Felbermayr (2015)
examine a total of 40 countries from 1995-2007.
8The discussion pertains to the choice of trade integration agreements, but it equally applies here.
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time-varying effects in all empirical specifications. This setup presents itself as a rel-
atively simple alternative to the instrumental variable techniques, previously used to
tackle the endogenous nature of environmental policy choice. Although some studies
have managed the task, finding the "correct" and relevant instrument can often be
difficult9.
The evidence brought forward by the current essay can be summarized in three
points. First, the ratification of IEAs is found to be a source of comparative disad-
vantage for pollution-intensive sectors. For example, the adoption of an additional
IEA by the exporter lowers outflows from sectors categorized as "dirty" by about 3%.
Exports from "clean" sectors are found to decrease by 1%. Furthermore, exports of
non-metallic minerals (the most CO2-intensive industry in the sample)10 are lowered
by 3.6% while exports of leather and footwear (the least CO2-intensive industry in
the sample) decline by only 0.5%.
Second, different types of IEAs seem to entail different composition and/or scale
effects11. Climate change IEAs involve a strong export composition effect. This kind
of IEAs, namely the Kyoto protocol, seem to be a modest source of comparative
disadvantage for pollution-intensive industries and a notable source of comparative
advantage for their least polluting peers. For sectors marked as "dirty" the ratification
of Kyoto protocol entails an export decline below 1%. The exports from "clean"
sectors, however, are estimated to increase by as much as 5.8%. Moreover, for the non-
metallic minerals industry, the export decline brought about by joining the protocol is
3%. Conversely, exports of leather and footwear are estimated to increase by 5%. Acid
rain and ozone depletion IEAs imply export scale effects. In contrast to climate change
IEAs, acid rain agreements appear as a large source of comparative disadvantage for
pollution-intensive industries. It is debatable, however, to what extent they harm or
benefit the least pollution-intensive industries. For example, the ratification of an
additional acid rain IEA is equivalent to an export decline of about 1% for sectors
classified as "clean", and 5% for those tagged as "dirty". Moreover, for coke, refined
petroleum, and nuclear fuel sector (the most SOx-intensive industry in the sample)12
the ratification of an extra acid rain IEA carries a 3.2% decline in outflows. At the
opposite end, exports of leather and footwear (the least SOx-intensive industry in the
sample) are negligibly, but positively, impacted. The average effect of joining ozone
depletion IEAs is even larger, bringing about an approximate export drop of 2.2% in
9For example, Broner et al. (2012) use the air pollution dispersal potential as an instrument
for IEA ratification. This nation-specific trait is elegantly constructed as a function of various
geographical and meteorological characteristics. Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) use the ratification
of Statuses of the International Criminal Court to instrument the ratification of IEAs.
10CO2 stands for carbon dioxide. This greenhouse gas is a by-product of virtually any industrial
activity and it is specifically targeted under the Kyoto protocol. However, due to emissions overlap
(e.g. CO2 may be released into the atmosphere along with other substances), it may be indirectly
targeted by other IEAs.
11The composition effect refers to changes in the export bundle brought about by the adoption of
IEAs (e.g., exports of non-metallic minerals decrease while exports of leather and footwear increase).
The scale effect refers to the changes (increase/decrease) in the overall volume of exports.
12SOx stands for sulfur oxides. Figuring as a target for three out of the seven acid rain IEAs
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"clean", and 7.5% in "dirty" sectors, respectively.
Third, only climate change and acid rain IEAs are found to engender "leakage"
effects. The effects appear to be stronger for the first category. For climate change
IEAs, the marginal effects of ratification on "dirty" exports and imports hover in the
vicinity of -3% and 4%, respectively13. Concerning acid rain IEAs, the effects situate
at -4.5% for exports and 2% for imports. Evidence of "leakage" is not found with
regards to ozone depletion IEAs. For this category, negative effects are found on
both "dirty" exports (i.e., -7%) and imports (i.e., -1%). This last set of findings is in
line with the international trade provisions aimed at reducing "leakage" and included
within this latter type of IEAs.
This essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the relevant
literature and elaborates on the contribution of this essay. Section 3.3 discusses the
framework for IEA adoption and describes the three agreement types introduced
earlier (i.e., climate change, acid rain, and ozone depletion). Section 3.4 discusses the
data and the construction of the covariates. Section 3.5 details the empirical analysis
and critically assesses the results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
There are two ways in which environmental regulation may affect international
trade patterns. First, a tougher environmental stance may alter comparative advan-
tage differentials by increasing production costs and leading to a loss of exports to
jurisdictions with less stringent environmental rules. This outcome is known as the
pollution heaven effect (PHE)14. A special case of the pollution heaven effect is known
as "leakage"; the scenario under which domestic production, which becomes costlier
due to increased environmental regulation, is substituted with imports from envi-
ronmentally lax nations (Copeland and Taylor, 2005). Second, Porter and van der
Linde (1995) argue for the case in which environmental regulation acts as a cata-
lyst for further research, innovation and efficiency gains. Ultimately, this outcome is
expected to translate into increased competitiveness both domestically and interna-
tionally. This is known in the literature as the "Porter hypothesis". In support of
this view, Morgenstern et al. (2001) outline the existence of an overlap between pro-
duction and environmental activities. Thus, increased environmental regulation may
induce additional economies of scope, improvements of production processes, or the
recovery of valuable byproducts through increased recycling. In summary, aside from
the "Porter hypothesis" scenario, environmental regulation is expected to adversely
impact export flows.
Early studies have analyzed the consequences of increased environmental strin-
considered, it is by far the most targeted chemical compound under the acid rain IEA category.
13These effects are relative to the corresponding flows in the "clean" sectors. For example, due to
the adoption of Kyoto protocol, exports from sectors categorized as "dirty" decrease by 3% relative
to exports from sectors regarded as "clean".
14Refer to Copeland and Taylor (1994, 2005). For an early theoretical discussion regarding the
locational choice of industries in the presence of environmental regulation and regulation in general
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gency on international trade with little success in providing evidence for PHE15. In a
survey, Levinson (1995) concludes that the apparent lack of evidence can give itself
to an array of factors ranging from empirical misspecifications to various motives for
which firms and sectors would not be impacted by a tougher environmental stance
(i.e., firms prefer to operate in line with the most stringent standards to achieve ef-
ficiency gains, or multinationals are more able to cope with the higher costs brought
about by regulation). Levinson (1996) advances the idea that industries with the
highest pollution abatement costs (PACs) may also be the least mobile (i.e., the least
footloose), and thus unlikely to relocate in "pollution havens". This may provide an
explanation for why early studies (which focused on PACs as measures of environ-
mental stringency) found little PHE evidence. Another drawback of earlier studies is
the failure to address the endogenous nature of the environmental policy stance. Left
unaccounted, this issue is likely to bias estimates away from PHE consistent figures
(Levinson and Taylor, 2008). In fact, studies that fall into this category, often invoke
arguments along the lines of the "Porter hypothesis".
More recent studies tackled the above issues and provided evidence in favor of the
pollution haven effect. Millimet and List (2004) do so by taking into account the het-
erogeneous nature of environmental controls across industries and space. They also
emphasize the issue of aggregation which has the potential of masking idiosyncratic
responses to regulation across sectors. Ederington and Minier (2003) assess envi-
ronmental stringency at the industry-level as the share of PACs in total costs. By
taking into account the endogenous nature of this ratio, they estimate a positive and
significant effect of environmental stringency on net sectoral imports for the United
States. Ederington et al. (2005) discuss the importance of accounting for sectoral
characteristics and the development level of the trading partner. In doing so, they
provide evidence in favor of the PHE for footloose sectors. Their study also points out
to an increase in the United States’ imports from low-income nations in response to
incremental environmental regulation. No such evidence is found for inflows originat-
ing within OECD countries. Levinson and Taylor (2008) circumvent the endogenous
nature of sectoral PACs by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach and find
significant PHE supporting evidence. Specifically, a 1% increase in PACs is equiva-
lent to a 0.4% increase in net imports from Mexico. A similar change in PACs entails
a 0.6% increase in net inflows from Canada. Kellenberg (2009) seems to be the first
study to provide evidence for the pollution heaven effect within a cross-sectional data
environment. Their identification strategy is based on a game-theoretical approach
to policy determination. This framework identifies two channels, and therefore two
sets of instruments, through which manufacturing costs, and environmental and trade
policies are determined. By using a first-differenced instrumental variable estimation
setup and the ratification of Kyoto protocol as treatment, Aichele and Felbermayr
(2012) provide support for the pollution haven effect of IEAs. For parties which rati-
fied the protocol with a binding emission cap, their estimates underline a 14% increase
refer to McGuire (1982).
15Refer to Kalt (1985), Robison (1988), Tobey (1990), Grossman and Krueger (1991), Hettige
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in the ratio of imported to domestic emissions. Broner et al. (2012) use meteorolog-
ical factors to construct regional pollution dispersal potentials. They then make the
argument that regions/nations with low dispersal potentials are more likely to pursue
stricter environmental regulation. Using this as an instrument, the authors underline
a deleterious effect of environmental regulation on comparative advantage and ex-
ports. As for the size of the PHE, the estimates are difficult to compare. Recall that
the studies discussed above use different measures of environmental stringency (share
of PACs in total costs, or value added, joining diverse IEAs) and various outcomes of
interest (imports, exports, their "net" counterparts, or births of plants)16.
The current work is concerned with IEAs as a source of comparative disadvantage,
and whether their impact is larger for pollution-intensive sectors. This angle contrasts
with previous studies which focused mainly on production abatement costs as a mea-
sure of environmental stringency. Two channels may be at play should IEAs engender
a loss of competitiveness for "dirty" industries. First, Heckscher-Ohlin, general equi-
librium effects underline the possibility of environmental regulation benefiting the
"clean" sectors while harming their "dirty" counterparts. The underlying mechanism
is simple: some resources employed within the "dirty" sectors, which shrink as a result
of regulation, are freed up and can be cheaply employed within the "clean" sectors
which, in turn, expand. In this scenario, IEA engagement implies a compositional
shift in a nation’s production and exporting clusters, with "clean" sectors account-
ing for a larger share of output and outflows. Conversely, increased environmental
regulation may negatively impact "clean" industries as well. This follows naturally
as industries are heavily inter-connected through upstream and downstream linkages.
In this case, the rise of production costs within the pollution-intensive sectors may
spill over into the least polluting ones through more costlier inputs (e.g., energy)
or transportation17. According to this second scenario, the ratification of IEAs im-
plies competitiveness losses and lower exports across the board, regardless of sectoral
pollution-intensity.
This study complements those employing the gravity model of international trade
et al. (1992), Mani and Wheeler (1998), and Kahn (2000) among others.
16For example, Levinson and Taylor (2008) estimate elasticities of the United States’ gross imports
from Mexico and Canada to share of PACs in value added at 0.49 in both cases. Regarding net
import penetration (from non-OECD countries) and environmental costs (as share of PACs in total
costs), Ederington et al. (2005) estimate an elasticity of 0.2.
17Based on World Input Output Tables (WIOT) data (Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al.,
2013; Timmer et al., 2015), for the 14 manufacturing industries considered here, the sector-specific
share of domestically sourced intermediate inputs in gross output is 28.60%. The share excludes
inputs sourced within the same industry (i.e., from transport equipment by transport equipment).
Also, the average ratio of "dirty" and domestically sourced intermediate inputs to "clean" gross
output is 5.4%. The ratio is calculated using the binary pollution-intensity measure outlined earlier
(i.e., based on 75th percentile of the CO2 intensity distribution). The WIOT data is available for
40 nations (all 27 European Union members (in 2011) plus 13 other nations: Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Taiwan, and the
United States) from 1995 to 2009.
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to analyze the effects of environmental policy on trade flows18. Perhaps the most
relevant, Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) analyze the effect of ratifying one IEA, the
Kyoto protocol19, on imports, carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity of imports, and the
CO2 content of imports. Taking into account the bilateral structure of their dataset,
they address the non-random selection into the protocol through the inclusion of ex-
porter and importer time-varying "fixed" effects. Their estimates are robust to the use
of ratification of Statuses of the International Criminal Court as an instrument for
adopting the Kyoto protocol. Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) provide strong evidence
in favor of the pollution haven effect. The result most relevant to the current study
is the effect of Kyoto ratification on imports. Specifically, an importer which ratifies
the protocol with a binding emission cap sees its inflows increasing by 5%. Given the
bilateral and balanced nature of their dataset, the exact opposite can be inferred for
exports (i.e., that they decrease by 5%). These declines are larger in more pollution-
intensive industries such as basic metals (i.e., -20%). For relatively "cleaner" sectors,
such as textiles and leather, there is evidence of increased exports of 12%. For a
number of sectors, such as chemicals and petrochemicals, Kyoto ratification appears
to have had a rather small (i.e., 2%) and statistically insignificant effect on outflows.
This evidence is in line with the two general equilibrium channels identified above.
First, in the wake of Kyoto ratification, some "clean" industries seem to expand at the
expense of their "dirty" counterparts; possibly through the employment of production
factors released from pollution-intensive sectors. Second, some other industries seem
to shrink, perhaps due to spillover effects (i.e., rising costs, and prices) within indus-
tries from which intermediate inputs are acquired. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013)
use matching techniques to account for self-commitment to the Kyoto protocol. In
doing so, they find that adopting a binding emission cap under the protocol entails a
decline in exports of about 15%. Further, the authors uncover that among the most
impacted are energy intensive sectors such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and
chemicals, as well as machinery and equipment.
3.3 International Environmental Agreements at a Glance
The design of most IEAs follows a well-established pattern. Initially, participat-
ing nations adopt a framework convention which outlines the rules, special provisions,
objectives, and other fundamental principles under which subsequent arrangements,
known as a protocols, are mediated. As part of protocols to the framework con-
vention, parties negotiate consumption and production reduction targets as well as
emission caps for one or more substances. Means of achieving the proposed targets,
such as the promotion of research and development, the exchange of information, the
18Aichele and Felbermayr (2015); De Santis (2012); Grether and De Melo (2003); Grether et al.
(2012); Jug and Mirza (2005) provide evidence for the PHE. Cagatay and Mihci (2006); van Beers
and van den Bergh (1997) find some evidence of a negative effect of environmental regulation on
exports. Others, Xu (2000); van Beers and van den Bergh (2000); Harris et al. (2002); Kee et al.
(2010) do not find evidence for the PHE.
19In their study, only the countries which ratified the Kyoto protocol with a binding emission
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sharing of technology among parties, and/or product standards are also discussed.
Sometimes protocols are accompanied by one or more amendments. Often, these
incorporate additional phase-out schedules, emission targets, and/or ways of achiev-
ing such targets that were not previously included within the protocol. Just as with
the framework convention and the associated protocols, amendments also follow the
same three-step, adoption process: signature, ratification, and entry into force. The
IEAs considered span three major categories, each briefly described in what follows.
The descriptions are based on the treaty texts provided by the International Envi-
ronmental Agreements Database Project (Mitchell (2016)) and are not meant to be
exhaustive. Instead, they are aimed at providing the reader with a broad overview of
the IEAs considered and the manufacturing sectors which they are likely to impact.
An IEA adoption time-line is presented in table 3.5.
3.3.1 Acid Rain IEAs
IEA’s designed to tackle the issue of air pollution and its transboundary effects
were adopted as part of the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP). The signatory and enforcing parties are, to a large extent,
represented by Canada, present members of the European Union, Norway, Russia,
Switzerland, and the United States.
The first accompanying protocol, Helsinki (1985), mandates the parties to an im-
mediate, or by 1993 at the latest, 30% reduction in sulphur emissions. The 1980 emis-
sion levels were used as a basis for the calculation of reduction targets. The protocol
also encouraged parties to reduce sulphur emissions beyond the initial mark of 30%.
Addressing the same pollutant, the Oslo (1994) protocol introduced party-specific re-
duction targets20. Under this protocol, parties were also mandated to increase energy
efficiency. This included the application of national standards with regards to the
sulphur content of gasoline, jet kerosene, diesel, marine diesel, or fuel oil. The major
sources of sulphur emissions include the combustion processes in the power generat-
ing, basic and fabricated metal, and coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel sectors.
Industries which process titanium dioxide, such as chemicals and chemical products,
other non-metallic minerals, and pulp, paper, printing and publishing sectors were
also identified as major emitters of sulphur21.
Under the 1988 Sofia protocol, parties pledged to bring nitrogen oxide (NOx) emis-
sions to their 1987 levels by 1995. Parties also agreed to negotiate further discharge
reductions, and introduced emission standards as well as controls for major emission
sources. Under the auspices of the same protocol, participating nations agreed to
make unleaded fuel "sufficiently" available no later than two years after the protocol
entered into force. Among the sectors affected by the enforcement of Sofia (1988) pro-
cap are regarded as de-facto ratifiers. These are known as Annex II countries and are also listed in
table 3.6.
20These are inscribed in Annex II of the protocol. For year 2000, the reduction targets range
from 11% for Croatia to 83% for Germany. 1980 is considered as the base year.
21In a 2006 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (Sanz Sánchez et al.
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tocol one can count the machinery, transport equipment, and the electricity/power
generating sectors22. Also impacted were the non-metallic minerals23, basic metals
and fabricated metal products, as well as coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel industries. Adding to these, pulp production is also associated with high
emissions of nitrogen oxides.
The 1991 Geneva protocol to LRTAP was geared towards reducing emissions of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Specifically, parties agreed to decrease their
emissions of VOCs by at least 30% by 1999. 1988 levels were used as base for reduction
calculations. However, if the emissions were transboundary in nature, the offending
party had to ensure that, by 1999, these fluxes were decreased by 30% while also
bringing its domestic VOC emissions below their 1988 levels. Given the VOC emission
reduction guidelines included in the protocol, industries such as petroleum, chemical
and chemical products, food and beverages, fabricated metal, and agriculture are
more likely to be impacted. Other sectors, such as transport equipment, in which
degreasing agents, paints, inks, and glues were heavily used, are also expected to
have been affected by the protocol ratification.
The Aarhus (1994) protocol mandated reductions for discharges of heavy metals
(cadmium, lead, and mercury). Although no specific targets were introduced for
annual emission levels, the protocol did emphasize concrete emission caps for major
discharge sources. For new stationary sources, these limits were mandated to be
achieved in two years after the protocol’s entry into force24. For existing sources,
eight years were awarded. Most of these sources were identified as various combustion
processes employed across an array of industrial sectors. Among these one can count
coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, basic metals and fabricated metal, and other
non-metallic minerals25. In addition, the protocol provided very detailed guidance
regarding the instruments and mechanisms through which heavy metal emissions can
be contained, reduced, or virtually eliminated26. The Aarhus protocol also mandated
parties to set standards on the lead content of fuel used by on-the-road vehicles27.
Under the Aarhus protocol of 1998, parties were mandated to cease the produc-
tion and use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in accordance to their specific
timetables. However, some exemptions regarding the use of POPs were allowed28. The
(2006)), titanium dioxide is identified as "the most important white pigment".
22According to the emission reduction guidelines included in the protocol manufacturers may be
mandated to equip vehicles with catalytic converters, more efficient engines, or injection systems.
23The cement as well as glass production processes are notoriously NOx-intensive. See table 3.10.
24A new stationary source is defined as any source "of which the construction or substantial
modification is commenced after the expiry of two years from the date of entry into force of: (i) the
protocol [...]".
25This includes the production of glass and cement. For example lead was identified as an
intermediate input in the production of crystal glass and cathode ray tubes.
26For example, protocol’s annex III discusses an array of heavy metal emission control techniques.
It also provides data on the performance of dust cleaning devices such as filters, and scrubbers.
27Under the protocol, an upper limit of 0.013 grams of lead per liter of unleaded fuel was mandated
for introduction no later than six months after the protocol entered into force.
28The use of DDT, a pesticide, was permitted only in cases of absolute necessity (i.e., malaria
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protocol also mandated environmentally sound strategies for recycling, destruction,
and disposal of POPs. Similar to the 1994 Aarhus protocol, the current agreement
also included a list of specific emission caps applicable to different stationary sources.
The time allowance for meeting these limitations was also conditional on the source
status (i.e., new or existing). In accordance with the identified discharge sources,
some of the affected industrial branches include energy production, basic metals and
fabricated metals, chemicals and chemical products, and agriculture29.
Finally, the 1999 Gothenburg protocol was aimed at targeting discharges associ-
ated with all of the previously introduced pollutants plus ammonia. In addition to
the provisions introduced as part of previous arrangements, the protocol added party-
specific, emission reduction targets for sulphur compounds (SO2), nitrogen oxides
(NOx), ammonia (NH3), and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC)30.
Further, emission caps for major stationary discharge sources were introduced, or
updated if previous figures were already present. In accordance with provided time
tables, the Gothenburg protocol also introduced tailpipe emission limits for passen-
ger cars, light and heavy-duty vehicles, motorcycles, and mopeds as well as non-road
vehicles and machinery. New standards for marketed fuels were also added under the
same agreement.
It is worth noting that all of the above protocols include extensive technical an-
nexes which provided detailed information on readily available, emission reducing
technologies by pollutant and emission source, as well as data on costs, and guide-
lines regarding means of implementation. The central idea behind the provision of
such information was to facilitate and expedite the emission reduction process for
participating members.
3.3.2 Ozone Depletion IEAs
IEAs aimed at reducing and controlling the emission of substances with ozone
altering and depletion characteristics were adopted under the auspices of the 1985
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL). These comprise
the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its
subsequent amendments, London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Montreal (1997), and
Beijing (1999). Broadly, the Montreal protocol was centered around limiting the
consumption and production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and bromofluorocarbons
(BFCs) relative to their calculated 1986 levels31. In addition, it also introduced
and encephalitis outbreaks) and for only one year after its production was stopped.
29After-crop incineration was identified as an important source of POP emissions.
30Emission reduction targets refer to 2010 relative to their 1990 levels. Across all four pollutants
these range between 0% and 90%. For example, in the case of NO2, Armenia, Croatia, and Greece
faced a 0% target whereas Czech Republic and Germany committed to a 61% and 60% discharge
drop.
31Calculated levels are obtained in a two-step process. First, the annual production of each
controlled substance is multiplied by its ozone depleting potential. Second, the obtained figures are
aggregated across all substances within a given category (consumption and production). For CFCs
and BFCs, the average ozone depleting potentials are 0.88 and 6.33, respectively.
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a phase-out timetable for the substances noted above. For example, by 1990, the
annual production and consumption of CFCs should not have exceeded the 1986
calculated levels. A similar stipulation, but with 1993 as a deadline, was made for
BFCs. By 1994, the annual consumption and production of CFCs was subjected to
a 20% reduction. By 1999, these counts were marked for a 50% decrease. Under
the protocol, developing countries were granted preferential treatment. Specifically,
they were allowed to delay, by as much as 10 years, their compliance with the above
timetable; as long as their consumption of controlled substances did not exceed certain
levels. Regarding production, and for most substances, developing countries were
allowed to exceed the reduction limits noted above by no more than 10 percentage
points.
Subsequent amendments to the Montreal protocol targeted new substances with
ozone altering or depleting features. These also introduced phase-out schedules, for
both the newly added and already targeted compounds. For example, the 1990 Lon-
don amendment expanded the list of initial CFCs. Relative to their 1989 calculated
levels, the amendment mandated a 20% reduction by 1993, 85% by 1997, and a com-
plete elimination by 2000. BFCs were also commissioned for a complete phase-out by
year 2000. The amendment also added two solvents, carbon tetrachloride and methyl
chloroform, to the list of controlled substances. Both substances were scheduled
for outright withdrawal by 2000, and 2005, respectively32. Hydrochlorfluorocarbons
(HCFCs), also known as transitional substances, were developed as alternatives to
CFCs but these compounds also display ozone depletion characteristics, albeit much
lower than that of CFCs. HCFCs were placed in the bin of controlled substances
under the 1992 Copenhagen amendment. This class of compounds is scheduled for
an outright displacement by 203033. The Copenhagen amendment also mandated the
phase-out of hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) by 1996. In addition, it expedited
the complete exclusion of CFCs, BFCs, and carbon tetrachloride from consumption
and production by 1995, 1993, and 1995, respectively. The 1997 Montreal amendment
introduced a timetable for limiting the use and production of methyl bromide. Specif-
ically, it emphasized a reduction of 25% by 1999, 50% by 2001, and 70% by 2003. A
complete phase-out was mandated by 2005. Critical use conditions and exemptions
pertaining to the use of this substance were also included in the amendment. The
1999 Beijing amendment mandated a complete phase-out of bromochloromethane by
2002. Additionally, it imposed significant consumption and production limitations on
HCFCs, thus accelerating their phase-out process. Thus, each participating nation
was required to commit itself to a 2.8% cap relative to the 1989 calculated levels.
The ordinary IEA is centered on setting production standards which apply only
to ratifying parties. In addition, the VCPOL agreements also impose product stan-
32Carbon tetrachloride consumption and production were mandated for an 85% and 100% re-
duction by 1995 and 2000, respectively. Similarly, methyl chloroform followed a similar phase out
schedule; 0%, 30%, 70%, and 100% by 1993, 1995, 2000, and 2005. The reductions are relative to
the 1989 levels.
33Relative to their aggregate 1989 level, the phase-out schedule for these substances was set at
0%, 35%, 65%, 90%, 95%, and 100% by 1996, 2004, 2010, 2015, 2020, and 2030, respectively.
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dards which also affect non-ratifying nations. It is, therefore, of crucial importance
to acknowledge that the Montreal protocol and its subsequent amendments deviate
from the typical IEA structure, as they include special provisions regarding interna-
tional trade with non-members. This way, the possibility of leakage is significantly
reduced. Specifically, parties were required to ban imports of controlled substances
from non-participating parties starting 1990. Beginning 1992, parties were also man-
dated to elaborate an annex of products containing the controlled substances and
ban their imports from non-members one year after the annex becomes effective. A
similar treatment was outlined for wares produced with, but not containing, the sub-
stances targeted under the protocol. Parties were also discouraged from exporting
to non-members any technology that may be used for the production of controlled
substances. However, the parties were encouraged to export any technologies that
facilitate the development of substitute substances, as well as the containment, cap-
turing, recycling, or destruction of controlled substances.
According to a report published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(Sanz Sánchez et al. (2006)), the substances targeted by the Montreal protocol were
used in diverse industrial processes across several manufacturing industries. These
include electronics and optical equipment where the substances served as cleaning
and degreasing agents for circuit boards, and machinery n.e.c. where the substances
aided as refrigerants for household and industrial air conditioning units, refrigerators,
or freezers. The controlled substances were also used as aerosol propellants in the
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, or as solvents for the dry cleaning services. The
compounds addressed under the protocol were also used for the manufacturing of
insulating foams, or as refrigerants in mobile air conditioning units, both of which
were passed downstream to the transport equipment sector.
3.3.3 Climate Change IEAs
Climate change IEAs were adopted as part of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Their end objective focuses on limiting
and curbing anthropogenic emissions of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) not covered by
the Montreal protocol34.
Concrete GHG emission reduction targets were introduced as part of the Kyoto
(1997) protocol to the UNFCCC. These are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sul-
phur hexafluoride (SF6). The principal provisions of the protocol are centered around
the reduction of aggregate GHG emissions35 rather than the reduction of discharges
for each GHG in part. Both the UNFCCC convention and the Kyoto protocol argued
for "common but differentiated" responsibilities among parties. In this regard, some
adopters pledged to reduce, keep unchanged, or increase by a limited amount their
34"Anthropogenic emissions" refer to emissions that are the result, direct or indirect, of human
activity.
35Emissions of various GHGs can be packaged together using specific global warming potentials
(GWPs), calculated for a given period of time. For Kyoto purposes, a 100 year period was chosen.
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aggregate emissions relative to 1990 levels36. Targets for the 2013 - 2020 window were
added as part of the Doha (2012) amendment to the Kyoto protocol. These are not
detailed here given the time frame of the analysis. Aside from adopting quantitative
reduction or limitation commitments (QERLCs), developed parties37 were also des-
ignated to spearhead, through domestic policies and other instruments, the effort of
achieving significant reductions of GHG discharges by 2005. Additional dispositions,
such as the provision of financial assistance and transfer of technologies towards the
developing parties, were also included. A key difference between the Kyoto protocol
and other international environmental accords (i.e., the protocols to the Convention
on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution or the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer) is the lesser degree of technical detail
with regards to the means of bringing emissions down to their pre-1990 levels. Un-
der the Kyoto protocol, parties were awarded significant flexibility for tackling the
emissions issue through various market based strategies (i.e., emission trading be-
tween Annex I parties, Joint Implementation, and Clean Development Mechanism38)
(Grubb, 2003).
Given the GHGs falling under the jurisdiction of the protocol, all industrial sec-
tors are expected to be impacted since CO2 discharges are characteristic to the entire
spectrum of industrial processes. However, the effects are expected to be relatively
larger in those sectors where emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hy-
drofluorocarbons, pentafluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride are particularly high.
Some of these sectors, such as energy production and transportation, rely heavily
on fuel combustion. Additionally, industrial processes in sectors such as coke, refined
petroleum and nuclear fuel, chemicals and chemical products, other non-metallic min-
erals, as well as electronics and electrical equipment generate significant emissions of
the GHGs outlined above (Sanz Sánchez et al., 2006).
3.4 Data and Variable Construction
The data universe is represented by 163 countries, observed as exporters and
importers across 14, ISIC 2 Rev. 3, manufacturing sectors between 1976 and 201139.
Data on sectoral export flows is obtained from COMTRADE. These were further
re-classified from SITC Rev. 2 into ISIC. Rev. 3.
GWPs for the GHGs covered are 1, 21, and 310 for CO22, CH4, and N2O, respectively. For HFCs,
PFCs, and SF6 these vary from 140 to 23,900. GWP figures are from (Albritton et al., 1995).
36These are referred to as Annex I countries. Parties also have the option of choosing to reduce
emissions jointly. This is the case of European Union members which together pledged an 8%
reduction in GHG discharges. However, EU members also adopted individual targets. Refer to table
3.6 for details.
37These are referred to as Annex II countries. See table 3.6.
38This strategy emphasizes investment projects aimed at lowering GHG emissions in developing
countries.
39Refer to tables 3.7, and 3.4 for details.
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3.4.1 IEA Membership
Information on each nation’s IEA membership is gathered from the International
Environmental Agreements Database Project (Mitchell (2016)). It is important to
note that only protocols and amendments are considered as IEAs40. In addition, only
the ratified protocols and amendments are used. As it is standard in the literature,
the ratification year is preferred to that of signature or entry into force as the official
treatment date41. Often times, the signature of IEAs is just a formality, with no
immediate implications for the parties nor on their future ratification decision. For
example, the United States signed the Kyoto protocol in 1998 but failed to ratify as it
did not gather the required domestic support. Also, by choosing the treatment year
as that of entry into force, one rules out the possibility of capturing any anticipatory
effects that do occur.
As in Slechten and Verardi (2014), this work focuses on the count of interna-
tional environmental agreements (IEAs) as a measure of environmental commitment.
Slechten and Verardi (2014) emphasize a clear and significant degree of overlap be-
tween IEAs. For instance, IEAs aimed at reducing sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions
could also lead to a reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as these pollutants
are often spewed into the atmosphere together, as part of the same industrial pro-
cesses. This point is further supported by the sectoral emission intensity rankings
shown in table 3.10.
However, the bundling of an entire spectrum of IEAs (i.e., climate change, acid
rain, and ozone depletion) may be too strong of an assumption; since this particular
approach implies analogous effects for each agreement added to the bundle, regardless
of type. In line with the previously mentioned study, the IEAs under scrutiny will
be divided into three major categories: acid rain (AR), ozone depletion (OD), and
climate change (CC)42. The rationale behind the split is simple and revolves around
the idea that IEAs belonging to the same convention are more likely to have a homo-
geneous effect on a certain pollutant, or group of pollutants. For instance, the use of
closed-loop catalysts in gas powered passenger cars, initially aimed at reducing emis-
sions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), may also lead to significant declines in emissions of
volatile organic compounds (VOC). Also, alternative techniques for reducing (NOx)
emissions may also result in lower sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. Reductions in
NOx emissions were mandated under the 1988 Sofia Protocol to the 1979 Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). Similarly, reductions in
VOC, and SO2 emissions were targeted as part of the Geneva (1991), Helsinki (1985)
40The framework conventions are not included. As it is often the case, this type of agreements only
sketch the rules under which the protocols and agreements are negotiated and/or provides guidelines
regarding the institutional or funding mechanisms; without including any specific emission targets or
phase-out schedules. This kind of agreement is expected to have negligible effects on firms, sectors,
and exports.
41Slechten and Verardi (2014) and Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) are just two studies, among
many others, considering ratification rather than signature or entry into force as the treatment date.
42The only climate change IEA is the Kyoto protocol. The two terms will be used interchangeably
throughout.
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and Oslo (1994) protocols to the same LRTAP Convention.
A number of studies highlighted the endogenous nature of IEA membership (Aichele
and Felbermayr, 2015, 2013, 2012; Antweiler et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 1995;
Grether and De Melo, 2003; Ederington and Minier, 2003; Kellenberg, 2009; Kellen-
berg and Levinson, 2014; Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Analyzing the effect of IEAs on
trade, using a gravity framework and a panel dataset, is highly desirable in addressing
this issue. Specifically, this setup allows for the inclusion of exporter and importer
time-varying "fixed" effects which, in turn, tend to successfully account for the en-
dogenous selection into IEAs. This feature is present in all econometric specifications
used in the current analysis.
3.4.2 Sectoral Pollution
Continuous Pollution Measures
Data on sectoral emissions and output are from the Environmental and Socio-
Economic Accounts of the World Input Output Database (Genty et al., 2012)43. In
accordance with Hettige et al. (1992), Hettige et al. (1995), Aichele and Felbermayr
(2015) and Broner et al. (2012), I first define sectoral "dirtiness" as annual emissions
relative to annual output. This ratio is further referred to as emission intensity44.
Data on sectoral emissions is available only for a subsample of 40 countries between
1995 and 2009; a time frame that is significantly narrower than the 1976-2011 time
horizon on which the current study focuses45. Nevertheless, since the current analysis
is not concerned with the technique effects of IEAs46, this limitation is of limited
importance. Given that emission intensity rankings tend to be correlated across time
and countries47 (Grether and De Melo, 2003; Grether et al., 2012; Hettige et al., 1995),
sectoral averages from the WIOD subsample are used as "dirtiness" proxies for the
entire sample period48.
43Emission data is available for carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), carbon monoxide (CO),
sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitrogen oxides (NOx), non-methane volatile organic
compounds (NMVOC), and ammonia (NH3).
44Sectoral emission intensities are expressed in kilograms per $1,000 of output at 2005 prices.
Sectoral output is deflated using sector specific price indexes.
45An extension of this work focuses entirely on the 40 country and 15 year subsample outlined
above.
46As per the logic of Grossman and Krueger (1991), and Antweiler et al. (2001) the technique
effect denotes the changes in sectoral emission intensities brought about by the ratification of IEAs.
47Own correlation analyses of emission intensities, calculated for the WIOD subsample but not
reported here, emphasize that sectoral "dirtiness" rankings are indeed correlated across time and
countries. For example, an industry which was "dirty" in 1995 (i.e., basic metals and fabricated
metal) is likely to be "dirty" in 2009. For the 8 pollutants considered, the average correlation
coefficient hovers around 0.5. Additionally, an industry which is classified as "dirty" within one
country (i.e., chemicals and chemical products) is very likely to be classified as "dirty" in another
country. Regarding this latter dimension, average correlation coefficients situate around 0.95.
48For example, the average CO2 intensity for the basic metals and fabricated metal sector from
the WIOD subsample (e.g., 675 kg/$1,000) will be assigned to all rows pertaining to this industry,
regardless of time, exporter, or importer. Refer to table 3.10 for more details.
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Binary Pollution Measures
For the ease of interpretation, I also consider binary measures of sectoral pollution
intensity. I follow previous studies (Kahn, 2000; Broner et al., 2012) and assign sectors
into "clean" and "dirty" bins based on the properties of the associated CO2 emission
intensity distribution. Mean and 75th percentile cut-offs are similar and identify
other non-metallic minerals, coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, basic metals
and fabricated metal, and chemicals and chemical products as "dirty" sectors. A cut-
off level set at the 50th percentile adds pulp, paper, printing and publishing to the
list of emission-intensive sectors. The bins are, to a large extent, preserved across
pollutants. Also, the most CO2-intensive sectors are topping the emission intensity
rankings for pollutants targeted by acid rain IEAs (i.e., SOx, NOx, NMVOC, and
NH3). Interestingly, the 75th percentile-based "dirty" bins are similar to those of other
related studies. Some of these have used pollution abatement costs per unit of value
added (output, or total costs) or capital intensity to quantify sectoral "dirtiness"49.
Unless specified otherwise, the 75th percentile measure is considered throughout.
IEA-Specific Pollution Measures
At this point, it is worth recalling the eight pollutants considered and the IEA
types addressing them. Climate change agreements are aimed at emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxides (N2O) while acid rain IEAs are
angled at emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), non-methane
volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), and ammonia (NH3). Directly, none of these
pollutants are the focus of ozone depletion IEAs. Given the multitude of substances
addressed by each IEA type, the ideal "dirtiness" measure should include the max-
imum amount of information on all relevant emission intensities. A "close to ideal"
pollution-intensity measure can be constructed using a principal component analysis.
Initially, I am considering the emission intensity measures for all eight pollutants.
This first PC analysis is detailed in table 3.1 and figure 3.9. The PC analysis yields
three principal components which, between them, account for 99% of the variance
in the eight emission intensity measures. Usually, all principal components with an
eigenvalue higher or equal to 1 are relevant. However, provided the current objective
(i.e., including principal components as covariates for "dirtiness" accounting), only the
first, PC1, is retained as the only component with positive loadings on all emissions.
By itself, PC1 embodies roughly 60% of the information incorporated in the emission
intensities. This principal component is used just as a regular covariate for estimation
purposes. Second, table 3.2 and figure 3.10 showcase the PC analysis for emission
intensities of climate change pollutants. Here, the first principal component (PC1
CC) accounts for 56% of the variance displayed by the CO2, CH4, and N2O intensity
measures. Third, the PC analysis for acid rain pollutants is shown in table 3.3 and
figure 3.11. Similar to the previous two, the first principal component (PC1 AR)
accounts for 58% of the variance characterizing emission intensities for SOx, NOx,
49Jänicke et al. (1997), Mani and Wheeler (1998), Ederington et al. (2005), Kellenberg (2009),
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NMVOC, and NH3. Given the unavailability of data, no PC analysis is conducted for
substances with ozone depletion characteristics.
As noted earlier, data on emissions for substances targeted under the Montreal
protocol (i.e., CFCs and HCFCs) is not available. Further, this lack of information
renders the process of calculating sectoral emission intensities impossible. Instead,
I make use of the data provided within a 2006 IPCC report (Sanz Sánchez et al.,
2006) about industrial processes which result in HCFC and HFC emissions, across
a range of ISIC Rev. 3 manufacturing sectors. The report also lists a number of
products in which HFCs and HCFCs are used as production inputs50. I augment these
insights with data from the EORA MRIO Project (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). Using
information on HFC emissions and sectoral output, I find that transport equipment
and textiles and wearing apparel are leading other sectors in terms of HFC emission
intensity by a notable margin. Based on the above, the following sectors are identified
as "dirty" from the perspective of Montreal protocol and its subsequent amendments:
transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment, machinery n.e.c., textiles and
textile products, together with leather and footwear.
3.5 Empirics
The covariates of interest are constructed using the count of ratified IEAs. First,
a linear, relative measure of environmental stringency, for a given pair (x,m) at time
t, is constructed as the difference between the number of agreements ratified by the
exporter (IEAsx,t), and by the importer (IEAsm,t).
d(IEA)x,m,t = IEAsx,t − IEAsm,t (3.1)
In addition to this, a second measure of relative stringency is built as shown in
(3.2). The added virtue of this variable consists in its non-linearity, a characteristic
which makes identification possible when unobserved heterogeneity is more rigorously
accounted for. This non-linear feature also implies, perhaps realistically, diminishing
marginal effects to IEAs ratification51. The correlation between the linear relative
environmental stringency difference and its non-linear counterpart is 0.844.
d(IEA)2x,m,t =
IEAs2x,t − IEAs2m,t
(IEAsx,t + 1)(IEAsm,t + 1)
(3.2)
Grether et al. (2012)
50CFCs and HCFCs were heavily used as refrigerants in stationary and mobile air conditioning
units. These substances were also used for the manufacturing of various foams, or solvents used for
high precision cleaning. It is worth pointing out that starting in the early 1990s these substances
were replaced/substituted by HFCs. HFCs fall under the jurisdiction of Kyoto protocol.





IEAx,t(IEAx,t + 2) + IEA2m,t




= −2(IEAm,t − 1)(IEAx,t + 1)3 ≤ 0
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The third and fourth covariates of interest are the exporter and importer-specific
counts of ratified IEAs, IEAsx,t, and IEAsm,t. The conventional discussion regarding
the expected signs on the attached coefficients, for these four measures, is provided
within the relevant section below.
Besides accounting for any omitted trade determinants, the empirical strategies
outlined in this section are also designed to address the crucial issue of endogenous
selection into IEAs. For example, one could reasonably argue, that trade and selec-
tion into IEAs are simultaneously determined. Specifically, larger degrees of trade
openness are positively correlated with national wealth which, in turn, is correlated
with an increased likelihood of ratifying IEAs. This dynamic is clearly emphasized in
figures 3.1 and 3.6 through 3.8. Also, the endogenous selection of nations in IEAs has
been extensively discussed within the literature. Often, an approach to this issue is
the use of various instrumental variables (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2015, 2013; Broner
et al., 2012; Kellenberg, 2009; Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Jug and Mirza, 2005; Ed-
erington and Minier, 2003). But, the endogeneity of IEAs is very similar to that of
economic integration agreements (EIAs). And, unlike the former category of agree-
ments, EIAs have been largely analyzed by using gravity-type frameworks (Baldwin
and Taglioni, 2006; Regolo, 2013; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Baier et al., 2014;
Soete and Van Hove, 2015). Hence the solution of including exporter and importer
time-varying effects for capturing any unobserved factors that might determine the
adoption of EIAs and IEAs.
3.5.1 Non-Linear Relative Environmental Stringency
Empirical Model
The effect of relative environmental stringency on international trade flows is an-
alyzed within a standard gravity framework. The benchmark results are produced
using the non-linear environmental differential. The first specification is depicted in
(3.3), where (x,m,t) denotes an exporter-importer pair at a given point in time, t.
Tx,m,s,t denotes export flows from exporter x to importer m in sector s during a given
year, t. The variable of interest, d(IEA)2x,m,t, denotes the non-linear difference in the
stocks of ratified IEAs between the exporter and importer whereas Ds represents a
measure of sectoral pollution-intensity. Ds is defined as in section 3.4.2, either as a
continuous52, principal component-based, or binary measure; nevertheless it is time
invariant in all three cases. Under the assumption of "IEAs as source of comparative
disadvantage", the expected sign on β1 is ambiguous for the two reasons already out-
lined in section 3.253. However, a negative sign is expected on the coefficient attached
52The natural logarithm transformation is used in this case.
53β1 could be positive. Lower output within pollution-intensive sectors, and therefore unemploy-
ment of production factors, may arise as a result of IEA adoption. One potential general equilibrium
effect outlines the expansion of less pollution-intensive sectors through the employment of these idle
factors. β1 could also be negative. This effect may arise if increases in production costs within the
pollution-intensive sectors spill over into the least polluting counterparts through more expensive
inputs, transportation alternatives, etc.
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to the interaction term d(IEA)2x,m,t ×Ds, β2. In other words, the more environmen-
tally committed the exporter becomes and the higher the sectoral pollution intensity,
the lower the export flows. TAx,m,t accounts for the level of economic integration54
characterizing an exporter-importer pair, (x,m) at time, t. Finally, µx,m,s,t represents
the error term.
lnTx,m,s,t = β1d(IEA)2x,m,t + β2d(IEA)2x,m,t ×Ds + γTAx,m,t + µx,m,s,t (3.3)
A discussion regarding the modeling of the error term, µx,m,s,t, is in line. Trade
flows between exporter x and importerm within sector s are determined by an array of
time-invariant and time-varying factors. Often, these elements are exporter, importer,
sector, and time specific, or any combination of these four dimensions. Broadly,
these are referred to as multilateral resistance terms (MRTs). Some of these factors
range from geographical, historical, and cultural characteristics to infrastructure and
preferences, to the sectoral supply and demand capacities of both the exporter and
importer55. Within a gravity-type setup, the standard procedure of accounting for
this type of unobserved heterogeneity is the inclusion of exporter×industry×year,
(x, s, t), and importer×industry×year, (m, s, t), effects along with their exporter-
importer, (x,m), peers (Head and Mayer, 2013).56 In line with the above, the error
term is initially modeled as shown in (3.4). It is worth pointing out that a term
β3Ds should be included in specification (3.3). However, since any variation in Ds is
absorbed by the included "fixed" effects, this term is intentionally omitted.
µx,m,s,t = νx,s,t + νm,s,t + νx,m (3.4)
54The economic integration variable was compiled by Jeffrey Bergstrand and his collaborators,
as part of the NSF - Kellogg Institute Data Base on Economic Integration Agreements Project
and is available at http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/. It is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, with
the null value indicating no integration whatsoever. TAx,m,t = 1 is indicative of a non-reciprocal
preferential trade agreement between x and m at time t. Similarly, level 2 denotes joint attendance
within a preferential trade arrangement while level 3 indicates joint participation within a free
trade agreement. If TAx,m,t = 4, x and m are part of a customs union. Level 5 underlines the
joint membership within a common market (i.e., the European Union) while level 6 denotes joint
membership in an economic union (i.e., the Eurozone).
55For example, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) emphasize the importance of price indexes. Under
the assumption that µx,m,s,t is well behaved, a proper estimation of the specification in (3.3) implies
the deflation of export flows by using exporter and sector-specific price indexes. The inclusion of year
dummies (i.e., a time trend) alone would not do justice, as these covariates only capture the common
trend in sectoral prices. Within a given year, however, a significant degree of heterogeneity exists
among the movement of prices across the industrial spectrum. Information on just this dimension
alone is difficult to gather, let alone other trade determinants such as the degree of substitutability
between similar goods, the quality of institutions, etc.
56Until recently, this particular approach, although simple in principle, was computationally
burdensome and time-consuming. This is especially true for the current analysis, which focuses
on a total of 210,627 exporter×importer×sector pairs across a 36 years span. In implementing




The benchmark results are shown in table 3.11. The first column presents the
results recovered by using the binary "dirtiness" measure. The second column shows
the results retrieved by using the first principal component, based on all eight pollu-
tants (PC1). Finally, in the last eight columns sectoral "dirtiness" is measured as the
emission intensity, in one of the available eight pollutants.
The magnitude of coefficients is addressed next. Given the ease of interpretation
brought about by the binary pollution measure, the discussion is centered on the
estimates in the first column. Here, β1 is rather small, but nevertheless negative,
thus underlining a potentially negative effect of IEA ratification on "clean" sectors.
More importantly, however, the environmental commitment differential exhibits a
significant and negative effect on "dirty" exports. Specifically, a 1 unit increase in
the IEA stock differential is associated with a 6% drop in outflows originating within
sectors classified as "dirty"57. From a more intuitive perspective, an additional IEA
ratified by the average exporter implies a 1.75% drop in "dirty" exports58 towards the
average importer.
I now turn to the non-linear effect of IEA ratification. For illustration purposes,
let’s first consider a hypothetical country pair consisting of the average importer and
an exporter with no IEAs adopted so far59. In this first scenario, the marginal effect of
IEA ratification on the exporter side is equivalent to a 9.7% fall in "dirty" exports60.
Now, let’s consider a similar pair, barring that the exporter ratified a total of 12
IEAs instead. In this scenario, the enactment of the 13th IEA (the maximum possible
given the current sample) generates a 1.4% decline in outflows from sectors classified
as "dirty". The effects on "clean" sectors are once again negligible; 0.6% and 0.1%
for ratifying the 1st and the 13th IEA, respectively. The diminishing effect of IEA
ratification is consistent with the non-linear structure of d(IEAs)2, and is relevant
from an economic standpoint61. It is not surprising that earlier stages of adjustment
to a new regulatory environment are relatively costlier for firms and industries.
The results are robust to the various "dirtiness" measures used (i.e., based on the
first principal component (PC1) in column (2) and emission intensity in columns (3)
57Refer to section 3.4.2 for details regarding the "dirty"/"clean" split.
58The dataset is not symmetric and, in turn, a relatively fewer number of exporters is observed. As
a result, the average exporter ratified 4.39 IEAs while the average importer ratified 3.79 agreements.
Together these imply a non-linear differential of approximately 0.19. All else constant, the ratification
of an additional IEA by the exporter increases this wedge to 0.48. The effect of a 1 unit change in
the non-linear differential commitment is equivalent to β1+β2×Ds. Following this rationale, a 0.29
differential change is equivalent to a 1.75% drop in "dirty" exports towards the average importer.
Unless otherwise specified, all results are discussed in the context of the average exporter-importer
pair.
59An exporter-importer pair which comes close to matching this average is Romania and the
Netherlands in 1992. By this time point, Romania ratified no IEAs while the Netherlands have
ratified 4.
60Evaluated at the mean, this effect amounts to a decline in "dirty" exports of USD3.38 million.
In terms of sectoral output, this translates into a 0.06% decline.
61Refer to equation (3.2) for details.
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through (10)) and emphasize the detrimental impact of IEA ratification on exports.
As expected, pollution-intensive sectors are the most affected. The β1 coefficient in
column (3), however, seems to break this pattern. Two aspects are worth discussing
at this point. First, despite the apparently large β1, a negative effect of IEAs on
pollution-intensive sectors still prevails. For a comparative static exercise, involving
the above two points, let’s consider once more the average exporter-importer pair62. If
there was an industry for which the CO2 intensity would be zero, then, an additional
IEA ratified by the exporter would increase its exports by 4.1%. However, such
industry does not exist. The sector with the least amount of CO2 emissions per unit
of output (80.88 kg. CO2/$1,000) is leather and footwear. Based on the estimates in
column (3), the marginal effect of IEA ratification would increase exports of leather
and footwear by 0.4%. Conversely, for the average CO2-intensive industry (260.66kg.
CO2/$1,000), the marginal ratification effect yields a 0.5% decline in exports. A sector
close to this CO2 intensity figure is transport equipment. For the most CO2-intensive
sector, other non-metallic minerals (1862.98kg. CO2/$1,000), the ratification effect
resembles a notable 2.2% drop in outflows. Second, the (+) and (-) signs on β1 and
β2 underline a possible compositional shift regarding export flows. In other words,
export bundles tend to become cleaner, CO2-wise, for nations which become more
environmentally committed, just as discussed in section 3.2. Recall that a potential
general equilibrium effect implies the expansion of "clean" sectors at the expense of
their "dirty" counterparts. Seemingly unusual, the estimates in column (3) are quite
relevant, and in line with intensity measures in columns (4) through (10). Estimates
involving emission intensities for other pollutants paint a similar picture. For the
most polluting sectors, the effect of ratifying an additional IEA range from -2.5%
(e.g., coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel for SOx) to -1.2% (e.g., chemicals and
petrochemicals for N2O). For industries displaying average emission intensities, the
effects range between -0.46% (for NH3) to -0.58% for (CO2). For the least pollution-
intensive industries the marginal ratification effects range between -0.1% (e.g., leather
and footwear for N2O) and +0.6% (e.g, leather and footwear for SOx)63. It is worth
pointing out that the marginal IEA ratification is equivalent with increases of exports
from the least pollution-intensive sectors; regarding six out of the eight pollutants
considered64. This result emphasizes once more the compositional shift in export
flows, which emerges as a consequence of IEA ratification. However, it is worth
bearing in mind that the growth in exports appears to be experienced only by the least
pollution-intensive sectors. This is by no means the case for the sectors displaying
average pollution intensities. The results presented in this section, and throughout
62Refer to footnote 58 for details.
63This last point may be confusing and an explanation may be in order. The leather and footwear
sector is the least polluting in both SOx, and N2O (see table 3.10). If sectoral "dirtiness" is assessed
using SOx emission intensity, then, for the average exporter-importer pair, the ratification of an ad-
ditional IEA by the exporter is equivalent to a 0.1% drop in leather and footwear exports. Similarly,
if the sectoral degree of pollution is assessed based on N2O emissions, ratifying an additional IEA
would boost leather and footwear exports by 0.6%.
64The sector-pollutant pairs are leather and footwear (CO2, NOx, SOx), textiles and textile
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the remainder of this essay, gain in importance given that, on average, the share of
outflows in the exporter’s gross domestic product (GDP) is approximately 29%.
3.5.2 Linear Relative Environmental Stringency
Empirical Model
There is, however, a drawback associated with the use of exporter×industry×year
and importer×industry×year effects. As noted in Head and Mayer (2013), sums, aver-
ages, and differences of exporter and importer-specific variables can no longer be iden-
tified. This is also the case of (dIEA)x,m,t, the linear differential. As a consequence,
its non-linear counterpart is used to produce the benchmark results. A trade-off is
therefore made between the intuition behind the environmental commitment differ-
ential and a comprehensive accounting of any unobserved trade determinants. One
way of retaining and identifying the linear environmental commitment differential in
(3.1) is through the use of symmetric exporter×importer×year effects along with their
exporter×importer×industry counterparts. Additionally, I include industry×year ef-
fects to control for any unobserved, industry-specific and time-varying characteristics.
This way, the error term will be modeled as shown in (3.6). Under the same assump-
tion of "IEAs as source of comparative disadvantage", an ambiguous sign is expected
on β′1. However, β′2 is expected to carry a negative sign. Despite the methodolog-
ical differences, this approach also underlines, very clearly, the negative impact of
environmental regulation on export flows.
lnTx,m,s,t = β′1dIEAx,m,t + β′2dIEAx,m,t ×Ds + γ′TAx,m,t + µ′x,m,s,t (3.5)
µ′x,m,s,t = ν ′x,m,t + ν ′x,m,s + ν ′s,t
ν ′x,m,t = ν ′m,x,t
(3.6)
Results
The results concerning the linear environmental stringency differential are ob-
tained by estimating (3.5) and presented in table 3.12. The organization of the table
is similar to that of table 3.11, discussed earlier.
I proceed by presenting the results in the first column. From here, one can observe
that β′1 is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that the marginal
effect of IEA adoption by the exporter yields a 1.2% decrease in "clean" export flows.
Perhaps more important is the coefficient attached to the interaction term, β′2, which
is significant and carries a negative sign. This denotes a negative effect of joining IEAs
on "dirty" exports as well. Quantitatively, the ratification of an additional IEA by the
exporter yields a 3.1% decrease in outflows from sectors classified as "dirty". However,
due to the use of the linear differential, β′1 implies a constant effect of IEA ratification,
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regardless of whether an exporter ratifies its 1st or its 13th IEA. It is therefore not
surprising that this effect lays within the [-9.7%, -1.4%] interval discussed in section
3.5.1. This estimate is of comparable magnitude and direction with the marginal
ratification effect characterizing the average exporter-importer pair (i.e., -1.75%) also
outlined in section 3.5.1. The wedge between β′1 and β1 owes itself, most likely, to the
use of the linear differential rather than to the modeling of the error term. Note, for
instance, that the bilateral measure of economic integration does not vary with the
error term structure.
The results presented throughout the rest of table 3.12 emphasize a clear and
consistent point. That is, pollution-intensive exports decline as a result of a larger
environmental commitment wedge between the exporter and the importer. Rati-
fication of IEAs by the origin country also seems to have an impact on the least
pollution-intensive sectors. This effect, however, is close to zero. Depending on the
pollution intensity measure, outflows from these sectors may increase or decrease as a
result of joining an IEA. For example exports of leather and footwear (the least SOx-
intensive sector) are estimated to increase by about 1% whereas exports of leather
and footwear (the least CO2-intensive) sector are found to decrease by 0.5%. Never-
theless, the export declines are significantly larger for pollution-intensive sectors. The
implications are robust across the "dirtiness" measures considered. The only deviation
from this pattern seems to appear, once again, in column (3), where the differential
commitment, by itself, is positive, large, and statistically significant. However, the
earlier discussion regarding this seemingly unusual estimate applies here as well. By
taking into account the interaction term, the ratification of an additional agreement
by the exporter is equivalent to a 1.6% drop in outflows originating within the "average
CO2-intensive" sector. Also using estimates from column (3), the effect of ratifying
an additional IEA on exports within the most polluting industry, other non-metallic
minerals, is equivalent to a 3.6% decline in exports. For the cleanest sector, leather
and footwear, the effect is of -0.5%65. Although higher66, most probably due to the
use of linear differential, the results shown in table 3.12 are painting the same pic-
ture as those outlined in the previous section. That is, IEAs seem to be a source
of comparative disadvantage, especially for sectors displaying high emission intensity
ratios. To put these results into perspective, the average effect of sharing a common
border with the importing country is estimated to increase exports by approximately
64%. Similarly, the average effect of joining regional trade agreements is estimated
at 60%67.
The results discussed above are also supported by those in tables 3.13 and 3.14.
Here, the environmental differential effect is estimated on a sector-by-sector basis.
products (CH4, NH3), and machinery n.e.c. (NMVOC).
65The results are calculated for the average exporter-importer pair. Refer to footnote 58 for
details. Cleanest and dirtiest sectors are picked based on the CO2 emission intensity distribution.
Refer to table 3.10 for details.
66The marginal effect of IEA ratification on "dirty" exports, obtained using the linear differential,
is -3.1%. Using the non-linear differential, this effect is -1.75%.
67These figures are surveyed by Head and Mayer (2013) from 159 articles. As the authors note,
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As expected, the impact of marginal IEA ratification is larger for the sectors at the
top of emission intensity rankings, namely other non-metallic minerals. For this in-
dustry, the effect of ratifying an additional IEA by the exporter is equivalent to a
6.6% decline in exports. Sectors such as machinery, rubber and plastics, and trans-
port equipment are notably impacted as well. These results are also expected. For
example, manufacturing of machinery subsumes, among others, the production of
domestic and industrial refrigerators and freezers as well as engines of various kinds.
Manufacturing of refrigerators and freezers is expected to have been affected by the
phase-out, under the Montreal protocol to the VCPOL, of CFCs and HCFCs. These
substances were widely used as cooling agents. The manufacturing of engines in gen-
eral, but especially that of engines for passenger vehicles, is expected to have been
impacted by new standards regarding fuels, combustion processes, efficiency, and
emissions; all implemented in response to the ratification of protocols to the LRTAP
convention. Under the LRTAP IEAs, efficiency guidelines were also set for stationary
emission sources such as industrial ovens, furnaces, and furnace burners; all of which
are products of the machinery sector. For some industries, however, the ratification
of additional IEAs seems to aid exporting (i.e., leather and footwear, manufacturing
n.e.c. and recycling, and wood, and products of wood and cork). According to the
rankings presented in table 3.10, leather and footwear, together with manufacturing
n.e.c. and recycling sectors are also among the cleanest. Provided the discussions
in sections 3.2 and 3.5.1 these results should not surprise. In fact, these estimates
emphasize once more the compositional shift towards "cleaner" outflows for exporters
which adopt a tougher environmental stance. Recall that the ratification of IEAs
hurts exports and most likely production of pollution-intensive sectors. This leads
to unemployment of production factors which, in turn, may be employed within the
least polluting sectors (i.e., that are impacted the least by the adoption of IEAs). Two
additional arguments may be in line with regards to the positive effect of IEA ratifi-
cation on outflows in the manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling sector. First, increased
environmental stringency may incentivize recycling activities. Second, a significant
part of this industrial branch is represented by the manufacturing of furniture from
any material, including recycled metal and non-metal waste, and scrap.
3.5.3 IEA-Specific Linear Relative Environmental Stringency
Empirical Model
By construction, the linear differential implies a constant effect across all IEAs
considered, regardless of their type. As noted earlier, a measure which combines the
entire spectrum of IEAs (i.e., climate change, acid rain, and ozone depletion) may
be regarded as not rigorous enough. Following Slechten and Verardi (2014), three
differential measures will be considered based on the three IEA categories (climate
change, acid rain, and ozone depletion) outlined in section 3.3. The logic behind this
bundling is simple and postulates that trade effects are more likely to be homogenous
these estimates may be upward biased since the most contemporaneous studies employing the gravity
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for IEAs belonging to the same category. The specification thus obtained is shown
in (3.7). Here k denotes the IEA type; namely climate change (CC), acid rain (AR),

















µ′′x,m,s,t = ν ′′x,m,t + ν ′′x,m,s + ν ′′s,t
ν ′′x,m,t = ν ′′m,x,t
(3.8)
Results
The results obtained after separating IEAs by their scope into climate change,
acid rain, and ozone depletion are presented in table 3.15. The estimates are in line
with those discussed earlier. Most importantly, the effects of climate change and acid
rain IEAs on pollution-intensive exports are negative, and statistically significant for
all pollutants considered. Furthermore, only the ratification of acid rain IEAs seems
to adversely affect exports of less pollution-intensive sectors. This dynamic is, most
likely, driven by the transmission of negative shocks from "dirty" sectors towards
their "clean" peers, perhaps through intermediate inputs or transportation linkages68.
Given the implied overall reduction in outflows, the adoption of acid rain IEAs is
characterized by a negative export scale effect. Conversely, "clean" sectors seem to
benefit from the ratification of climate change agreements, namely the Kyoto proto-
col69. This dynamic is in line with the discussions and results presented in sections
3.2, 3.5.1, and 3.5.2; according to which ratification of IEAs engenders a compositional
shift towards a "greener" bundle of exports. Let’s now turn to column (3) of table 3.15
for a numerical perspective on this last viewpoint. For exports of other non-metallic
minerals (the most CO2-intensive industry in the sample), the estimates in column
(3) imply a Kyoto ratification effect of -3%. Meanwhile, outflows of transport equip-
ment (the average CO2-intensive industry) would experience a 2% increase. Lastly,
if the exporter ratifies the Kyoto protocol, exports of leather and footwear (the least
CO2-intensive industry) are estimated to increase by approximately 5%. Moreover,
for coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel sector (the most SOx-intensive industry
in the sample)70 the ratification of an additional acid rain IEA implies a 3.2% decline
in outflows. At the opposite end, the marginal ratification effect of an acid rain IEA,
model fail to account for the time-varying nature of trade determinants.
68For example, a regulatory shock that results into higher production costs in the coke, refined
petroleum, and nuclear fuel industry may spill over into industries such as leather and footwear, or
textiles and textile products through higher energy prices.
69The next chapter reassesses this result by taking into account the binding emission caps adopted
by some Kyoto ratifiers.
70Recall that SOx stands for sulfur oxides and it is by far the most targeted chemical compound
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entails a meager 0.02% increase in exports of leather and footwear (the least SOx-
intensive industry in the sample). A version of this weak compositional effect was also
observed in the previous sections, when the aggregate stock of IEAs was utilized71.
The ratification of ozone depletion agreements, however, does not seem to affect
"dirty" industries at all. In fact, these opposite is observed. This finding, although
counterintuitive, is driven by one important detail. That is, sectors where the use
of ozone depletion substances is high display moderate emission intensities in all
eight pollutants considered72. It is also worth reminding the reader that none of
the eight pollutants included is targeted directly by the Montreal protocol and its
subsequent amendments. In order to circumvent this problem, I turn to the inclusion
of agreement-specific measures of pollution intensity. The results obtained this way
are shown in table 3.16. The first column includes the first principal components
as IEA-specific measures of sectoral "dirtiness"73. No data is available on emissions
of ozone depletion substances (i.e., CFC or HCFC). As a consequence, no principal
component-based measure of "dirtiness" is obtainable for this kind of IEAs. A binary
measure, specific to ozone depletion IEAs, will be used instead. This was introduced
and discussed within section 3.4.2. The estimates recovered this way are clear and
in line with previous findings. It is important to note that now, as expected, the
coefficient attached to the interaction term involving the ozone depletion differential
(β′′2,OD) is negative and statistically significant. With the exception of climate change
IEAs, which seem to positively affect outflows from "clean" sectors, all coefficients
indicate a negative effect of IEAs on exports; regardless of whether the sector is
"dirty" or "clean", or more or less polluting.
I now shift the focus to the second column of table 3.16. Here, two binary mea-
sures of sectoral pollution intensity are introduced to facilitate the interpretation of
ratification effects. These are specific to climate change (CC) and acid rain (AR)
IEAs. Both measures are based on the underlying distributions of the PC1 CC and
PC1 AR principal components. Sectors with principal component values above the
75th percentile are categorized as "dirty" whereas the rest are marked as "clean".74
First and foremost, the coefficients attached to the interaction terms β′′2,CC , β′′2,AR,
under the acid rain IEA category.
71Unfortunately, the present analysis does not benefit from emission data for ozone depletion
substances. It is, therefore, unable to make any inferences on the potential compositional shifts
brought about by the ratification of ozone depletion IEAs when using a continuous measure of
sectoral "dirtiness".
72These sectors are i.e., transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment, machinery, n.e.c.,
textile and textile products, and leather and footwear. This sectoral trait can also be observed in
table 3.10.
73The first principal component of emission intensities from carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), and nitrogen oxides (NOx), PC1 CC, is used as a measure of pollution intensity that is
specific to climate change IEAs. The first principal component of emission intensities from sulphur
oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), nitrous oxide (N2O), non-methane volatile organic compounds
(NMVOC), and ammonia (NH3), PC1 AR, is used as a relevant pollution intensity measure for acid
rain IEAs.
74Based on PC1 AR, the industries identified as "dirty" are other non-metallic minerals, coke,
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and β′′2,OD are negative and statistically significant, once again highlighting the dele-
terious effect of IEA ratification on sectors categorized as "dirty". Quantitatively, the
ratification of the Kyoto protocol on the exporter side is equivalent to a 0.8% decline
in "dirty" exports. Conversely, outflows from sectors tagged as "clean" are expected
to increase, in the wake of the Kyoto adoption, by 5.8%. Once more, these results
underline the readjustment of the export bundle towards a higher "clean"/"dirty" out-
flows ratio. Conversely, acid rain IEAs seem to hamper exports regardless of their
origin sector. Specifically, the ratification effect of an additional acid rain IEA by the
exporter decreases "clean" outflows by about 1%. Similarly, exports from sectors cat-
egorized as "dirty" decline by approximately 5%. Ozone depletion IEAs carry an even
stronger effect but this result is expected. Recall that the Montreal protocol and its
subsequent agreements include strict provisions regarding the banning of (i) exports
of substances targeted, (ii) exports of products incorporating these substances, and
(iii) exports of goods manufactured with but not containing, the targeted substances.
Numerically, outflows from sectors identified as "clean" decline by 2.2% due to the
ratification of an additional ozone depletion IEA by the exporter. The decline in
"dirty" exports is even larger, situating at about 7.5%. The ratification of any kind
of IEA (i.e., climate change, acid rain, and ozone depletion) by the exporter seems
to entail a negative effect on outflows from sectors categorized as "dirty". Moreover,
acid rain and ozone depletion IEAs appear to have a detrimental effect on exports
originating in "clean" industries as well. This evidence underlines the negative scale
effects brought about by the adoption of IEAs in these two categories. The effects
are considerably larger for ozone depletion IEAs. Conversely, the adoption of Kyoto
protocol seems to benefit exporters in "clean" sectors, where outflows are found to
increase by as much as 5.8% following the ratification. This result showcases, once
more, the compositional shift towards a more "cleaner" export bundle for parties to
the Kyoto protocol.
3.5.4 Environmental Stringency by Exporter and Importer
Empirical Model
Another way to estimate the impact of IEA ratification on export flows is to
consider exporter and importer-specific measures of environmental commitment. The
specification obtained this way is depicted in (3.9), where IEAkx,t and IEAkm,t denote
the number of ratified IEAs in category k, for the exporter and importer at a given
point in time. As noted previously these categories are climate change (CC), acid
rain (AR), and ozone depletion (OD). More flexible than the ones used previously,
this approach facilitates the decomposition of the IEAs’ ratification overall effect
into pollution haven (PHE)75 and "leakage" sub-effects. If IEAs in category k are
refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, chemicals and chemical products, as well as wood and products of
wood and cork. Regarding PC1 CC, these are other non-metallic minerals, coke, refined petroleum,
and nuclear fuel, together with chemical and chemical products.
75Recall that the PHE underlines a loss of comparative advantage for industries which are im-
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a source of comparative disadvantage (and thus of PHE) then α1,k is expected to
bear a negative sign. Specifically, a more environmentally committed exporter would
ship less to its partners. Hence, α1,k < 0. If IEAs in category k are to generate
"leakage", one would expect α2,k to be positive. Under this scenario, an importer
which commits itself more strongly to environmental regulation is expected to import
more from non-committed exporters in sectors classified as "dirty". Hence, α2,k > 0.
Moreover, α1,k < 0 and α2,k = 0 denote the scenario in which the exports of dirty
goods decline in response to IEA ratification without being replaced or substituted
with similar goods from abroad. Consequently, support for the "leakage" hypothesis is
synonymous with a positive sign on α2,k. All other definitions and notations outlined
















µ′′′x,m,s,t = ν ′′′x,t + ν ′′′m,t + ν ′′′s,t + ν ′′′x,m,s (3.10)
In line with the "unobserved heterogeneity" rationale outlined earlier, the er-
ror term is modeled as shown in (3.10). This represents a departure from the
exporter×industry×year and importer×industry×year structure shown in (3.4) or
(3.6). Yet again, the trade-off between a proper accounting of unobserved hetero-
geneity and the ability of identifying the covariates of interests becomes apparent.
Usually, (3.9) should include separate covariates for the exporter’s and importer’s
IEAs ratified. The equation should also contain the pollution intensity covariate.
However, given their structure, these are absorbed by the "fixed effects" considered
in (3.10), and therefore not identifiable. Additionally, the coefficients obtained by
estimating (3.9), can only be used for relative inferences; on a "clean"/"dirty" relative
basis.
Results
The results obtained by estimating (3.9) are presented in table 3.17. Here, the
exporter and importer stocks of ratified IEAs are used as a measure of environmental
commitment. The first column displays coefficients that are in line with expectations,
both in terms of sign and magnitude, for climate change and acid rain IEAs. Thus, the
ratification of the Kyoto protocol by the exporter implies a relative decline in "dirty"
exports of 3.1%. A similar action undertaken by the importer leads to a relative
increase in "dirty" imports of 3.4%. Similarly, the ratification of an additional acid
rain IEA entails a relative deterioration in "dirty" outflows of 4.4%. On the importer
side, a similar enactment is expected to increase "dirty" imports by about 2%. This
outcome is indicative of "leakage". Regarding climate change IEAs, the evidence
presented here is in line with that of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015). They also
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provide support in favor of "leakage" effects that are attributable to the ratification
of Kyoto protocol. Throughout the remainder of the table, the results are, to a large
extent, robust in terms of sign and in line with those discussed in sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2,
and 3.5.3. However, not the same can be inferred with regards to their statistical
significance. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that α1,CC , α2,CC , α1,AR, and α2,AR
display the expected signs and are statistically meaningful when sectoral "dirtiness"
is measured using the relevant pollutant (e.g., CO2 for climate change, or NOx and
SOx for acid rain).
The results regarding ozone depletion IEAs seem once again counterintuitive.
However, bear in mind that, as pointed earlier, the sectors most affected by the
ratification of ozone depletion IEAs are not ranking high in any of the above eight
pollutants. As a consequence, ozone depletion IEAs are unlikely to impact sectors
categorized as "dirty" using the first principal component (PC1), the binary, or the
continuous measures76. In order to address this difficulty IEA-specific pollution in-
tensity measures are considered once more. The results are depicted in table 3.18.
Again, the results underline the importance of agreement-relevant pollution intensity
degrees, especially for ozone depletion IEAs.
Turning to column (1), one can observe that the coefficients are in line with the
"leakage" hypothesis; both in terms of sign and, to a large extent, in terms of statis-
tical significance. The only exception is the negative sign on α2,OD. The absence of
"leakage" regarding the ratification of ozone depletion IEAs is, however, expected. As
noted in section 3.3.2, imports of ozone depleting substances and products contain-
ing these substances from non-members were banned under the Montreal protocol.
Column (2) introduces an IEA-specific, binary measure of sectoral pollution-intensity
to aid with coefficient interpretation77. In doing so, the modest "leakage" effect of
acid rain IEAs vanishes; most likely due to the less-flexible nature of the binary
"dirtiness" measure. Nevertheless, the "leakage" effects of climate change IEAs line
up with expectations. The absence of "leakage" characterizing the build-up of ozone
depletion IEAs is consistent with the international trade restrictions included within
the Montreal protocol to VCPOL and its subsequent amendments. On the exporter
side, the marginal ratification effects of climate change and ozone depletion IEAs are
calculated as -5.5%, and -7% respectively. Bear in mind that these figures are relative
to comparable flows within the "clean" industries. On the importer side, positive co-
efficients are estimated for both climate change and acid rain IEAs. For the climate
change category, the ratification of an additional agreement is equivalent to a rela-
tive increase in "dirty" imports of about 4%. This result is emphasizing, once again,
the "leakage" effect induced by joining the Kyoto protocol. For acid rain IEAs, the
marginal effect of ratification leads to a small relative increase in imports of 0.4%. In
summary, the results outlined by the current section are supportive of the "leakage"
hypothesis in the case of climate change IEAs, namely the Kyoto protocol. "Leakage"
pacted by a tougher environmental stance.
76Refer to table 3.16 and section 3.4.2 for details.
77These are identical to the ones used within the previous section.
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also seems to occur for acid rain IEAs but the supporting results are less robust,
and lower magnitude-wise. Finally, there is no confirmation of ozone depletion IEAs
triggering "leakage" effects.
3.6 Conclusions
Early work provides little evidence on the adverse effect of environmental regu-
lation on exports. In addition, these early studies are plagued by several drawbacks
ranging from the unavailability of time-series data to the deficit of taking into account
the endogenous nature of environmental policy stance. Recent studies have addressed
these issues, and were able to produce concrete evidence on the detrimental effect of
environmental regulation on exports. The present work adds to this recent literature
strand along three important margins. First, in contrast to most studies, it uses the
count of air pollution IEAs as a measure of environmental commitment. Second,
it analyzes environmental stringency and trade within a considerably larger sample.
Third, it uses a gravity framework along with a panel dataset which, together, allow
for a rather simple accounting of unobserved trade determinants and the endogenous
selection of the environmental policy regime.
The evidence brought forward by the current essay can be summarized in three
points. First, the ratification of IEAs in general is a source of comparative disad-
vantage for pollution-intensive sectors. Second, the results underline the existence of
composition and scale effects, but these differ in accordance to each IEA category. Cli-
mate change IEAs (i.e., the Kyoto protocol) are found to be a source of comparative
disadvantage for pollution-intensive industries and a source of comparative advan-
tage for their least polluting peers. Hence, the ratification of climate change IEAs
suggests a compositional shift towards a "cleaner" (less pollution-intensive) export
bundle. Acid rain IEAs seem to be a notable source of comparative disadvantage
for pollution-intensive industries. It is uncertain to what extent they aid or harm
the least polluting sectors. Ozone depletion IEAs, on the other hand, bring about
negative effects on exports regardless of whether the sector is categorized "clean" or
"dirty". Hence, acid rain and ozone depletion IEAs call for negative scale effects.
Third, climate change and acid rain IEAs involve "leakage" effects, which appear to
be stronger for the first category. In line with their international trade provisions,
ozone depletion IEAs do not spawn "leakage" effects. On the contrary, they comprise
of negative effects on exports and imports alike.
This study contributes to the vast literature on comparative advantage and inter-
national trade patterns. Specifically, it causally links the ratification of international
environmental agreements (IEAs) with deleterious effects on comparative advantage
and exports. The analysis starts from the premise that ratification of IEAs is more
likely to impact the pollution-intensive sectors. In order to tease out this effect, the
current study relies on both binary and continuous measures of sectoral polluting
degrees. First, the adoption of additional IEAs is found to adversely affect exports
of not only "dirty" but of "clean" industries as well. Numerically, the marginal effect
of ratifying an IEA on "dirty" exports is approximately -3%. For "clean" outflows
the implied decline is approximately 1%. Diminishing effects of IEA ratification are
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also found (i.e., -9.7% for the 1st IEA and -1.4% for the 13th IEA). Second, evidence
of a compositional shift in export bundles emerges. More precisely, ratifying par-
ties seem to transition towards a "cleaner" export mix. For sectors exhibiting high
emission intensities, the ratification of an additional IEA is found to entail a signif-
icant decline in exports. For example, exports of other non-metallic minerals, the
most CO2-intensive sector, are estimated to decrease by 3.6%. For sectors with low
emission intensities, the ratification of an additional IEA is found to entail negligible
negative effects, or even small gains, on outflows. This depends on the differential
(i.e., linear or non-linear) and pollution intensity (i.e., CO2, SOx, etc.) measures
used. For example, exports of leather and footwear, the least CO2 intensive sec-
tor, are estimated to decrease by 0.5% (when using the preferred linear differential).
Sector-by-sector estimates further support this evidence. The most adversely affected
sector is that of other non-metallic minerals, for which the marginal IEA ratification
entails a 6.6% decline in exports. At the other end of the spectrum one finds leather
and footwear as well as machinery n.e.c. and recycling sectors. For these industries,
exports are estimated to increase by 1.7%, and 2.8%, respectively, if an extra IEA is
ratified by the exporter. A similar picture is painted when the marginal ratification
of IEAs is analyzed in accordance with their type. Specifically, ozone depletion IEAs
are found to be the most detrimental to export flows. Each additional IEA of this
type is found to reduce "dirty" exports by approximately 7.5%. Similarly, "clean"
exports are decreased by 2.2%. Acid rain IEAs rank next, with implied effects on
"dirty" outflows of -5%. The effect on "clean" exports is about -1%. Climate change
IEAs, namely the Kyoto protocol, are different because they entail modest declines
(i.e., -0.8%) in exports of pollution-intensive sectors but large gains (i.e., 5.8%) for
their least polluting peers. These results suggest that the adoption of climate change
IEAs (i.e., the Kyoto protocol) veer the ratifying parties towards a "cleaner" export
bundle.
More narrowly, this study adds to the now substantial body of evidence on envi-
ronmental policy and "leakage". Evidence of "leakage" is presented for both climate
change and acid rain IEAs, but found to be more robust for the former. For cli-
mate change IEAs, the marginal effect of ratification on relative "dirty" exports range
between -5.5% and -3%. In line with the leakage hypothesis, the effect on relative
"dirty" imports locates between 3% and 4%. Regarding acid rain IEAs, the effect on
relative exports situates around -4.5%. Meanwhile, the marginal ratification effect on
relative imports is approximately 2%. Conversely, evidence of "leakage" is not found
with regards to ozone depletion agreements. For this IEA category, negative effects
are found for both the relative "dirty" exports (i.e., -7%) and imports (i.e., -1%). This
result is expected, and in line with the "leakage"-reduction stipulations of the Mon-
treal protocol to VCPOL and its subsequent amendments. Specifically, parties were
mandated to ban imports of targeted substances from non-parties shortly after ratifi-
cation. Imports of products containing such substances and of goods produced with,
but not containing, the targeted compounds were also restrained. In other words,
these provisions can be regarded as product standards, which non-ratifiers have to
comply with in order to penetrate the domestic markets of ratifying parties. The
exporting of technology that may be used for the production of controlled substances
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towards non-members was also restricted. This last set of results may hold some
implications regarding the design of future IEAs, which could include international
trade provisions in order to achieve the desired emission reductions while reducing
"leakage".
Copyright© Mihai Paraschiv, 2016.
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Ratification as function of Real GDP per capita (USD, 2005 prices)



















































































Ratification and CO2 emissions as functions of Real GDP per capita (USD, 2005 prices)
75



















































































Ratification and CO2 emission intensity as functions of Real GDP per capita (USD, 2005 prices)

































1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air) (rounded)
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air)
Total CO2 Emissions (Mt)
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1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air) (rounded)
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air)
Avg. CO2 Emission intensity
CO2 emission intensity is expressed in kg/US$ of GDP at 2005 prices















1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air) (rounded)
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air)
Non-Dirty (Clean) Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Dirty Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Industry is dirty if the sectoral emission intensity is above the mean.
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1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air) (rounded)
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air)
Non-Dirty (Clean) Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Dirty Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Industry is dirty if the sectoral emission intensity is above the 50th percentile of the associated 
distribution (by country/year).
















1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air) (rounded)
Avg. # of Ratified IEAs (Air)
Non-Dirty (Clean) Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Dirty Exports; bil. USD, 2005 prices
Industry is dirty if the sectoral emission intensity is above the 75th percentile of the associated
distribution (by country/year).
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CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
PC1 4.68 0.59 0.40 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.08
PC2 2.05 0.26 0.02 -0.08 0.67 0.17 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 0.68
PC3 1.10 0.14 0.43 -0.37 -0.19 0.71 0.02 -0.24 -0.24 -0.13
The table displays the factor loadings for those principal components with eigenvalues greater
than 1. The proportion of emission intensity variance, across all 8 pollutants, captured by
each component, is also displayed.














0 2 4 6 8
Number
Emission intensities of all pollutants (CO2, CH4, N2O, NOX, SOX, CO, NMVOC, NH3) are included
in the PC analysis.
Select principal component if eigenvalue > 1.
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PC1 CC 1.67 0.56 0.68 0.69 0.24
PC2 CC 0.96 0.32 -0.19 -0.15 0.97
The table displays the factor loadings for those principal
components with eigenvalues greater than 1. The propor-
tion of emission intensity variance, across the 3 climate
change pollutants, captured by each component, is also
displayed.













1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Number
Emission intensities of climate Change pollutants (CO2, CH4, N2O) are included in the PC analysis.
Select principal component if eigenvalue > 1.
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Table 3.3: PC Analysis on Emission Intensities (Acid Rain Pollutants): Summary
Eigenvalue Var. Covered NOX SOX NMVOC NH3
PC1 AR 2.32 0.58 0.48 0.62 0.59 0.18
PC2 AR 1.01 0.25 0.22 -0.25 -0.20 0.92
The table displays the factor loadings for those principal components with eigenvalues
greater than 1. The proportion of emission intensity variance, across the 4 acid rain
pollutants, captured by each component, is also displayed.

















1 2 3 4
Number
Emission intensities of acid Rain pollutants (NOX, SOX, NMVOC, NH3) in the PC analysis.
Select principal component if eigenvalue > 1.
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Barbados Hong Kong Romania
Belarus Hungary Russian Federation
Belgium and Luxembourg Iceland Rwanda
Belize India Saint Kitts and Nevis
Benin Indonesia Saint Lucia
Bermuda Iran Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Bhutan Iraq Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia Ireland Saudi Arabia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Israel Senegal
Botswana Italy Sierra Leone
Brazil Jamaica Singapore
Brunei Darussalam Japan Slovakia
Bulgaria Jordan Slovenia
Burkina Faso Kazakstan South Africa
Burundi Kenya Spain
Cambodia Korea Sri Lanka
Cameroon Kuwait Sudan
Canada Kyrgyzstan Suriname
Cape Verde Lao People’s Democratic Republic Swaziland
Central African Republic Latvia Sweden
Chad Lebanon Switzerland
Chile Lesotho Syrian Arab Republic
China Liberia Taiwan
Colombia Lithuania Tajikistan
Comoros Macau Tanzania, United Rep. of
Congo Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of) Thailand
Costa Rica Madagascar Togo
Croatia Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Malaysia Tunisia
Czech Republic Maldives Turkey
Cote d’Ivoire Mali Turkmenistan
Denmark Malta Uganda
Djibouti Mauritania Ukraine
Dominica Mauritius United Kingdom
Dominican Republic Mexico United States of America
Ecuador Moldova, Rep. of Uruguay
Egypt Mongolia Uzbekistan
El Salvador Morocco Venezuela






All countries appear as both exporters and importers with the exception of Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of), and Uzbekistan. These six nations
are only observed as importers.
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Ratifiers as of 2011
Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)
Helsinki Protocol for Reduction of
Sulphur Emissions (1985)
1985 Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany Hungary,
Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of), Netherlands,
Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine
Sofia Protocol on the Control of
Nitrogen Oxides and their Trans-
boundary Fluxes (1988)
1989 All Helsinki ratifiers plus Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania,
Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America
Geneva Protocol on the Control
of Volatile Organic Compounds
and their Transboundary Fluxes
(1991)
1993 Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithua-
nia, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of), Netherlands, Norway,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
Oslo Protocol on Further Reduc-
tion of Sulphur Emissions (1994)
1995 All Geneva ratifiers plus Canada, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Slovenia;
less Estonia, Russia, and the United States of America
Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants (POP) (1998)
1998 Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep.
of), Moldova, Rep.of, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals
(1998)
1998 All Aarhus POP ratifiers plus the United States of America, less Iceland
and Italy
Gothenburg Protocol to Abate
Acidification, Euthrophication
and Ground Level Ozone (1999)
2002 All Aarhus POP ratifiers plus the United States of America, less Cyprus,
Estonia, Iceland and Italy
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL)
Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(PSDOL) (1987)
1988 Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bul-
garia, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom,
the United States of America, Uzbekistan
London Amendment to Montreal
PSDOL (1990)
1990 All nations in table 3.4 except Angola, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and Macau
Copenhagen Amendment to Mon-
treal PSDOL (1992)
1993 All nations in table 3.4 except Angola, Bermuda, Guinea, Hong Kong,
Kazakhstan, Macau, and Nepal
Montreal Amendment to Mon-
treal PSDOL (1997)
1998 All nations in table 3.4 except Angola, Bermuda, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire,
Guinea, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Macau, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,
Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe
Beijing Amendment to Montreal
PSDOL (1999)
2000 All nations in table 3.4 except Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cape Verde,
Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, Georgia, Guinea, Hong Kong,
Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Macau, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique,
Nepal, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, and Zimbabwe
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Kyoto Protocol (1997) 1998 All nations except Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the United States of
America
Source: International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Mitchell (2016))
83
Table 3.6: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Parties
Country
Code





AUS Australia YES 108 108
AUT Austria YES 92 87
BLR Belarus YES
BEL Belgium YES 92 92.5
BGR Bulgaria YES 92 92
CAN Canada YES 94 94
CYP Cyprus
HRV Croatia YES 95 95
CZE Czech Republic YES 92 92
DNK Denmark YES 92 79
EST Estonia YES 92 92
FIN Finland YES 92 100
FRA France YES 92 100
DEU Germany YES 92 79
GRC Greece YES 92 125
HUN Hungary YES 94 94
ISL Iceland YES 110 110
IRL Ireland YES 92 113
ITA Italy YES 92 93.5
JPN Japan YES 94 94
LVA Latvia YES 92 92
LIE Liechtenstein YES 92 92
LTU Lithuania YES 92 92
LUX Luxembourg YES 92 72
MLT Malta
MCO Monaco YES 92 92
NLD Netherlands YES 92 94
NZL New Zealand YES 100 100
NOR Norway YES 101 101
POL Poland YES 94 94
PRT Portugal YES 92 127
ROU Romania YES 92 92
RUS Russian Federation YES 100 100
SVK Slovakia YES 92 92
SVN Slovenia YES 92 92
ESP Spain YES 92 115
SWE Sweden YES 92 104
CHE Switzerland YES 92 92
TUR Turkey
UKR Ukraine YES 100 100
GBR United Kingdom YES 92 87.5
USA United States YES 93 93
All parties are included in Annex I. Slovakia and Slovenia were added in 1998. Annex I also includes
the European Union (EU). Malta and Cyprus were added in 2009, and 2013, respectively. Turkey
was removed from Annex II in 2002. *Denotes parties transitioning to a market economy in 1992.
**Denotes individual targets of EU members; EU pledged to an 8% overall reduction. In most
cases targets are relative to 1990 levels. Targets are for the 2008-2012 period.
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Table 3.7: ISIC Rev. 3 Industries
Industry Code
Other Non-Metallic Minerals 26
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24
Transport Equipment 34t35
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22
Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33
Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling 36t37
Machinery, n.e.c. 29
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20
Rubber and Plastics 25
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16
Textiles and Textile Products 17t18
Leather and Footwear 19
Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of Emission Intensities
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
CO2 14.00 503.68 634.58 78.38 2,012.69
CH4 14.00 1.05 2.55 0.03 9.70
N2O 14.00 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.71
NOX 14.00 1.25 1.28 0.32 5.20
SOX 14.00 1.91 1.92 0.28 7.32
CO 14.00 7.25 14.90 0.98 56.35
NMVOC 14.00 2.08 3.00 0.39 11.97
NH3 14.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.40
The table displays summary statistics for emission inten-
sities of various pollutants across the 14 sectors considered.
Note that these intensities do not display any time variation.
These represent 1995-2009 sectoral averages across a total of
40 countries. All intensities are measured in kg/USD1000;
1995=100 at real LCU/USD
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Table 3.9: Correlation of Emission Intensities
CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
CO2 1.00 0.63 0.10 0.88 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.12
CH4 0.63 1.00 0.13 0.24 0.85 0.96 0.97 0.10
N2O 0.10 0.13 1.00 0.20 0.06 -0.05 0.16 1.00
NOX 0.88 0.24 0.20 1.00 0.58 0.30 0.39 0.24
SOX 0.80 0.85 0.06 0.58 1.00 0.88 0.90 0.05
CO 0.70 0.96 -0.05 0.30 0.88 1.00 0.93 -0.07
NMVOC 0.71 0.97 0.16 0.39 0.90 0.93 1.00 0.14
NH3 0.12 0.10 1.00 0.24 0.05 -0.07 0.14 1.00
The table displays the correlations among emission intensities for various pollu-
tants across the 14 sectors considered. Note that these intensities do not display
any time variation. These represent 1995-2009 sectoral averages across a total
of 40 countries. All intensities are measured in kg/USD1000; 1995=100 at real
LCU/USD
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Table 3.10: Averages of Average Sectoral Emission Intensity, 1995-2009
Industry Code CO2 Industry Code CH4 Industry Code CO
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 1862.989 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 6.937139 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 28.10301
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 956.9238 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 2.032567 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 13.71119
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 675.3937 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 1.04851 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 6.714299
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 641.975 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 0.287095 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 3.33507
Transport Equipment 34t35 231.6829 Rubber and Plastics 25 0.259174 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 3.0766
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 212.922 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 0.224497 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 1.821617
Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 165.4621 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 0.200001 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 1.684806
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 160.4766 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.171497 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 1.560314
Machinery, Nec 29 155.1142 Transport Equipment 34t35 0.074484 Machinery, Nec 29 1.170698
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 146.7433 Machinery, Nec 29 0.063461 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 1.117451
Rubber and Plastics 25 129.7071 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.062605 Rubber and Plastics 25 1.09954
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 126.9798 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 0.055674 Transport Equipment 34t35 1.03152
Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 112.6842 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.029444 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.988043
Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 80.88471 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.029016 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.952425
Industry Code SOX Industry Code N2O Industry Code NOX
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 3.781532 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 0.703064 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 4.843615
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 3.373948 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 0.020928 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 1.970532
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 2.140508 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 0.011024 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 1.207739
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 1.987198 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 0.01019 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 1.031063
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 1.66861 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 0.009011 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 1.018366
Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 1.348554 Transport Equipment 34t35 0.008386 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 0.944367
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 1.287153 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.00801 Transport Equipment 34t35 0.892484
Transport Equipment 34t35 1.14708 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 0.007387 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 0.687034
Rubber and Plastics 25 0.727831 Rubber and Plastics 25 0.005918 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.537801
Machinery, Nec 29 0.599853 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.004902 Machinery, Nec 29 0.501572
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.538747 Machinery, Nec 29 0.003818 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.475943
Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.468463 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 0.003159 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.415188
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.313231 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.002745 Rubber and Plastics 25 0.4015
Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.257367 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.002663 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.321317
Industry Code NMVOC Industry Code NH3
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 5.641593 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 0.400923
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 3.061148 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 0.032313
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 2.589367 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 0.011643
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 1.653843 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 0.011362
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16 1.331466 Transport Equipment 34t35 0.008966
Rubber and Plastics 25 1.070523 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 0.00878
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28 1.022056 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.00655
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21t22 0.879475 Machinery, Nec 29 0.006077
Transport Equipment 34t35 0.846256 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 0.005984
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37 0.715842 Rubber and Plastics 25 0.005323
Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.529734 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 0.004674
Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.525155 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23 0.003907
Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33 0.501122 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 0.002348
Machinery, Nec 29 0.375537 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18 0.001927
Note: Emission intensities are expressed in kg/USD1,000 of output at 2005 prices. CO2, CH4, and N2O pollutants are targeted by the Kyoto (1997) protocol of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change. SOX, NOX, NMVOC, and NH3 pollutants are targeted by the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air pollution (LRTAP) and its protocols (Helsinki (1985) on SOX, Sofia
(1998) on NOX, Geneva (1991) on NMVOC, Oslo (1994) on SOX, and Gothenburg (1999) on SOX, NOX, NMVOC, and NH3).
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Table 3.11: Benchmark Results: Non-Linear Relative Environmental Stringency Measure and Dirty Exports
Pollutant: DIRTY PC1 CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
Econ. Integration 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d(IEAs)2 -0.004 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.003 -0.016∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.040) (0.010) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021)
d(IEAs)2×Pollutant -0.056∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Obs. 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064 3,040,064
Adj. R-Squared 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.765
Country Pair Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exp.×Ind.×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Imp.×Ind.×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Emission
intensities are measured in kilograms per USD 1000 of output at real exchange rates in 1995 prices. When the dirtiness indicator is
binary, the industry is considered dirty if the CO2 emission intensity is above the 75th percentile of the associated emission intensity
distribution. Sectoral dirtiness measure is also given by the first principal component, PC1. This principal component loads on CO2,
CH4, SOX, CO, NMVOC and accounts for 58% of emission intensity of all 8 pollutants considered (i.e., CO2, CH4, N2O, NOX, SOX,
CO, NMVOC, and NH3). The variable of interest d(IEAs)2 is constructed as [(exporter number of IEAs)2 - (importer number of
IEAs)2]/[(exporter number of IEAs + 1)*(importer number of IEAs + 1)].
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Table 3.12: Results: Linear Relative Environmental Stringency Measure and Dirty Exports
Specification: DIRTY PC1 CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
Econ. Integration 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d(IEAs) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
d(IEAs)×Pollutant -0.019∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557
Adj. R-Squared 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Industry dirtiness indicator is the emission
intensity per USD 1000 of output at real exchange rates in 1995 prices. When the dirtiness indicator is binary, the industry is considered dirty if the
CO2 emission intensity is above the 75th percentile of the associated emission intensity distribution. Sectoral dirtiness measure is also given by the
first principal component, PC1. This principal component loads on CO2, CH4, SOX, CO, NMVOC and accounts for 58% of emission intensity of all 8
pollutants considered (i.e., CO2, CH4, N2O, NOX, SOX, CO, NMVOC, and NH3). The variable of interest is the environmental stringency measure,
d(IEAs). This is constructed as the difference between the exporter’s and importer’s number of IEAs ratified.
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Econ. Integration 0.214∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.001 0.142∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.095) (0.028) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026)
d(IEAs) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.034∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.006 0.017∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Obs. 97,006 98,414 16,776 107,502 106,444 66,270 91,170
Adj. R-Squared 0.811 0.843 0.642 0.869 0.800 0.816 0.850
Country Pair Effects
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of interest is the environmental
stringency measure, d(IEAs). This is constructed as the difference between the exporter’s and importer’s number of IEAs ratified.
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Econ. Integration 0.180∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035)
d(IEAs) 0.028∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Obs. 107,436 61,672 99,320 84,620 92,032 73,042 57,832
Adj. R-Squared 0.829 0.818 0.841 0.838 0.829 0.787 0.791
Country Pair Effects
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of interest is the environmental
stringency measure, d(IEAs). This is constructed as the difference between the exporter’s and importer’s number of IEAs ratified.
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Table 3.15: Results: Linear Relative Environmental Stringency and Dirty Exports, by IEA and Pollutant Type
Pollutant: DIRTY PC1 CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
Econ. Integration 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
d(CC IEAs) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.032) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017)
d(CC IEAs)×Pollutant -0.035∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.003
(0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
d(AR IEAs) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
d(AR IEAs)×Pollutant -0.032∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
d(OD IEAs) -0.026∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.007∗ 0.008 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
d(OD IEAs)×Pollutant 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557 2,985,557
Adj. R-Squared 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Emission intensities are measured in
kilograms per USD 1000 of output at real exchange rates in 1995 prices. When the dirtiness indicator is binary, the industry is considered dirty if
the CO2 emission intensity is above the 75th percentile of the associated emission intensity distribution. Sectoral dirtiness measure is also given
by the first principal component, PC1. This principal component loads on CO2, CH4, SOX, CO, NMVOC and accounts for 58% of emission
intensity of all 8 pollutants considered (i.e., CO2, CH4, N2O, NOX, SOX, CO, NMVOC, and NH3). The variable of interest is the environmental
stringency measure, d(IEAs). This is constructed as the difference between the exporter’s and importer’s number of IEAs ratified.
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Table 3.16: Results: Linear Environmental Stringency Measure and Dirty Exports,
by IEA, and IEA Specific Pollutant Type
Specification: (1) (2)
Econ. Integration 0.132∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
d(CC IEAs) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
d(CC IEAs)×PC1 CC -0.033∗∗∗
(0.008)
d(CC IEAs)×DIRTY CC -0.066∗∗∗
(0.012)
d(AR IEAs) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
d(AR IEAs)×PC1 AR -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
d(AR IEAs)×DIRTY AR -0.039∗∗∗
(0.003)
d(OD IEAs) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
d(OD IEAs)×DIRTY OD -0.059∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Obs. 2,985,557 2,985,557
Adj. R-Squared 0.827 0.827
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes
Country×Year Effects Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-
importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Sectoral dirtiness measure is given by
the agreement specific first principal components. Climate change specific first principal component
(PC1 CC) accounts for 56% of the variance in the three pollutants targeted by the Kyoto protocol
and for which data is available. Similarly, the acid rain specific first principal component (PC1 AR)
accounts for 58% of the variance in emission intensities associated with those pollutants targeted
by acid rain agreements. No data is available on those pollutants targeted by the ozone depletion
agreements. In this case a binary indicator of sectoral dirtiness is used. A value of 1 denotes
the transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment, machinery, n.e.c., textile and textile
products, and leather and footwear sectors. DIRTY CC and DIRTY AR denote IEA-specific binary
measures of dirtiness. These are based on 75th percentile cut-offs associated with the first principal
components for climate change and acid rain pollutants, respectively.
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Table 3.17: Results: Exporter and Importer Number of IEAs and Dirty Exports, by IEA Type
Pollutant: DIRTY PC1 CO2 CH4 N2O NOX SOX CO NMVOC NH3
Econ. Integration 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Exp. CC IEAs×Pollutant -0.031∗ -0.006 -0.033∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.005 -0.008 0.003 -0.007 0.019∗ -0.006
(0.017) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005)
Imp. CC IEAs×Pollutant 0.034∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Exp. AR IEAs×Pollutant -0.043∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Imp. AR IEAs×Pollutant 0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ -0.000 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Exp. OD IEAs×Pollutant 0.052∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Imp. OD IEAs×Pollutant 0.005 -0.001 0.004∗ 0.001 0.002 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623
Adj. R-Squared 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822
Exp.×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Imp.×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Industry dirtiness indicator is the emission
intensity per USD 1000 of output at real exchange rates in 1995 prices. When the dirtiness indicator is binary, the industry is considered dirty if the
CO2 emission intensity is above the 75th percentile of the associated emission intensity distribution. Sectoral dirtiness measure is also given by the
first principal component, PC1. This principal component loads on CO2, CH4, SOX, CO, NMVOC and accounts for 58% of emission intensity of all 8
pollutants considered (i.e., CO2, CH4, N2O, NOX, SOX, CO, NMVOC, and NH3). The variable of interest is the environmental stringency measure,
d(IEAs). This is constructed as the difference between the exporter’s and importer’s number of IEAs ratified.
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Table 3.18: Results: Exporter and Importer Number of IEAs and Dirty Exports, by
IEA, and IEA Specific Pollutant Type
Specification: (1) (2)
Econ. Integration 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Exp. CC IEAs×PC1 CC -0.013
(0.009)
Imp. CC IEAs×PC1 CC 0.029∗∗∗
(0.008)
Exp. CC IEAs×DIRTY CC -0.056∗∗∗
(0.017)
Imp. CC IEAs×DIRTY CC 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015)
Exp. AR IEAs×PC1 AR -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
Imp. AR IEAs×PC1 AR 0.003∗
(0.002)
Exp. AR IEAs×DIRTY AR 0.007∗
(0.004)
Imp. AR IEAs×DIRTY AR 0.004
(0.005)
Exp. OD IEAs×DIRTY OD -0.076∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Imp. OD IEAs×DIRTY OD -0.007 -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Obs. 3,014,623 3,014,623
Adj. R-Squared 0.822 0.822
Exp.×Year Effects Yes Yes
Imp.×Year Effects Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sectoral exports. Estimates are produced using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-
importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Sectoral dirtiness measure is given by
the agreement specific first principal components. Climate change specific first principal component
(PC1 CC) accounts for 56% of the variance in the three pollutants targeted by the Kyoto protocol
and for which data is available. Acid rain specific first principal component (PC1 AR) accounts for
58% of the variance in emission intensities associated with those pollutants targeted by acid rain
agreements. No data is available on those pollutants targeted by the ozone depletion agreements. In
this case a binary indicator of sectoral dirtiness is used. A value of 1 denotes the transport equipment,
electrical and optical equipment, machinery, n.e.c., textiles and textile products, and leather and
footwear sectors. DIRTY CC and DIRTY AR denote IEA-specific binary measures of dirtiness.
These are based on the 75th percentile cut-offs associated with the first principal components for
climate change and acid rain pollutants, respectively.
95
Chapter 4 The Kyoto Protocol and the Carbon Content of Trade:
Evidence from the EORA Dataset
4.1 Introduction
The Kyoto protocol is aimed at tackling carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and curb
the effects of climate change1. It involves a total of 192 parties but, among these,
only about one in five is legally bound to quantitative emission reduction or limitation
commitments (QERLCs). In other words, committed parties pledged to reduce, keep
unchanged, or increase by a limited amount their CO2 discharges through the 2008-
2012 period2. On a different note, however, the emission content of international
trade is found to be rather large and to increase rapidly (Hertwich and Peters, 2008a;
Peters et al., 2011; Sato, 2012). Within this context one question emerges. Does
commitment to the Kyoto protocol shape trade flows and their carbon content?3 The
causal link is intuitive. On one hand, if the committed parties engage in climate
change reform they are expected to export more "clean" and fewer "dirty" (i.e., CO2-
intensive) goods; a category of wares for which they lose comparative advantage. On
the other hand, climate change policies are awaited to increase the price of carbon and
reduce the overall CO2 emissions per unit of output. In both scenarios, the carbon
content of trade is supposed to decline.
Most of the work on carbon price adjustment and the carbon content of trade
is conducted using computable general equilibrium techniques. The produced esti-
mates are found to vary widely in concordance with the parameter choice and the
underwritten assumptions (Karp, 2011). Other studies, mainly in the environmental
sciences and input-output analysis (IOA) fields, are focused on quantitative descrip-
tions rather than causal analyses (Hertwich and Peters, 2008a; Peters et al., 2011;
Boitier, 2012). Econometric evidence that links the Kyoto protocol and the CO2 con-
tent of bilateral trade is rather limited. So far, the sole empirical exercise carried out
in this vein is Aichele and Felbermayr (2015). However, the composition and time
horizon of their sample masks important post-ratification adjustments. This work
seeks to answer the above question, and to extend the literature notch on the Kyoto
protocol and the carbon content of trade, in several ways. First, it extends the scope
of the above mentioned study by taking advantage of the relatively new EORA26
dataset. This way, the effect of Kyoto ratification4 on the carbon content of exports
is estimated in a sample comprising 149 nations, observed between 1995 and 2012.
1In addition to carbon dioxide, the Kyoto protocol targets methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluoro-
carbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. Due to limited data availability, only carbon
dioxide emissions are considered here.
2Refer to table 4.2 for details.
3The CO2 content of trade is defined as CCT = ηT , where η is a measure of emissions per USD of
output and T denotes exports or imports in monetary terms. This is discussed further in section 4.3.1.
4Unless otherwise specified, Kyoto ratification and Kyoto commitment stand for ratification of
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The addition of the 2008-2012 period is of paramount importance as the QERLCs
adopted under the protocol only become binding during this particular time frame.
Second, it employs a year-by-year analysis to scrutinize the degree of adjustments that
may prevail in the wake of ratification. Third, it investigates whether the outcomes
of interest (i.e., exports (X), the CO2 intensity of exports (η), and the carbon content
of exports (CCX)) are shaped by the type of QERLC adopted or by whether a party
transitions towards a market economy5. On a secondary note, this work also adds to
the burgeoning literature on IEAs and their competitiveness and the pollution haven
effects.
The above approaches lead to a series of novel and important results. First, by
taking into account the 2008-2012 period I find that exports of Kyoto committed
parties increase significantly, by about 6%. The effects recovered by leaving out this
time frame situate at about 0.5%. Furthermore, the CO2 intensity of exports declines
by about 18.5% whereas the carbon content of exports decreases by 14%. In contrast,
the estimates of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) point to much lower and, in the case of
exports, opposite, effects. More specifically, their results imply that the Kyoto com-
mitment decreases exports by 5%, their CO2 intensity by 3%, and the carbon content
of exports by 8%. Second, the year-by-year analysis emphasizes an export adjust-
ment process that prevails during the post-ratification period. This way, exports are
found to decline between 2001 and 2003, only to rebound thereafter. Zooming in, ex-
ports are also found to recover in as little as three years for less CO2-intensive sectors
(e.g., agriculture and fishing). For the more CO2-intensive sectors (e.g., petroleum,
chemicals, and non-metallic mineral products) exports resume growth five years after
ratification. It is important to note that the export recovery does not come into view
if the 2008-2012 time frame is disregarded. The CO2 intensity of exports, on the other
hand, is found to decrease permanently after ratification, thus signaling a potential
compositional shift in the exporting basket (i.e., towards a less CO2-intensive produc-
tion mix). The effect on the carbon content of exports is similar to that on carbon
intensities. Third, by looking at the type of QERLCs (decrease, keep unchanged, or
increase GHG emissions by a controlled amount) I find that the ratification effects are
relatively strong for parties which pledged to reduce emissions. For this group, the
ratification effect on the carbon content of exports was estimated at about -20%. For
countries which pledged to limited increases or no emission changes the effect situates
at circa -2%. Contrary to prior beliefs, I find that the EITs significantly reduced both
the CO2 intensity and the carbon content of their exports. The analysis of QERLCs’
heterogeneous nature gains in importance if viewed through the lenses of the Doha
amendment to the Kyoto protocol. As part of this accord roughly one fifth of Kyoto
ratifiers took on new QERLCs for the 2013-2020 period. The evidence presented here
might be of interest to policy makers as well. Committed parties not only see their
CO2 intensity of exports declining significantly after ratification but exports appear
to have rebounded in the latter part of the 2000s. Simply put, exports become less
the protocol while opting for a legally binding QERLCs.
5Parties to the Kyoto protocol which are transitioning to a market economy are further referred
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CO2-intensive and increase as a result of Kyoto commitment. Contrary to previous
beliefs, this evidence suggests that the engagement in climate change reform might
not be as detrimental to a nation’s competitiveness position.6
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, some of the key
features of the Kyoto protocol are discussed. The baseline empirical strategy and
the benchmark results are discussed within section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the time
series estimation approach and the results. The heterogeneous nature of the QERLCs
is scrutinized within section 4.5. Section 4.6 focuses on the economies in transition
(EITs). Finally, section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Kyoto Protocol
This section describes the Kyoto protocol by drawing on the relevant materials
provided as part of the International Environmental Agreements Database Project
(Mitchell (2016)) and the European Commission. These include and are limited to
information on the protocol itself, its 2012 Doha amendment, and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto protocol is the
outcome of the 1992 UNFCCC and comprises a total of 192 parties (191 sovereign
states and the European Union as a regional economic integration organization). It
is aimed at curbing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by comple-
menting the 1987 Montreal protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer, and its subsequent amendments. While the Montreal protocol is
aimed at containing discharges of chlorofluorocarbons, bromofluorocarbons, and hy-
drochlorfluorocarbons, the Kyoto protocol is designed to target emissions of carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur
hexafluoride. However, unlike the Montreal agreement, the Kyoto protocol focuses
on aggregate rather than individual emissions.
Subject to much controversy, a key feature of the Kyoto protocol is the "com-
mon but differentiated" responsibilities designated among parties. Some of these
duties consist in legally binding quantitative emission limitations or reductions com-
mitments (QERLCs). For example, some ratifiers such as Switzerland and Japan
assured to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions by 8% and 6%, respectively. Other
parties, such as Australia and Norway, promised to increase their GHG emissions by
no more than 8% and 1%. In contrast, some parties (e.g., New Zealand) pledged to
keep their emissions unchanged. Adopters of the Kyoto protocol were also presented
with the option of committing to QERLCs as a group. This is the case of the pre-2004
European Union members (EU15) which jointly adopted an emission cutback of 8%.
As per the European Commission’s guidelines, parties become responsible for indi-
vidual targets if the joint fulfillment target is not met. In this regard, EU15 members,
to as Eastern European transitioning economies or simply as economies in transition (EITs).
6The United States did not ratify the Kyoto protocol due to competitiveness concerns (Grubb,
2003). Also invoking competitiveness concerns, Canada did not take on QERLCs for the 2013-2020
commitment period.
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and those that joined the EU starting 2004, also took on individual QERLCs7. For
example, both Denmark and Germany committed to a 21% reduction commitment
while Greece and Portugal promised to increase their GHG emissions by no more
than 25% and 27%, respectively. The individual commitments took on by the EU15
nations amount to an average emission decrease of 5.2%. The reduction targets refer
to the 2008-2012 period relative to 1990 levels8. This five year span is also referred
to as the first commitment period of the protocol. By the end of this window, parties
which adopted QERLCs must have met their targets or otherwise face international
sanctions. The enforcement of QERLCs is discussed shortly. The nations which have
committed themselves to QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol are listed within An-
nex I of the Framework Convention and are often referred to as Annex I parties9,10.
Further targets, for the 2013-2020 period, were added as part of the Doha (2012)
amendment to the protocol. The QERLCs are listed within the sixth column of table
4.2. Under the addendum, the EU members plus Iceland opted for a joint QERLC
of -20%. In the case in which this target is not met, the EU members are responsible
for carrying out the individual marks listed in the last column of table 4.2. Under
the Doha amendment, some parties also pledged to non-binding QERLCs that range
between -5% for Australia and -40% for Norway11. Canada withdrew from the pro-
tocol in 2012 while Japan and Russia declined to take on QERLCs for the second
commitment period (i.e., 2013-2020). In addition to adopting QERLCs, developed
parties (also referred to as Annex II countries) were prompted to initiate efforts of
achieving important reductions of GHG emissions by 2005. Annex II countries were
also designated to take part in the flexibility mechanisms developed under the proto-
col. These instruments are designed to complement domestic climate change policies.
First, emissions trading (ET) under the Kyoto protocol is similar to a domestic cap-
and-trade system. Under this system, committed parties with emission headroom can
7These are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia. Among those only Cyprus and Malta did not commit themselves to binding
emission caps. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. For completion purposes, Croatia joined in
2013. Refer to table 4.2 for details
8For most parties the reduction targets refer to 1990 emission levels. However, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia picked different base years in accordance with the provisions
stipulated within the 1st Conference of the Parties. In the order specified above, the base years are
1988, 1985-1987 average, 1988, 1989, and 1986.
9Technically, QERLCs were assigned for Annex I countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto
protocol. A presentation of the emission reduction/cap targets accepted by ratifying parties is
provided in table 4.2.
10It is worth pointing out that not all Annex I countries (i.e., Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey) took
on binding emission caps for the 2008-2012 period. Cyprus became an Annex I member only in 2013.
Malta was added to Annex I in 2009 and therefore did not commit to any reductions for the above
mentioned period. According to the 2001 Marrakesh Conference of Parties, Turkey is recognized
"in a situation different from that of other Parties included in Annex I to the Convention". Turkey
did not take on any binding QERLCs. Also, the United States signed the protocol in 1998 and
opted for an emission reduction of 7%. However the Kyoto protocol was never ratified by the U.S.
Administrations that followed since.
11These voluntary commitments are to be pursued only if other parties would subject themselves
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trade their remaining allowances to parties that are in the position of not meeting
their QERLC. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation
(JI) mechanisms are built around international investment incentives. As part of the
CDM, parties that adopted QERLCs can accrue certified emission reductions (CERs)
by pursuing projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions in non-Annex I parties. Sim-
ilarly, under JI emission reduction units (ERUs) may be earned for similar projects
conducted between parties with QERLCs. Both CERs and ERUs can be used for
meeting the legally binding QERLCs. The end purpose of the flexibility mechanisms
is to facilitate sustainable growth in developing parties and to aid Annex I parties in
meeting their emission commitments.
Some of the early concerns regarding the protocol were focused on the extent to
which penalties for non-compliance can be enforced. As noted in Grubb (2003), the
repercussions are mild in comparison to domestic legislation. For example, a party
that does not meet the legally binding QERLCs by the end of the first commitment
period is barred from taking part in the flexibility mechanisms. Furthermore, for
the second commitment period the offending party’s emission allowance is cut by
30%. Nevertheless, parties which committed to QERLCs under the protocol seem to
have taken their duties seriously. Figure 4.4, borrowed from Aichele and Felbermayr
(2015), shows that committed participants’ stock of climate change policies (e.g., on
energy efficiency standards, afforestation, or facilitation of research and development)
rose faster than that of their non-committed peers, and by 2011 they had enforced
roughly twice as many policies. Another piece of evidence regarding the efforts of
committed parties is presented in figure 4.8. From here, one can observe that the
total CO2 emissions embodied in exports increased much faster for non-committed
Kyoto parties. Moreover, the series appear to diverge starting 2009. At this point
in time, the CO2 content of outflows from non-committed nations starts to increase
sharply. One of the first econometric analyses linking QERLCs with reduced CO2
emissions is Aichele and Felbermayr (2013). Their study emphasizes that parties
which ratified the protocol by taking on a binding emission cap saw their domestic
CO2 emissions reduced by approximately 7%. However, this cutback was offset by
increases in imported emissions, particularly from non-committed nations. In the
same vein, Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2011) conclude that, for committed
parties, the ratification of Kyoto protocol entails a 24.5% decline in the CO2 emission
levels.
Another concern involves the QERLCs took on by the Eastern European transi-
tioning countries. According to Grubb (2003) and Victor (2004), these targets are
believed to be rather lenient. Given the disintegration of their industrial clusters, and
the implied decline in CO2 emitting capacity, some questioned whether the adopted
QERLCs will prompt the EITs to engage in climate change reform. Nevertheless,
in the context of the European Union (EU) Eastern Enlargement, the enforcement
of a tougher environmental stance may have been used as a signaling instrument by
some EITs. Once in, these nations were motivated to comply with the EU’s environ-
to similar standards.
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mental guidelines by otherwise hefty fines (Jug and Mirza, 2005). Further, transition
economies are found to rank relatively high in terms of environmental performance
according to Emerson et al. (2012)12.
As per the above, a detailed look into the exporting behavior of Annex I and
EIT parties, all of which ratified the protocol with a binding QERLC, is therefore in
line. Also, it is important to dissect the time dimension, since each post-ratification
year may entail an idiosyncratic Kyoto commitment effect. For instance, most parties
ratified the protocol between 2001-2003 and the protocol entered into force in 2005.
Further, the commitment of parties which took on QERLCs is evaluated at the end
2012. In addition, firms and industries are expected to gradually adapt to the above
time-line and to the environmental policies enacted post-ratification.
4.3 Empirics: Kyoto Ratification
4.3.1 Baseline Empirical Specification and Discussion
A notable amount of empirical research focused on the link between environmental
policy and exports13. However, the strand of literature analyzing the link between
environmental policy, pollution intensities, and the pollution content of bilateral trade
is not as vast. Nevertheless, it is expanding fast given the recent accumulation of
data on industry-level emissions and the increased availability of detailed multi-region
input output tables. One recent study in this vein and on which the present analysis
builds is Aichele and Felbermayr (2015).
The effect of ratifying the Kyoto protocol on the carbon content of exports is
analyzed using the gravity framework proposed by Aichele and Felbermayr (2015).
However, while their study focuses on imports, the current work analyzes exports and
their carbon content by using a much larger dataset (i.e., 149 countries and 18 years).
The carbon content of exports from exporter x, in industry s, to importer m at time
t, CCXx,m,s,t is depicted in (4.1). Here, ηx,s,t stands for sectoral emissions per unit of
output (or emission intensity) in the exporting country while Xx,m,s,t denotes exports
in monetary terms. As in the above mentioned study, the effect of environmental
policy on sectoral carbon content of exports can be decomposed in two sub-effects.
First, the technique effect is outlined by changes in sectoral emission intensities (ηx,s,t).
Second, the scale effect underlines changes in the carbon content of exports which are
12In terms of their environmental performance index, eight out of the thirteen EITs rank ahead of
the United States. According to the same report, all EITs rank ahead of the United States in their
potential of reaching four climate change-specific objectives. These include emissions of GHG per
capita, per unit of GDP, and per kilowatt-hour in addition to the share of energy produced using
renewable sources.
13Kalt (1985); Robison (1988); Tobey (1990); Grossman and Krueger (1991) are some of the
early analyses. De Santis (2012); Grether and De Melo (2003); Grether et al. (2012); Jug and Mirza
(2005); van Beers and van den Bergh (1997); Aichele and Felbermayr (2013); van Beers and van den
Bergh (2000); Ederington and Minier (2003); Ederington et al. (2005); Levinson and Taylor (2008);
Kellenberg (2009); Broner et al. (2012) are among the more recent studies. Refer to section 3.2 of
the previous chapter for a detailed review of this literature notch.
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attributable to changes in sectoral export flows (Xx,m,s,t).14
CCXx,m,s,t = ηx,s,tXx,m,s,t (4.1)
With the above in mind, I now turn to discuss the empirical specification. This
is depicted in (4.2) where the variable of interest is the differential Kyoto commit-
ment, dKyotox,m,t. This is constructed as the simple difference between the exporter
and importer-specific Kyoto ratification status. Specifically, this differential takes
a value of 1 (and -1) if the exporter (importer), but not the importer (exporter),
ratified the Kyoto protocol by taking on legally binding QERLCs. In case in which
both (or none of) the exporter and importer committed to the protocol, the dif-
ferential is null. TAx,m,t denotes the degree of economic integration characterizing
an exporter-importer pair. This is expected to affect the carbon content of exports
through the scale effect; as a more integrated dyad is more likely to exchange a
larger volume of goods. Finally, the error term µx,m,s,t is modeled as in (4.3). The
reasoning behind this particular error term structure is discussed within the pre-
vious chapter15. Briefly, this particular design is aimed at capturing exporter and
importer, time-invariant and time-variant, determinants of export flows (e.g. border
tax adjustments16) and sectoral pollution intensities. Furthermore, the inclusion of
exporter×year and importer×year effects, both nested in νx,m,t, circumvents the prob-
lem of self-selection into the Kyoto protocol, the QERLC choice, or the participation
in protocol’s flexibility mechanisms17. A sector-specific time trend is also included to
account for any idiosyncratic shocks that an industry may display. Furthermore, pair-
sector-specific fixed effects are included to account for any time-invariant factors that
may influence sectoral exports (e.g., distance, common border, common language,
etc.). The inclusion of the high-dimensional effects outlined above is computationally
feasible by virtue of the new regdfe STATA routine (Correia, 2015). All estimates are
produced using ordinary least squares.
lnCCXx,m,s,t = βdKyotox,m,t + δTAx,m,t + µx,m,s,t (4.2)
µx,m,s,t = νx,m,t + νx,m,s + νs,t




> 0 and ∂CCX
∂X
> 0;
For an extended initial discussions on these two sub-effects refer to Antweiler et al. (2001); Grossman
and Krueger (1991).
15Refer to sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for details
16In a sense, border tax adjustments can be regarded as import duties aimed at mitigating adverse
competitiveness effects and reduce carbon leakage.
17Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) utilize a similar approach in the context of Kyoto adoption while
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As noted earlier, the ratification of the Kyoto protocol transforms the sectoral
carbon content of exports through changes in the CO2 emission intensity of exports
(i.e., the technique effect) and exports (i.e., the scale effect). First, the technique effect
should be negative since commitment under the protocol appears to entail a more
demanding climate change reform18. In turn, this is expected to engender declines
in the CO2 intensity of exports; perhaps due to more efficient production processes
or fuel standards, for example. To a large extent, this outcome is also supported by
the findings of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015). Their findings imply that exports of
Kyoto committed parties, towards their non-committed peers, are characterized by
lower CO2 intensities. In addition, Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) find that parties
with QERLCs under the protocol reduced their domestic emissions by approximately
7%. Second, the scale effect is ambiguous. From a general equilibrium perspective
it could be positive if the growth of "clean" exports more than offsets the decline in
"dirty" outflows. This dynamic gives itself to a possible compositional shift towards
less CO2-intensive production; as climate change reform may necessitate a reallocation
of resources from "dirty" sectors towards their "clean" counterparts.19. On the other
one hand the scale effect can be negative if post-Kyoto climate change policies entail
reductions in exports from both "dirty" (i.e., CO2-intensive) and "clean" (i.e., less
CO2-intensive) sectors. In the light of the above, and should the technique effect
dominate the scale effect, β is expected to be negative.
4.3.2 Data
The sample under analysis comprises 149 countries observed between 1995 and
2012 as both exporters and importers. These are listed in table 4.1. With the excep-
tion of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the United States of America, all countries
in the sample have ratified the Kyoto protocol by 2012. A total of 37 parties adopted
the protocol by taking on QERLCs for the first commitment period (i.e., 2008-2012)
but only 35 remain after the data assembly process is finished20. These are shown in
table 4.2. A dataset on industry-level, bilateral exports is initially constructed using
the harmonized EORA26 world input-output table21. This is compiled as part of the
EORA World MRIO project (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). The export figures refer to
both intermediate inputs (i.e., shipped to foreign firms) and final goods (i.e., shipped
to foreign final consumers). In total, information on 14 service, 10 manufacturing, and
Head and Mayer (2013); Baier and Bergstrand (2007); Baier et al. (2014); Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006); Regolo (2013); Soete and Van Hove (2015) discuss it with regards to the ratification of
economic integration agreements (EIAs).
18Refer to figure 4.4 for details.
19In the previous chapter I document that the Kyoto protocol is a source of comparative dis-
advantage for pollution-intensive industries and a source of comparative advantage for their less
pollution-intensive peers. That is, the ratification of Kyoto protocol by the exporter is equivalent
to a 0.8% decline in exports of "dirty" sectors. At the same time, outflows from "clean" sectors are
estimated to increase by 5.8%.
20Liechtenstein and Monaco are not in the sample.
21A toy depiction of such table is shown in figures A.1 and A.2 of the appendix.
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2 primary sectors is provided. However, only the latter two categories are analyzed.
In addition and for comparability purposes, outflows are further aggregated such
that the industrial classification matches that of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015)22.
This way, 1 primary and 8 manufacturing sectors are retained.23 In turn, the typi-
cal observation denotes an exporter-importer-industry pair at a given point in time.
Another advantage of using the EORA26 database is outlined by the availability of
sectoral carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions24. This information can be further used to
construct industry-specific CO2 intensities25 and the CO2 content of exports as shown
in (4.1). Sector specific summary statistics on exports, the CO2 intensity of exports,
and the carbon content of exports are showcased in table 4.5. Data on the Kyoto
participation is obtained from the International Environmental Agreements Database
Project (Mitchell (2016)). QERLCs data for the EU15 countries is retrieved from the
European Commission. For reasons already discussed in the previous chapter, the
ratification as opposed to signature or entry into force is regarded as the treatment
date. Economic integration is measured on a zero to six scale, with zero denoting no
integration between the exporter and importer at a given point in time26. The overall
summary statistics are presented in table 4.4.
4.3.3 Results
Before presenting the estimates obtained using the full dataset, I discuss the re-
sults recovered using a sub-sample which replicates that of Aichele and Felbermayr
(2015)27. The results are presented in table 4.6. Column (1) reports the results ob-
tained by estimating equation (4.2) while using exports (Xx,m,s,t) as the dependent
variable. Column (2) presents the results for the sectoral pollution intensity of ex-
ports (ηx,s,t). Column (3) addresses the carbon terms of trade (CTTx,m,s,t)28. From
22Mining and quarrying, and electricity, gas and water supply sector is not included due to the very
high emissions per unit of output displayed. Its exclusion does not impact the results quantitatively
or qualitatively. Services sectors are also left out.
23Refer to table 4.3 for the list of sectors.
24The main sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are represented by energy production.
Other sources include the production of cement and extraction of minerals, and agricultural burning.
25For each sector, emission intensities are constructed as a ratio of yearly CO2 emissions to yearly
output. In absence of sectoral price indexes, sectoral output is converted in 2005 prices using the
GDP price indexes provided in the Penn World Tables 8.1.
26This measure is obtained from the NSF - Kellogg Institute Data Base on Economic Integration
Agreements Project. The first level is indicative of a non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement.
Similarly, levels two and three denote joint attendance within a preferential trade arrangement
and a free trade agreement, respectively. Level four signals that the exporter and importer are
concomitantly part of a customs union. Level five underlines the joint membership within a common
market (i.e., the European Union). Finally the last stage expresses dual participation in an economic
union (i.e., the Eurozone).
27The authors construct a bilateral dataset comprising of 40 exporters and importers between
1995 and 2007. The countries in their sample are marked with an asterisk in table 4.1.
28CTTx,m,s,t is defined as the ratio of carbon content of exports to that of imports and it is
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panel A one can note that exports decline by about 2%29 if the exporter ratified the
Kyoto protocol with a binding emission cap but the importer has not. Similarly, the
carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity of exports decreases by approximately 9%. Together,
these negative scale and technique effects bring about a decline in the CO2 content
of exports of 11%. In comparison, the findings of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015)
are underlining a differential commitment effect of -5% on imports, -3% on the CO2
intensity of exports, and -8% on the CO2 content of exports.30 In sum, parties which
took on legally binding emission caps as part of the Kyoto protocol are characterized
by a lower volume of outflows and a less CO2-intensive export basket. This result is
also supported by the estimates in column (3) which denote a negative differential
effect on the carbon terms of trade. In turn, this finding suggests that, relative to
imports, the exports of committed parties become cleaner (i.e., less CO2-intensive).
This post-Kyoto pattern may give itself to potential Heckscher-Ohlin general equi-
librium effects. According to this hypothesis, less CO2-intensive sectors expand at
the expense of their more polluting counterparts. I now turn to panel B where the
sub-sample mimicking that of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) is extended to include
the 2008-2012 time frame. This addition brings the differential commitment effect on
exports from a statistically significant -2% to an insignificant -0.5%. The impacts on
the CO2 intensity of exports (i.e., -9%) and the CO2 content of exports (i.e., -9.5%)
are not altered significantly. In sum, for the extended sample, the exports of commit-
ted parties, although cleaner, seem unaffected by the adoption of Kyoto QERLCs.
Collectively, the estimates in panels A and B suggest existence of an adjustment
period. Specifically, exports decline in the wake of ratification, only to rebound post-
2008. These findings represent the catalyst for the year-by-year analysis conducted
in section 4.4.
The remainder of this section focuses on the benchmark estimates. These are
produced using the full set of countries and displayed in table 4.7. Panel A con-
tains the results obtained using the 1995-2007 period. From here, the differential
commitment effect on exports and the CO2 intensity of exports is 0.6% and -18%
respectively. Together these scale and technique effects imply a decline in the car-
bon content of exports of about 17.4%. Panel B presents the estimates produced
by taking into account the protocol’s first commitment period (i.e., 2008-2012). The
coefficients listed here underline a differential QERLC effect of approximately 6%
on exports and -18.5% on the CO2 intensity of outflows. In turn, the carbon con-
tent of exports declines by about 14%. As with the sub-sample replicating that of





A similar measure is discussed in Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) and Antweiler (1996).
29Effects are computed based on the following formula: (eβ − 1) ∗ 100.
30Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) analyze imports, the CO2 intensity of imports, and the carbon
content of imports. However, due to the symmetric nature of the commitment differential, their
findings may be extended to exports as well.
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the effects on the CO2 intensity of exports or the carbon terms of trade, which are
shown in columns (2) and (3). A similar argument could be made with regards to
the CO2 content of exports. However, the differential effect declines slightly upon
expanding the time horizon (i.e., moving from panel A to panel B in column (4)).
This shift is attributable in its entirely to the export recovery that seems to occur
post-2008. The export adjustment argument is supported once more by the estimates
in column (1). Note that by including the 2008-2012 period, the Kyoto commitment
effect on exports changes significantly, from a meager 0.6% to a much larger 6%.
The positive scale effect follows to some extent the logic of Rose and Spiegel (2010).
In their study, membership within international environmental agreements (IEAs) is
regarded as a signaling mechanism for international cooperation. Specifically, joint
adoption of IEAs was found to facilitate cross-border asset exchange. Further, foreign
direct investment, a type of asset exchange, was shown to complement international
trade activities (Helpman, 1984; Head and Ries, 2004). On a similar note, Kee et al.
(2010) link increases in carbon taxes with higher exports for OECD countries. Their
argument revolves around the idea of tax-recycling and over-compensation of CO2-
intensive industries.
To summarize, ratifying the Kyoto protocol by adopting QERLCs entails a pos-
itive scale effect (i.e., the change in the volume of exports) of approximately 6%.
The technique effect (i.e., the change in the CO2 intensity of exports) is negative
and much larger, thus situating at about -18.5%. Together, the scale and technique
effects imply a decline in the CO2 content of exports of roughly 14%. In addition,
the results presented here are also indicative of a supply side "leakage". That is, the
carbon content of outflows from parties with no QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol
is increasing due to ratification.
4.3.4 Robustness Checks
In the spirit of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), a battery of robustness checks
is presented within table A.1 of the appendix. In order to produce these results I
employ the specification described in (4.2). As noted before, exports are used as the
dependent variable in column (1). Column (2) refers to the CO2 intensity of exports
whereas column (3) shifts the focus onto the carbon terms of trade. In column
(4) the differential commitment effect on the CO2 content of exports is presented.
Panel A shows the results obtained by excluding China from the sample. Panel B
excludes countries which, in 2014, found themselves among the twenty five leading
oil producers31. The results exhibited within panels A and B are minimally altered
when compared to the benchmark estimates.
One may rightfully argue that the differential Kyoto commitment may be biased
as it may be correlated with latent differences between developed (i.e., parties with
31According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Statis-
tics these are (first to last) the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Canada, the United
Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Brazil, Mexico, Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria, Qatar, Norway, Angola, Al-
geria, Kazakhstan, Colombia, India, Oman, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Azerbaijan, and Ar-
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QERLCs) and developing countries (i.e., parties without QERLCs) which may also
influence the scale and technique effects. Differences in preferences and the fact that
countries with higher per capita income trade more with one another (Markusen,
2013; Martínez-Zarzoso and Vollmer, 2010) may reshape the scale effect. Concerning
the technique effect, Hertwich and Peters (2008a); Peters et al. (2011); Boitier (2012)
emphasize that CO2 emissions embodied in exports flowing from developing towards
developed nations have increased sharply since the 1990s. I address this potential issue
by including a GDP per capita differential within specification (4.2). The estimates
obtained this way are shown in panel C. The results hardly change vis-a-vis their
benchmark figures; a signal that the symmetric and time-varying country pair effects
are performing well in accounting for this particular type of omitted variable bias.
Factor endowment differences are important for two reasons. First, the classical
theory of trade holds that trade patterns are shaped by differences in factor endow-
ments. By omitting these factors, one opens the door towards a potentially biased
scale effect. Second, "dirty" industries (i.e., CO2-intensive) are characterized by rel-
atively high capital-to-labor ratios32. Moreover, parties which ratified the protocol
by taking on QERLCs are capital-abundant while those opting out of QELRCs are
labor-abundant33. Thus, capital-abundant, and Kyoto committed, parties are likely
to host CO2-intensive sectors. The opposite holds true for labor-abundant, but not
committed parties. I address this potential issue by including exporter-importer dif-
ferences in the capital-to-labor ratios and years of schooling in equation (4.2). The
results obtained are presented in panel D and, although lower, they line up rather
well with their benchmarks.
A series of counterfactual tests are also conducted by closely following Aichele and
Felbermayr (2013). These are presented in table A.2 of the appendix. The estimates
are once again recovered by the employment of specification (4.2). Panels A, B, and C
present the results for exports, the CO2 intensity of exports, and the carbon content
of exports, respectively. In the first two columns 1997 and 1998 are used as hypothet-
ical ratification years34. Note the absence of any association between the estimates
presented here and the benchmarks. The counterfactual differential commitment ef-
fect on exports is double than that recovered using the correct treatment date while
the effect on CO2 intensities is virtually null. Together these imply a positive effect
gentina. Among these only Canada, Russia, Norway, and the United Kingdom ratified the protocol
by adopting QERLCs.
32Using industry-level data from the World Input Output Tables (WIOT) (Timmer et al., 2012;
Dietzenbacher et al., 2013; Timmer et al., 2015), small but positive correlations are found between
sectoral CO2 intensities and capital/labor ratios. The WIOT data is available for 40 nations (all 27
European Union members (in 2011) plus 13 other nations: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Taiwan, and the United States) from 1995
to 2009. Similar correlations but regarding nitrous oxides, sulphur dioxide, and carbon monoxide
intensities are shown in Broner et al. (2012). Antweiler et al. (1998) link capital intensity with
higher pollution abatement costs. Grether and De Melo (2003) and Mani and Wheeler (1998) also
find that pollution intensive sectors are more capital-intensive.
33This very aspect is shown in figure 4.5.
34The first Kyoto ratification under a QERLCs regime occurred in 2001.
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of hypothetical ratification on the carbon content of exports. These counterfactual
tests rule out the presence of pre-ratification trends that might be captured by the
true commitment differential.
As noted earlier, developed parties are more likely to have taken QERLCs under
the protocol. With the exception of EITs, the opposite is true for developing countries.
The estimates presented in columns (3) - (5) are aimed to tackle, from a different
angle, the potential issues that may arise due to this feature. In column (3), exports
and imports of Kyoto committed parties to and from their non-committed partners are
stacked against the United States’ exports and imports to and from non-committed
nations. Column (4) is similar but a group of developed countries is used instead
of only the United States.35 To produce columns (3) and (4) I follow Aichele and
Felbermayr (2015) and exclude pairs with null Kyoto commitment differentials (e.g.
both exporter and importer having QERLCs as well as both exporter and importer
not having QERLCs)36. Finally, in column (5) the United States is assigned to the
group of QERLCs adopters with a hypothetical treatment year of 2002. In all three
cases, the estimates confirm the benchmark results and cast away any concerns related
with QERLCs being adopted overwhelmingly by developed rather than developing
parties.
4.4 Empirics: Timing Effects
4.4.1 Empirical Specification and Discussion
The estimates shown in column (1) of tables 4.6 and 4.7 imply that exports of
Kyoto committed parties may have increased post-2008. In order to assess the yearly
effects of the differential Kyoto commitment from their sample averages the empir-
ical specification in (4.4) is employed. Here, dKyotox,m,t+k denotes the interaction
terms between the Kyoto commitment differential and the binary indicators for each
of the eleven post-ratification years. Thus, βt+k denotes the additional differential
commitment effect which prevails k years after ratification. With the exception of
the summation term all else is similar to (4.2). The ratification of Kyoto protocol,
by parties which adopted QERLCs, was started in 2001 by Romania and Czech Re-
public37. Given the time span of the dataset, the post-ratification period comprises
eleven years. The error term is similar to the one depicted in (4.3), and is shown in
35These are Argentina, Bahrain, Chile, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait, Macau,
Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan.
36This way I only observe the committed parties trading with all other nations in the sample
except with other committed parties; and the United States (or the group of developed countries)
trading with all other nations included. This exercise does not restrict the sample to include only
committed parties and the United States (or the group of developed countries).






βt+kdKyotox,m,t+k + δ′TAx,m,t + µ′x,m,s,t (4.4)
µ′x,m,s,t = ν ′x,m,t + ν ′x,m,s + ν ′s,t
ν ′x,m,t = ν ′m,x,t (4.5)
4.4.2 Results
The results obtained by estimating (4.4) are shown in table 4.8. As noted before,
column (1) displays the results recovered with export flows as the dependent variable.
In column (2), the CO2 intensity of exports is used. Estimates in column (3) refer
to the carbon terms of trade while those in column (4) pertain the carbon content of
exports. I start by addressing the estimates in the first column. The marginal effects
implied are plotted in figure 4.6. From here, one can notice that outflows of Kyoto
committed exporters decline in the first three years after ratification by 2.7%, 4.1%,
and 1.2%, respectively. Starting in 2004, the exports of committed parties increase at
an average of 5.4% per year. The gains are more pronounced towards the end of the
first commitment period. This result may give itself to an adjustment process which
is experienced initially by both "clean" and "dirty" industries. Recall, that parties
which took on QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol enacted relatively more climate
change policies. In turn, these policies may have impacted production regardless of
its CO2 intensity. A short-run38 decline in exports is, nevertheless, expected as in-
dustrial branches are interconnected through upstream and downstream linkages39.
For instance, climate change policies are likely to increase energy prices. Energy
production is notoriously CO2-intensive as it relies heavily on the burning of fossil
fuels. Additionally, climate change policies are also bound to alter the shipment of
intermediate inputs due to higher fuel prices brought about by, for example, more
stringent fuel or emissions standards. The inelastic nature of energy demand may
also exacerbate the short-run decline. In the long run, however, exports are expected
to recover once the adjustment to the post-Kyoto environmental regime is completed.
For committed Kyoto parties, the adjustment to the new environmental regime may
also entail a shift towards a less CO2-intensive export bundle as "clean" sectors gain at
the expense of their "dirty" peers; which are impacted relatively more by environmen-
tal policies enacted after ratification. Thus, the post-Kyoto export expansion path is
expected to be driven by two types of dynamics. First, the CO2-intensive industries
adjust gradually to a new equilibrium characterized by relatively low production and
exports. Second, less CO2-intensive production and exports expand as more factors,
previously tied to "dirty" industries, are being employed within these sectors.
38Unless otherwise notified, the term short run denotes the five year post-ratification period.
39Refer to footnote 17 for a supplementary argument in this regard.
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The results recovered by estimating (4.4) while using the CO2 intensity of exports
as the dependent variable are presented in column (2). The marginal effects obtained
using these results are plotted in figure 4.7. As expected, the CO2 intensity of exports
that originate within committed jurisdictions declines. This finding is in line with
Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2015); Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2011). Even
more, the CO2 intensity of exports diminishes persistently throughout the entire
post-ratification period. This way, eleven years after the protocol was first ratified
the effect on CO2 intensity of exports is roughly -18%. This finding is supported by
the estimates presented in column (3). Here, the dependent variable is the carbon
terms of trade. Negative coefficients are indicative of a decline in the export to import
carbon content ratio. In other words, relative to imports, the exports of parties which
adopted QERLCs under the protocol become "cleaner". This set of results line up once
more with the three studies mentioned earlier. In addition, the estimates displayed
in column (3) are also consistent with Hertwich and Peters (2008b) and Nakano et al.
(2009) who find that parties which adopted QERLCs display a carbon trade deficit
around the early 2000s; when most committed countries ratified the agreement.
The results in column (4) refer to the carbon content of exports. To aid the dis-
cussion, the yearly effects of Kyoto commitment differential are plotted in figure 4.8.
From here, two aspects become apparent. First, the CO2 content of exports declines
sharply immediately after ratification due to the sizable and negative technique ef-
fect. Second, this dynamic persists until 2006 after which the differential commitment
effect diminishes in magnitude. To a large extent, this lower effect is induced by the
positive scale effect (i.e., an improvement in exports). Note that the technique effect
is relatively stable post-2006. Despite the latter decline, the differential commitment
effect on the CO2 content of exports for 2012 stands at a significant -8.3%. These two
developments can be observed in figure 4.9 which showcases the scale and technique
effects of ratification together with the differential Kyoto commitment impact on the
carbon content of exports.
The deleterious effect of QERLC adoption on the CO2 intensity of exports is in-
tuitive. This may be driven, for example, by more efficient production processes or
efficiency standards for fuels and industrial equipment that were introduced as part
of the climate reform enacted after ratification. However, the post-Kyoto export ad-
justment may not be as customary. The first paragraph notes that the scale effect
may be driven by two types of developments. On one hand, for CO2-intensive sec-
tors, the post-ratification period is characterized by relatively low exports. On the
other hand, for the less CO2-intensive industries exports decline in the short run but
expand relatively more in the long run; as more factors, previously tied to "dirty"
industries, are being employed within these sectors. The estimates presented in table
4.9 underline exactly this type of adjustment40. Column (1) presents the differential
commitment effect by taking into account the sector-specific CO2 intensity. Accord-
ing to the estimates, the Kyoto ratification effect on sectoral exports is a function
on their respective CO2 intensity. For example, exports of petroleum, chemicals, and
40Estimations in column (1) are carried out using an empirical specification similar to (4.2). In
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non-metallic mineral products, the most CO2-intensive industry in the sample, de-
crease on average by 2.6% due to the adoption of QERLCs. At the other end of the
spectrum, outflows from the agricultural and fishing sector increase by about 8%.
Column (2) presents the associated year-by-year analysis. The timing effects of the
differential commitment are plotted in figure 4.1041 and stress a recovery of exports
for parties which adopted QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol. In addition, exports
from less CO2-intensive sectors (e.g., agriculture and fishing) seem to start increasing
in the third post-ratification year. Outflows from more CO2-intensive industries (e.g.,
petroleum, chemicals, and non-metallic minerals) resume growth six years after rati-
fication. On this subject, the 2008-2012 upturn in exports seems to be driven by an
expansion of exports from "clean" and "dirty" industries alike. However, the export
growth is larger for the former category.
To summarize, due to ratification, Kyoto committed parties are experiencing an
initial decrease in exports. But, exports seem to recover in as little as three years after
ratification. On a different note, the CO2 intensity of exports declines immediately
after ratification. This dynamic persists throughout the post-ratification period. Due
to QERLCs adoption, the CO2 content of exports declines, up until 2006. This is
mainly due to a large and negative technique effect. After 2006, however, the Kyoto
ratification implies an increase in the carbon content of exports. This hike seems to
be driven by a recovery of exports. The last set of findings caters directly towards
the discussion surrounding international environmental agreements (IEAs) and their
detrimental effects on export competitiveness. Explicitly, outflows from less CO2-
intensive sectors are found to recover faster (i.e., 3 years) in comparison to their
more polluting peers (i.e., 5 years). These results suggest that the adverse effects on
export competitiveness induced by the Kyoto protocol are rather short lived. Overall,
the ratification of an IEA such as the Kyoto protocol leads to lower CO2 emission
intensity of exports, lower carbon content of exports, but higher exports.
4.5 Empirics: Kyoto Ratification and Heterogeneous QERLCs
4.5.1 Empirical Specification and Discussion
The results presented in sections 4.3.3 and 4.4.2 emphasize the importance of
taking on QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol. In sum, adopting such commitments
appears to have increased exports and lowered the CO2 intensity of exports. The
combined result of these two dynamics is the reduction in the carbon content of sec-
toral exports. Further, the adoption of QERLCs also seems to entail a compositional
shift towards cleaner exports. However, the type of QERLCs selected as part of the
protocol are heterogeneous. For example, Germany agreed to an individual commit-
addition it includes exporter’s sectoral CO2 intensity and its interaction with the Kyoto commitment
differential. The estimates in column (2) are produced using a specification similar to (4.4). In
addition, this specification includes exporter’s sectoral CO2 intensity and its interaction with the
Kyoto commitment differential and year-specific binary indicators.
41The effects are calculated using year, sector, and differential commitment-specific average CO2
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ment of -21% while France and Portugal opted for 0% and +27%, respectively42. This
particular feature begs the question of whether the degree of adjustment to the post-
Kyoto environmental regime depends on the QERLC type adopted. Specifically, are
exports, the CO2 intensity of exports, and the carbon content of exports impacted
differently for parties which pledged to emission cutbacks as opposed to their less
committed peers (i.e., which opted for controlled increases, or no changes at all)?
The analysis of heterogeneous QERLCs gains in importance as the Doha amendment
is expected to enter into force in the near future.43 Once in force, new QERLCs will
become legally binding for the 2013-2020 period.44
The empirical specification used to estimate the heterogeneous QERLC effect is
shown in (4.6). The structure of the error term is outlined in (4.7). With the exception
of the covariates of interest, the econometric details discussed within section 4.3.1
apply here as well. The focus is placed on rdKyotox,m,t and adKyotox,m,t. First,
rdKyotox,m,t takes a value of 1 (and -1) if the exporter (importer), but not the
importer (exporter), ratified the Kyoto protocol. If none or both countries ratified, the
differential is null. Hence, rdKyotox,m,t ∈ {1, 0,−1}. This is further referred to as the
ratification differential. Second, adKyotox,m,t is constructed as the difference between
the exporter’s and importer’s degrees of commitment to the Kyoto protocol (i.e., ζx
and ζm). For the exporter ζx is defined as in (4.8). According to columns (1) and
(2) of table 4.2, Germany represents the type of exporter for which ζx=2. Portugal
or New Zealand represent exporters for which ζx=1. For non-listed exporters ζx=0.
The same logic is applied for the importer and its degree of commitment, ζm. Hence,
adKyotox,m,t ∈ {2, 1, 0,−1,−2}.
lnCCXx,m,s,t = α′′rdKyotox,m,t + β′′adKyotox,m,t + δ′′TAx,m,t + µ′′x,m,s,t (4.6)
µ′′x,m,s,t = ν ′′x,m,t + ν ′′x,m,s + ν ′′s,t
ν ′′x,m,t = ν ′′m,x,t (4.7)
ζx =

0, if no QERLC by the exporter
1, if QERLCx ≥ 0%
2, if QERLCx < 0%
(4.8)
This discrete methodology of capturing the heterogeneous effects on QERLCs may
have its drawbacks. For example, it implies that the effect of Kyoto ratification on an
intensities.
42Refer to table 4.2 for a list of party-by-party commitments.
43According to the amendment text, entry into force is governed by articles 20 and 21 of the
Kyoto protocol. In sum, the Doha addendum enters into force on the ninetieth day after the receipt
of instruments of acceptance by at least 75% (144) of the parties to the Kyoto protocol. According
to UNFCCC, as of June 2016 65 parties have deposited their instrument of acceptance.
44The QERLCs assigned as part of the Doha amendment range from -20% for Denmark to +20%
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exporter-importer pair with ζx = 2 and ζm = 0 doubles that for a pair characterized
by ζx = 2 and ζm = 1. Nevertheless, this differential approach of analyzing the Kyoto
ratification makes possible the inclusion of symmetric time-varying pair effects. In
turn, this strategy addresses three important issues: (i) the non-random selection into
the Kyoto protocol, (ii) the non-random selection of QERLCs, and (iii) other unob-
served factors that might influence the outcomes of interest. Based on the premise
that exporters which ratified the protocol by taking on negative QERLCs (i.e., ζx=2)
are likely to enact more and stricter climate change policies, β′′ is expected to be neg-
ative. Further, the sign attached to α′′ is ambiguous. This is because less committed
parties are equally likely to reach lower or higher levels of CO2 emissions embodied
in exports in comparison to parties which opted for non-negative QERLCs.
4.5.2 Results
The results obtained by estimating (4.6) are shown in table 4.10. As customary,
column (1) displays the results obtained by treating export flows as the dependent
variable. In column (2), the CO2 intensity of exports is used as the outcome of interest.
Estimates in column (3) pertain to the carbon terms of trade. Finally, the figures
in column (4) apply to the carbon content of exports. Based on the commitment
differentials’ values, five relevant outcomes are emerging.45 The first three involve the
exporter as a Kyoto ratifier and the importer as a non-ratifier (i.e., rdKyoto = 1 and
adKyoto ∈ {2, 1, 0}). The last two are given by both the exporter and the importer
as Kyoto ratifiers (i.e., rdKyoto = 0 and adKyoto ∈ {2, 1}). For the sake of brevity,
I discuss only the first three.
Rather than presenting each column in part, I proceed by discussing each of the
three outcomes outlined earlier using the figures in panel A. First, if the exporter
ratifies the protocol without taking on any commitments its exports towards non-
ratifiers decline by 5%. Meanwhile, the carbon intensity and, implicitly, the carbon
content of exports increase by 21.3% and 16%, respectively. It is worth pointing out
that towards the end of the sample period (i.e., 2009-2012) the only non-ratifiers
observed are Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the United States of America. Second,
the adoption of a non-negative QERLC by exporter entails a -0.8% decline in export
flows, -1.6% decline in the CO2 intensity of exports, and a combined 2% decline in
the carbon content of exports. Third, the adoption of a negative QERLC by the
origin country implies a 3.5% increase in exports, 20% decline in the carbon intensity
of exports, and 17.4% drop in the carbon content of exports. One may reasonably
argue that the results in panel A are driven by the EITs which, with the exception
of Russia and Ukraine, are also part of the group of parties which opted for emission
reductions as part of the protocol. The estimates in panel B are aimed exactly at this
issue. Although lower, the results further bolster the hypothesis according to which
for Bulgaria.
45Technically there are fifteen possible outcomes but there is little value in analyzing all of them.
Among the remaining ten, six are mutually exclusive and one denotes the case in which both differ-
entials are null. The remaining combinations are mirroring three of the five relevant outcomes.
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emission reduction commitments entail larger declines in the CO2 intensity of exports
and their carbon content.
Despite the multitude of possible outcomes one aspect is clear. That is, the type
of QERLC adopted as part of the Kyoto protocol matters. Specifically, taking on
negative QERLCs (i.e., aim to reduce emissions) as opposed to non-negative ones
or no QERLC at all involves higher exports, a lower CO2 intensity of exports, and
a lower carbon content of exports. The potential factors influencing the scale and
technique effects, and therefore the carbon content of exports, were addressed within
the previous two sections.
4.6 Empirics: Transition Countries
4.6.1 Empirical Specification and Discussion
Parties with QERLCs under the Kyoto protocol do not differ only in their com-
mitment type but also in their CO2 emissions growth prospects. Specifically, the
economies in transition (EITs)46 experienced an unraveling of their industrial assem-
blage which significantly curbed their CO2 emitting capacity after 1990. Within this
context, the QERLCs adopted by the EITs are believed to be rather loose (Grubb,
2003). In turn, this feature spawned early concerns surrounding the EITs’s incentives
of engaging in climate change reform. This next section is aimed at better under-
standing the extent to which the Kyoto EITs altered the carbon content of their
exports as a result of Kyoto adoption.
The differential commitment effect on the carbon content of outflows for EITs
estimated by employing specification (4.9). For reasons already addressed in earlier
sections, the error term is modeled as in (4.10). With the exception of including
the interaction term, dKyotox,m,t × τx, the discussion in section 4.3.1 applies here as
well. τx represents a binary indicator of whether the exporter is part of the EITs
group. Since dKyotox,m,t is defined as in 4.3.147, β′′′ is expected to be negative and
of comparable magnitude with the benchmark estimates presented in table 4.7. If
the post-1990 industrial restructuring within the EITs entailed a less CO2-intensive
production network, or if the EITs’ climate change policies were more successful at
lowering the CO2 intensity of exports, γ′′′ is expected to carry a negative sign. Only
if the EITs failed to engage in post-Kyoto environmental reform or if the proposed
policies were lenient and/or not properly enforced, γ′′′ should be positive and larger
in absolute value when compared to β′′′.
lnCCXx,m,s,t = β′′′dKyotox,m,t + γ′′′dKyotox,m,t × τx + δ′′′TAx,m,t + µ′′′x,m,s,t (4.9)
46Refer to table 4.2 for details.
47This is given by the difference between the exporter and importer-specific Kyoto QERLC status.
dKyotox,m,t ∈ {1, 0,−1}.
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µ′′′x,m,s,t = ν ′′′x,m,t + ν ′′′x,m,s + ν ′′′s,t
ν ′′′x,m,t = ν ′′′m,x,t (4.10)
4.6.2 Results
The results obtained by estimating (4.9) are shown in table 4.11. Column (1)
presents the differential Kyoto commitment effect on exports by Annex II and EIT
membership status48. The estimates in column (2) pertain the CO2 intensity of
exports, column (3) refers to the carbon terms of trade, and the figures in column (4)
are for the carbon content of exports. The results concerning Annex II countries, are
in line with expectations and not much different than the benchmark results presented
in Panel B of table 4.7. Specifically, exports of Annex II parties are increasing by
about 6.5% while the CO2 emission intensity of their exports decline by approximately
15.5%. Regarding the CO2 content of exports, the negative and relatively large
technique effect implies a differential commitment effect of approximately -8.5%.
In terms of sign, the results regarding the differential commitment effect for the
EITs line up with prior prospects. Magnitude-wise, however, they are considerably
larger. Due to ratification, EITs’ exports increase by 3.5% while the CO2 intensity of
their exports is found to decrease by approximately 37%. Together these scale and
technique effects imply a reduction in the EITs’ carbon content of exports that situates
at about 35%. These results too, suggest a move towards less CO2-intensive exports
and are once again supported by the estimates shown in column (3). However, while
bearing the expected signs the technique effect and therefore the impact on the carbon
content of exports seem large. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation
for why such a substantial effect prevails. Nevertheless, an attempt is made in what
follows.
Besides their CO2 emissions growth prospects, Annex II parties and the EITs also
differ in their factor endowments. Support for this claim may be found in figure
4.5. This depicts the EITs as being capital scarce but labor abundant in comparison
to their Annex II peers. These differences may be important since CO2-intensive
industries tend to be capital intensive (e.g., basic metals, petroleum, chemical, and
non-metallic mineral products) (Broner et al., 2012; Antweiler et al., 1998; Mani and
Wheeler, 1998; Grether and De Melo, 2003; Karp, 2011). It is therefore possible that
the wedge between the Annex II parties and the EITs (involving the effect of Ky-
oto ratification on the CO2 intensity of exports and the carbon content of exports)
is driven by a two-pronged compositional effect. First, less CO2-intensive industries
gain at the expense of their more polluting counterparts as a result of climate change
policies enacted post-Kyoto. Second, most CO2-intensive sectors within the EITs may
shrink even further due to competitive pressures set in motion by the trade liberaliza-
48Recall that Annex I includes of Annex II and EIT parties. Both of these groups adopted
QERLCs as part of the Kyoto protocol.
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tion process pre-dating the 2004 and 2007 European Union Eastern Enlargements49.
CO2-intensive sectors may also contract due to a relocation of these capital-intensive
industries within relatively capital-abundant jurisdictions. These sector-level, Melitz
and Krugman-type of adjustments may complement post-Kyoto climate change poli-
cies underwritten by the EITs in further expanding the share of less CO2-intensive
sectors in total exports50. In turn, these dynamics would entail a lower CO2 intensity
and carbon content of export flows. The relatively large effects characterizing the
EITs also find empirical support in table 4.12. From here one can observe that the
differential ratification effect on the CO2 intensity of exports and the carbon content
of exports tends to be larger for exporters with lower capital to labor ratios (e.g., the
EITs). Note that the introduction of the capital-to-labor interaction term entails a
decline in the effect that is initially attributed to being part of the EIT group. Eval-
uated at the mean, the wedges between the differential commitment effects on the
CO2 intensity and the carbon content of exports are of approximately 5 percentage
points in each case. These disparities are obtained by comparing the EITs’ differen-
tial commitment effects depicted within tables 4.11 and 4.12. This last set of findings
suggests that factor endowments may play an important role in how sectors adjust
to more stringent climate change reform.
4.7 Conclusions
An important number of studies have pointed at the growing emissions embodied
in international trade flows. By taking into account the increased availability of
input-output data, and in particular the relatively new EORA26 dataset, the current
study adds to the literature strand concerning the Kyoto protocol and the carbon
content of bilateral trade in three major ways. First, this paper broadens the reach of
Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) by making use of a novel dataset which encompasses
149 nations, observed between 1995 and 2012. The 2008-2012 period is important in
its own right since sector-level exports seem to decline shortly after ratification but
recover in the long run. Leaving out this time frame may lead to erroneous conclusions
about the competitiveness effects engendered by the adoption of Kyoto protocol. In
doing so, I find that exports of Kyoto committed parties increase by about 6%. The
estimates recovered by leaving out the above time window situate at about 0.5%.
Furthermore, the CO2 intensity of exports declines by approximately 18.5% whereas
the carbon content of exports decreases by 14%. This last set of results confirms to
some extent the findings of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015). However, the differential
Kyoto commitment effect on the CO2 intensity of exports and the carbon content of
exports are found to be significantly larger. Additionally, in contrast to their study
49With the exception of Croatia, Russia, and Ukraine, all EITs joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.
Croatia joined the EU in 2013.
50Melitz (2003) advances the idea that only the most productive firms export. Meanwhile the
least productive firms are pushed out of the market. Here, this idea is envisioned at the industry-
level. Hence only the most productive sectors survive once trade barriers are lowered. This is because
capital-intensive industries are expected to be more productive within relatively capital abundant
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the current analysis brings forward a positive ratification effect on exports.
Second, this essay deploys a year-by-year analysis to scrutinize any short-run and
long-run adjustments that occur post-ratification. While exports are estimated to
decline during the 2001-2003 period, they are also found to rebound thereafter. Along
this margin, the loss of competitiveness attributable to the Kyoto protocol is rather
short-lived. Exports seem to recover in as little as three years for less CO2-intensive
sectors (e.g., agriculture and fishing) and as much as six for the most CO2-intensive
(e.g., petroleum, chemicals, and non-metallic minerals). In this regard, the current
essay adds to the burgeoning literature on international environmental agreements
(IEAs) and their competitiveness effects. Furthermore, the CO2 intensity of exports
is found to decrease in every year after Kyoto ratification. The effect on the carbon
content of exports follows a similar dynamic path. For the eleventh post-ratification
year (i.e., the last year in the sample) the Kyoto ratification effect on these two
outcomes is estimated at -18% and -8.4%, respectively. This development underlines
a compositional shift in exports or an export "clean-up" effect that is brought about
by taking on quantitative emission reduction or limitation commitments (QERLCs)
under the Kyoto protocol.
Third, this essay also evaluates the heterogeneous nature of the QERLCs adopted
under the protocol; and if the parties which are transitioning towards a market econ-
omy are impacted differently. By analyzing at the type of QERLCs I find that the
ratification effects are stronger for parties which pledged to reduce emissions. For
this particular group, the ratification effect on the carbon content of exports is esti-
mated at about -17.4%. Meanwhile, exporters which pledged to limited increases or
no emission changes see their carbon content of outflows reduced by about 2% due
to ratification. In line with the previous set of results, I also find that the Eastern
European transition economies (EITs) reduced both the CO2 intensity and the carbon
content of their exports by 37% and 35%, respectively.
In summary, due to the Kyoto ratification, parties with QERLCs are character-
ized by lower emissions embodied in exports. In addition, these effects are found to
be stronger for parties that opted for reduction commitments. Unfortunately, these
results also imply that the average party, with no commitments under the protocol,
is characterized by increases in its carbon content of exports. In addition, the results
are consistent with an increase in the carbon content of imports for committed par-
ties. The large carbon "leakage" effects implied by adopting Kyoto QELRCs should
be worrisome as climate change efforts seem to be undermined by international trade.
Any reduction in CO2 emissions achieved within the developed world (i.e., jurisdic-
tions with QERLCs under Kyoto protocol) is bound to be offset by an increase in
emissions within the developing nations (i.e., jurisdictions with no commitments un-
der Kyoto protocol). Answers on how to address "leakage" effects should be perhaps
sought within the Montreal protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer (and its subsequent amendments). These IEAs include special
provisions regarding international trade that, so far, seem to have been successful at
jurisdictions. Krugman (1993); Krugman and Venables (1996) discuss sectoral agglomeration and
117
preventing "leakage". The results brought forward by the current essay further gain
in their importance as new QERLCs will become binding for the 2013-2020 period,
as part of Doha amendment to the Kyoto protocol.
Copyright© Mihai Paraschiv, 2016.
the relocation of industries in the presence of increased trade integration.
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Total exports in billions of USD at 2005 prices. The vertical lines indicate the time period in which most
countries have ratified the protocol with a binding emission cap.
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CO2 emission intensity of exports in kilograms per dollar of output at 2005 prices. The vertical lines
indicate the time period in which most countries have ratified the protocol with a binding emission cap.
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CO2 content of exports in 1000s of gigagrams (kilotonnes). The vertical lines indicate the time period
in which most countries have ratified the protocol with a binding emission cap.
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Note: The graph shows the average stock of climate policies and measures for Kyoto (solid line) and non-
Kyoto (dashed line) countries from 1974-2011. Data is obtained from the IEA Policies and Measures:
Addressing Climate Change database. The red solid line signifies the date of Kyoto ratification for most
Kyoto countries. The red dashed line marks the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
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Belize Indonesia∗ Russian Federation∗
Benin Iran Rwanda
Bermuda Ireland∗ Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan Israel∗ Saudi Arabia
Bolivia Italy∗ Senegal
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jamaica Sierra Leone
Botswana Japan∗ Singapore
Brazil∗ Jordan Slovakia∗
Brunei Darussalam Kazakhstan Slovenia∗
Bulgaria Kenya South Africa∗
Burkina Faso Korea∗ Spain∗
Burundi Kuwait Sri Lanka
Cambodia Lao People’s Democratic Republic Sudan
Cameroon Latvia Suriname
Canada∗ Lebanon Swaziland
Cape Verde Lesotho Sweden∗
Central African Republic Liberia Switzerland∗
Chad Lithuania Syrian Arab Republic
Chile∗ Luxembourg Taiwan
China∗ Macau Tajikistan
Colombia Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of) Tanzania, United Rep. of
Congo Madagascar Thailand
Costa Rica Malawi Togo
Croatia Malaysia Tunisia
Cyprus Maldives Turkey∗
Czech Republic∗ Mali Turkmenistan
Cote d’Ivoire Malta Uganda
Denmark∗ Mauritania Ukraine
Djibouti Mauritius United Kingdom∗
Dominican Republic Mexico∗ United States of America∗
Ecuador Mongolia Uruguay
Egypt Morocco Uzbekistan
El Salvador Mozambique Venezuela




All countries appear as both exporters and importers. Starred nations are included in in Aichele
and Felbermayr (2015).
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Table 4.2: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Parties
Country
Code










AUS Australiaa 8 2007 -0.5
AUT Austriaa -8 -13 2002 -20d -16
BEL Belgiuma -8 -7.5 2002 -20d -15
BGR Bulgariab -8 2002 -20d 20
CAN Canadaa -6 2002
HRV Croatiab -5 2007 -20d
CYP Cyprus -20d -5
CZE Czech Republicb -8 2001 -20d 9
DNK Denmarka -8 -21 2002 -20d -20
EST Estoniab -8 2002 -20d 11
FIN Finlanda -8 0 2002 -20d -16
FRA Francea -8 0 2002 -20d -14
DEU Germanya -8 -21 2002 -20d -14
GRC Greecea -8 25 2002 -20d -4
HUN Hungaryb -6 2002 -20d 10
ISL Icelanda 10 2002 -20d
IRL Irelanda -8 13 2002 -20d -20
ITA Italya -8 -6.5 2002 -20d -13
JPN Japana -6 2002
LVA Latviab -8 2002 -20d 17
LTU Lithuaniab -8 2003 -20d 15
LUX Luxembourga -8 -28 2002 -20d -20
MLT Malta -20d 5
NLD Netherlandsa -8 -6 2002 -20d -16
NZL New Zealanda 0 2002 0
NOR Norwaya 1 2002 -16
POL Polandb -6 2002 -20d 14
PRT Portugala -8 27 2002 -20d 1
ROU Romaniab -8 2001 -20d 19
RUS Russiab 0 2004
SVK Slovakiab -8 2002 -20d 13
SVN Sloveniab -8 2002 -20d 4
ESP Spaina -8 15 2002 -20d -10
SWE Swedena -8 4 2002 -20d -17
CHE Switzerlanda -8 2003 -15.8
TUR Turkey
UKR Ukraineb 0 2004 -24
GBR United Kingdoma -8 -12.5 2002 -20d -16
USA United Statesa -7
All parties are in Annex I. This also includes the European Union (EU). Slovakia and Slovenia were
added in 1998. Malta and Cyprus were added in 2009 and 2013. Liechtenstein and Monaco took
QELRCs for 2008-2012 but are not in the sample. aAnnex II members. bParties transitioning to
a market economy in 1992 (EITs). cIndividual targets of EU15 members; EU15 agreed to an 8%
overall reduction. In most cases 2008-2012 targets are relative to 1990 levels. dTo be fulfilled as part
of (or jointly with) the EU. eIndividual targets for EU27 members relative to 2005; EU27 agreed
to a 20% overall reduction relative to 1990. Under the Doha amendment, Belarus and Kazakhstan
adopted a -5% and -12% QELRC, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Industry Classification
Industry Code Industry Description
1 Agriculture and Fishing
3 Basic Metals
6 Transport Equipment
7 Electrical and Machinery
8 Food and Beverages
11 Textiles and Wearing Apparel
12 Other Manufacturing
45 Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products
910 Wood and Paper
The table displays an industry’s code and its description. The Electricity, Gas, Water
Supply, Mining and Quarrying industry along with the non-traded sectors Construction
(13), Transport (14), and Other Services (15) are not included in the analysis and therefore
not shown in the table.
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Econ. Integration 3,572,424.00 0.52 1.15 0.00 6.00
Exp. in Transition 3,572,424.00 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Exp. Kyoto w/ Cap 3,572,424.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Exp. Kyoto w/ Cap (+,/,-) 3,572,424.00 0.78 0.90 0.00 3.00
Exports (USD mil.) 3,572,424.00 40.30 678.89 0.00 163,093.05
CO2 in Exports (kg./USD) 3,480,368.00 0.34 0.63 0.00 14.44
CO2 Exports (kt.) 3,437,802.00 7.79 165.82 0.00 44,435.11
Exp. K/L (1,000USD/Worker) 3,360,636.00 83.08 86.20 1.39 439.44
Exp. Years of Schooling 2,875,788.00 7.73 2.74 0.92 13.09
Exp. Pers. Engaged (mil.) 3,360,636.00 17.58 70.85 0.03 784.43
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics by Kyoto Commitment Differential
Differential Kyoto Commitment (Kyoto Exp.-Kyoto Imp.)
1: Only Exporter 0: None -1: Only Importer
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Agriculture and Fishing
Exports 12.93 244.63 11.03 125.77 19.96 172.05
CO2 Intensity 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.19
CO2 Exports 1.03 26.64 1.00 11.79 2.01 13.73
Basic Metals
Exports 61.97 650.02 31.33 413.16 31.09 330.88
CO2 Intensity 0.21 0.37 0.40 0.66 0.32 0.53
CO2 Exports 7.22 84.64 5.76 71.06 8.77 88.12
Electrical and Machinery
Exports 228.00 2,416.77 101.57 1,279.72 125.26 1,378.86
CO2 Intensity 0.09 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.23
CO2 Exports 11.40 145.19 11.00 219.51 18.01 205.21
Food and Beverages
Exports 30.92 378.77 23.07 252.80 28.40 289.15
CO2 Intensity 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.18 0.23
CO2 Exports 2.34 44.10 2.70 31.33 5.10 54.99
Other Manufacturing
Exports 16.14 261.57 9.43 215.79 16.11 179.24
CO2 Intensity 0.10 0.11 0.34 0.45 0.28 0.33
CO2 Exports 0.94 17.25 1.73 63.49 3.62 41.83
Petroleum, Chemical and
Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Exports 125.11 1,244.65 65.50 684.75 67.32 711.09
CO2 Intensity 0.50 0.51 1.03 1.40 0.85 1.15
CO2 Exports 39.49 688.80 32.36 350.80 43.48 378.01
Textiles and Wearing Apparel
Exports 25.05 317.32 26.07 459.51 43.54 579.73
CO2 Intensity 0.10 0.12 0.33 0.45 0.27 0.32
CO2 Exports 1.34 16.20 4.77 127.89 11.09 159.46
Transport Equipment
Exports 87.95 1,852.30 41.73 696.37 33.31 787.86
CO2 Intensity 0.10 0.12 0.27 0.50 0.22 0.39
CO2 Exports 5.77 141.40 3.98 71.72 3.70 61.41
Wood and Paper
Exports 25.81 532.56 16.21 189.49 13.45 142.12
CO2 Intensity 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.40 0.21 0.31
CO2 Exports 1.43 33.72 1.57 21.04 1.98 18.48
Total
Exports 68.21 1,151.78 36.22 590.93 42.05 636.71
CO2 Intensity 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.67 0.30 0.54
CO2 Exports 7.88 242.29 7.33 152.33 11.05 161.44
The table displays summary statistics of dependent variables sector-by-sector. Exports are in millions
of USD, CO2 intensity in kilogram per USD, and CO2 content of exports in Gg (kt) of CO2.
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dKyoto -0.020∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Obs. 182,520 182,520 182,520 182,520
Panel B: 1995-2012
dKyoto -0.005 -0.096∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Obs. 252,720 252,720 252,720 252,720
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled
sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. The variable of interest is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in
specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is measured as the ratio of carbon content or exports to that of
imports. Panel A replicates Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) w/ export rather than import flows. Panel B extends the time horizon.
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dKyoto 0.006∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 2,535,163 2,529,616 2,480,106 2,488,123
Panel B: 1995-2012
dKyoto 0.057∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 3,525,925 3,480,368 3,392,244 3,437,802
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled
sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. The variable of interest is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in
specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is measured as the ratio of carbon content or exports to that of
imports. Panels A, and B extend Aichele and Felbermayr (2015)’s 40 country sample to include 149 nations. Panel B extends the time
horizon.
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dKyoto×2001 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.000 0.008 -0.026∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
dKyoto×2002 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2003 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2004 0.008∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2005 0.012∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2006 0.025∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2007 0.055∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×2008 0.082∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
dKyoto×2009 0.119∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
dKyoto×2010 0.110∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
dKyoto×2011 0.135∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
dKyoto×2012 0.112∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Obs. 3,525,925 3,480,368 3,392,244 3,437,802
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using
ordinary least squares on pooled sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of interest
is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in
specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is measured as the ratio of carbon
content or exports to that of imports.
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Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using
ordinary least squares on pooled sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of
interest is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto and the associated interactions. A joint
economic integration measure is included in all specifications.
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Panel A: All Annex I
rdKyoto -0.051∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
adKyoto 0.043∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 3,525,925 3,480,368 3,392,244 3,437,802
Panel B: w/o EITs
rdKyoto -0.039∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
adKyoto 0.033∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Obs. 2,928,889 2,890,350 2,810,312 2,848,771
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled
sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. The variables of interest are the alternative Kyoto commitment differential, adKyoto, and the simple ratification differential,
rdKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is
measured as the ratio of carbon content or exports to that of imports. In Panel B, EITs are removed from the sample.
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dKyoto 0.063∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
dKyoto×Exp. Transition -0.029∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Obs. 3,525,925 3,480,368 3,392,244 3,437,802
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled
sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. The variable of interest is the alternative Kyoto commitment differential, adKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is
included in in specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is measured as the ratio of carbon content or exports
to that of imports.
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dKyoto 0.072∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗ -0.932∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
dKyoto×Exp. Transition -0.032∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
dKyoto×lnK/L -0.004∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Obs. 3,314,630 3,269,904 3,183,399 3,227,634
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled
sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1. The variable of interest is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in




This dissertation targets two major ramifications of the ongoing international
trade research. The first essay adds to the literature strand on economic integration
agreements (EIAs) and their effects on the diversity of international trade flows. Con-
trary to what most studies find, this essay shows that export diversification depends
not only on trade costs but on horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) costs as
well. Since EIAs exhibit asymmetric effects on trade and horizontal FDI costs, their
impact on trade diversity depends on each accord in part. The second and third
essays add to the empirical research on the competitiveness effects of international
environmental agreements (IEAs) and environmental regulation in general. The sec-
ond essay underlines that, in general, IEAs are detrimental to exports. The effects
are found to be relatively large for pollution-intensive sectors. However, a more disag-
gregated analysis points to a heterogeneous effect of IEAs on exports. For example,
the Kyoto protocol is found to be a minor source of comparative disadvantage for
pollution-intensive sectors. For the least pollution-intensive sectors, however, the
Kyoto protocol emerges as a source of comparative advantage. This finding is further
bolstered by the results brought forward within the third essay. Conversely, ozone
depletion IEAs are found to generate declines in exports, regardless of the origin in-
dustry. The third essay focuses on the Kyoto protocol and evaluates its effects on the
carbon content of exports from several perspectives.
The purpose of the first essay is to gain insight into the mechanisms through which
economic integration shapes the diversity of exports. The overwhelming majority of
studies on the subject hold economic integration as a catalyst to export diversity.
This conclusion rests on the logic that economic integration lowers trade costs which,
in turn, facilitates exports and export diversification. The first essay challenges this
conclusion by showing, theoretically and empirically, that the above reasoning may
not always hold. I start by developing a theoretical model which postulates that
export diversity depends not only on trade costs but on horizontal foreign direct
investment (FDI) costs as well. The logic behind this key theoretical insight rests
on the substitutability between exporting and horizontal investment, as means of
serving foreign markets. The model yields two testable predictions. First, a relative
decline in trade costs generates bilateral export diversification, just as emphasized
throughout the literature. Second, a relative drop in horizontal FDI costs results in
less diverse exports. These predictions underline important implications that concern
export diversity and economic integration agreements (EIAs); as these accords may
display an asymmetric effect on horizontal FDI and trade costs. For example, shallow
integration agreements (e.g., free trade agreements) entail large declines in trade costs
with little or no changes in costs of cross border investment, and are expected to
generate export diversity. Conversely, deeper integration agreements (e.g., economic
and monetary unions) are associated with notable reductions in investment costs but
little change in trade costs, and are predicted to engender less diverse outflows. In the
second half of the essay I take the theoretical model to the data. The results showed
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that joint ratification of trade agreements in general leads to a more diverse export
basket. However, joint membership within the European economic and monetary
union (e.g., the Eurozone) is found to accomplish the exact opposite.
The second essay reevaluates the competitiveness effect of environmental regu-
lation on international trade. In doing so, the study contributes to the existing
literature along three important margins. First, while most studies have focused on
environmental regulation or pollution abatement costs, I use the stock of ratified air
pollution international environmental agreements (IEAs) as a measure of sovereign
commitment to environmental reform. Second, by doing so I am able to analyze a
substantially larger number of countries across a much broader time horizon. Third,
by being able to observe a country as an exporter and importer over a generous period
of time, I am able to account, relatively easy, for the endogenous selection into IEAs.
Three sets of results are uncovered by the second essay. First, the adoption of IEAs is
found to act as a source of comparative disadvantage especially for pollution-intensive
sectors. Second, different categories of IEAs display idiosyncratic composition and
scale effects. Climate change IEAs (i.e., the Kyoto protocol) are found to be a modest
source of comparative disadvantage for pollution-intensive industries. However, for
the least polluting industries, these accords represent a source of comparative advan-
tage. Hence, the ratification of climate change IEAs suggests a compositional shift
towards a "cleaner" (less pollution-intensive) export bundle. A similar piece of evi-
dence emerges from the third essay. Conclusive evidence on acid rain IEAs as sources
of comparative disadvantage is found only for pollution-intensive industries. At the
other end of the spectrum, ozone depletion IEAs induce negative effects on exports
regardless of whether a sector is more or less pollution-intensive. Hence, acid rain
and ozone depletion IEAs bring about negative scale effects. Third, climate change
and acid rain IEAs involve "leakage" effects which appear to be stronger for the first
category of accords. In line with their international trade provisions, ozone depletion
IEAs do not generate "leakage" effects. This result is nevertheless expected, and in
line with the "leakage"-reduction provisions often included within this type of IEAs.
Aside from its economic implications this result is may be of added importance with
regards to the design of future IEAs.
By making use of a novel dataset, the third essay zooms in on the Kyoto protocol
and its effect on the carbon content of exports, the CO2 intensity of exports, and
exports in general. The contributions made to the existing literature can be sum-
marized as follows. First, I expand the reach of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) by
assessing a total of 149 nations observed between 1995 and 2012. Second, I employ
a year-by-year analysis in order to shed light on the post-ratification short-run and
long-run adjustments. Third, I evaluate whether the type of quantitative emission
reduction or limitation commitment (QERLC) had any role in shaping the three
outcomes of interest. A similar analysis is conducted for the Eastern European tran-
sitioning economies. The results are summarized below. First, the inclusion of the
2008-2012 period points to a significant and positive effect of Kyoto ratification on ex-
ports. Additionally, the CO2 intensity of exports and the carbon content of exports
are found to exhibit much larger declines in comparison to those brought forward
by previous studies. The year-by-year analysis underscores an export decline which
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occurs immediately after ratification (i.e., during 2001-2003). However, exports are
estimated to rebound thereafter. Exports from less CO2-intensive sectors seem to
recover in as little as 3 years. In contrast, outflows from CO2-intensive industries
appear to rebound after about 6 years. These results also contribute to the literature
on the IEAs and their competitiveness effects by suggesting that the Kyoto proto-
col’s adverse effects on exports are rather short lived. The CO2 intensity of exports
is found to decline continuously after the protocol’s ratification. The effect on the
carbon content of exports follows a similar dynamic path. In line with the findings
of the second essay, these results also underline a compositional or a "clean-up" effect
on exports. Third, the type of QERLCs adopted under the protocol matter. In this
regard the ratification effect on exports, the CO2 intensity of exports, and the carbon
content of exports is stronger for parties which pledged to reduce emissions. Con-
trary to ante-ratification beliefs, Eastern European transition economies significantly
reduced the CO2 intensity and the carbon content of their exports.
Copyright© Mihai Paraschiv, 2016.
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Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1.1 Proofs
First Proposition
Step 1. Given (2.2) and (2.6), export flows in each of the two sectors, that originate
in H with destination F, can be written as
















From (A.1) it follows that XH,Fl > X
H,F











Sectoral price indexes are expressed as in (2.4) and thus (A.2) can be rewritten as









































∣∣∣∣ > 0 (A.5)




denotes the elasticity of the fraction of exporting firms with respect
to trade costs. The latter holds with strict inequality given the model assumptions.





Step 3. From (A.1) it can be shown that sectoral exports, XH,Fs , and trade costs,






























There are no reasons to believe that the elasticity of the price index with respect to
transportation costs is greater than unity as this would imply a more than a 100%
trade costs pass through rate.













By using (A.4), (A.6), and some algebraic manipulations it can be shown that the








These three conditions are met given the assumptions of the model.










































































< 0 and using (A.8) along with








Using (2.12) and (A.11), the response of bilateral concentration to change in trade




























Step 1. Recalling the price index in (2.4), that γHh is a positive function of fH,F ,
and allowing the number of firms in Foreign’s high-τ sector to change accordingly in
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Step 3. Noting that the firms and thus exports in the low-τ sector do not respond to








































Using (2.12) and (A.18) the response of bilateral concentration to change in trade





























All three concentration measures are the product of own calculations based on bi-
lateral export flows at SITC 3 digit Rev. 3 aggregation level. Bilateral export data
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under SITC 3 Rev. 3 classification is extracted from UNCTAD. Here, exporting sec-
tors are characterized by flows totaling $100,000 or more within a given year. For
comparison purposes, I follow Regolo (2013) and assume that all 255 SITC 3 digit
Rev. 3 manufacturing sectors within the dataset represent potential exporting sec-
tors. UNCTAD reports its own set of Hirschmann-Herfindahl bilateral concentration
indexes. However, this measure is calculated by using the total number of active
lines for a given pair and year rather than the maximum number of sectors in the
classification. Employing this measure within the estimation approach does not have
a significant impact on the results. The construction of bilateral export concentration
indexes is detailed below.
• The normalized Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of bilateral export concentration
for pair (x,m) at time t is computed as in (A.20). The share of industry i in
total exports from x to m at time t, six,m,t, is computed as shown below, where
















• The Theil index of bilateral export concentration for pair (x,m) at time t is
computed as in (A.22). As mentioned above six,m,t accounts for the export
share of industry i in total bilateral export flows from x to m at time t and is













• The Gini index of bilateral export concentration for pair (x,m) in year t is
computed as in (A.23). More specifically this index is computed as the difference
between the actual distribution of industry level flows from x tom and the equal
distribution of industry specific, bilateral exports across all industries. AL,x,m,t
denotes the area under the Lorentz curve.




• The integration measure used in Regolo (2013) (TAx,m,t) was compiled for the
period 1950-2012 by Jeffrey Bergstrand as part of the NSF-Kellogg Institute
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Economic Integration Agreements Database Project. It is measured on a scale
from 0 to 6, with the null value indicating no integration whatsoever. As per
data construction methodology provided by the author, TAx,m,t = 1 is indicative
of a non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement between x and m at time t.
Similarly, TAx,m,t = 2 denotes the existence of a preferential trade arrangement.
TAx,m,t = 3 indicates the presence of a free trade agreement. If TAx,m,t = 4,
x and m are part of a customs union at t. TAx,m,t = 5 underlines the joint
membership within a common market. Finally, TAx,m,t = 6 points to the joint
membership in an economic union; in this case the Eurozone. Pertaining to the
current sample, values of 5 appear after 1993, the year in which the European
Single Market was launched. Values of 6 show up after 1999 and denote country
pairs which share the euro.
• The variable associated with joint Eurozone membership (EZx,m,t) was con-
structed based on information provided by the European Central Bank. This
variable takes a value of 1 if both the exporter and importer are part of the
Eurozone at time t and 0 otherwise. Starting in 1999, 11 European countries
joined the European economic and monetary union. The initial adopters are
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This group is referred throughout as EZ11.
Since then, 8 other countries have joined: Greece in 2002, Slovenia in 2007,
Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014
and Lithuania in 2015. Given that the last available year within the dataset
at hand is 2011, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not regarded as part of the
Eurozone.
Endowments
Following Regolo (2013), exporter-importer differences in factor endowments are con-
structed as shown in (A.24). Country specific physical capital stock (K ) and em-
ployment (L) figures are from version 8.0 of the Penn World Tables. Information on
national stock of arable land (A) is obtained from the World Development Indicators
dataset published by the World Bank and complemented using the environmental
accounts of the World Input Output Database. In PWT v8.0 human capital is not
expressed simply as average years of schooling (H/L) but rather as an index. This
is obtained by combining data on the average years of schooling with that on rates
of return to education. Thus, one can use the index and back out figures on average
years of schooling (H/L). Experimenting with differential variables which are built
using either the index or the raw average years of schooling has no quantitative or
qualitative impact on the results. All estimations are produced using the average
years of schooling differential.
K/L differential for exporter (x) and importer (m) for year (t) is denoted by dK/L,x,m,t.
Here, K/Lk,t represents the physical capital to labor ratio in country k at time t,
k = {x,m}. Similarly, exporter and importer specific K/L ratios can be replaced
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with their counterparts, H/L and A/L, to obtain dH/L,x,m,t and dA/L,x,m,t respectively.
dK/L,x,m,t = |ln(K/Lx,t)− ln(K/Lm,t)| (A.24)
Geographic Variables
Data regarding distance, contiguity and whether or not the exporter and the importer
are sharing a common language is provided by CEPII.
Other Variables
• GDP and population figures are extracted from PWT v8.0. There are several
measures of gross domestic product within this dataset. I am using the output-
side real GDP measured in constant 2005 USD at current purchasing power
parity (PPP). Choosing expenditure-side measures or figures adjusted for PPP
has no impact on the empirical analysis. This data series is used to construct
the per capita GDP variable. Information on total factor productivity figures
is from PWT 8.0. The PWT dataset comprises two measures of total factor
productivity. Both measures are constructed by dividing the relative output by
relative input levels. The key difference is given by the term "relative". One
measure involves output and stock of factors relative to the U.S. at current
PPPs whereas the other refers to output and factors relative to national levels
in the year 2005. The results are not quantitatively and qualitatively altered
by experimenting with the two measures. All estimations are produced using
the former measure.
• GDP per capita and total factor productivity variables are used to construct the
analogous exporter-importer differential measures, dGDPpc,x,m,t and dTFP,x,m,t, as
depicted below. Here, GDPpck,t and TFPk,t represent the real GDP per capita
and total factor productivity in country k at time t, k = {x,m}.
dGDPpc,x,m,t = |ln(GDPpcx,t)− ln(GDPpcm,t)| (A.25)
dTFP,x,m,t = |ln(TFPx,t)− ln(TFPm,t)| (A.26)
• The country specific Hirschmann-Herfindahl index used for producing column
(7) of tables 2.5 and 2.6 is from UNCTAD.
• The financial openness measure is constructed by following Bos et al. (2011).
More specifically, this variable is given by the ratio of total liabilities (portfolio
equity liabilities, FDI liabilities, debt liabilities and financial derivatives) to
GDP. Data on portfolio equity liabilities, FDI liabilities, debt liabilities and
financial derivatives are provided by Philip Lane on his website.
• A nation’s trade openness is defined as the ratio of its exports and imports
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to its GDP. PWT v8.0 contains information on national export/GDP and im-
port/GDP ratios and thus adding the two gives out the trade openness measure.
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A.2 Chapter 4 Appendix
A.2.1 Robustness Checks












Panel A: w/o China
dKyoto 0.057∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 3,477,973 3,433,038 3,345,536 3,390,472
Panel B: w/o Top 25 Oil Producers
dKyoto 0.064∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 2,591,422 2,554,732 2,479,920 2,516,430
Panel C: Diff. lnGDPpc
dKyoto 0.052∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 3,314,575 3,270,018 3,183,328 3,227,678
Panel D: Diff. Factor Endowments
dKyoto 0.038∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 2,426,709 2,390,976 2,335,604 2,371,149
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using
ordinary least squares on pooled sectoral data. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of interest
is the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in
specifications (1), (2) and (4). The carbon terms of trade (CTT) is measured as the ratio of carbon
content or exports to that of imports. Top 25 oil producers are the United States, Saudi Arabia,
Russia, China, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Brazil, Mexico, Kuwait, Venezuela,
Nigeria, Qatar, Norway, Angola, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Colombia, India, Oman, Indonesia, the United
Kingdom, Azerbaijan, and Argentina. Panel C includes differences in logarithms of GDP per capita.
Panel D includes differences in logarithms of physical capital to labor ratio and years of schooling.
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Table A.2: Counterfactual Analysis










United States in Kyoto
Panel A: ln Exports
dKyoto 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 1,156,752 1,156,752 1,326,860 1,833,515 3,525,925
Panel B: ln CO2 Int.
dKyoto -0.001 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 1,171,420 1,171,420 1,306,980 1,807,659 3,480,368
Panel C: ln CO2 Exports
dKyoto 0.096∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 1,139,055 1,139,055 1,304,647 1,801,916 3,437,802
Country Pair×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair×Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is denoted in the first row of the table. Estimates are produced using ordinary least squares on pooled sectoral data.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the country-pair-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The variable of interest is
the differential Kyoto commitment, dKyoto. A joint economic integration measure is included in specifications A, B, and C. Columns (1) and (2) limit
the sample to the pre-treatment period (1995-2000) and a fictitious treatment of Kyoto ratifiers in either 1997 or 1998. Columns (3) and (4) compare
committed parties with the United States, and Argentina, Bahrain, Chile, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait, Macau, Malaysia, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States respectively. In column (6) the United States is included in the treatment group with















Figure A.1: Multi Region Input-Output Table: Supply-Use
Table; Source: EORA26 MRIO Documentation
Year: 2000
Country 1 Country 1 Country 1 Country 1 Country 2 Country 2 Country 2 Country 2 Country 3 Country 3 Country 3 Country 3
T (or Z) Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4
Country 1 Sector 1 346             156             95               594             819             154             832             397             409             562             241             554                     
Country 1 Sector 2 354             443             7                 908             42               92               561             839             470             770             83               368                     
Country 1 Sector 3 291             795             243             825             753             2                 340             232             251             605             526             610                     
Country 1 Sector 4 637             259             289             813             500             716             947             645             856             221             898             41                        
Country 2 Sector 1 547             466             910             276             518             149             779             553             197             285             305             828                     
Country 2 Sector 2 752             936             822             638             611             496             98               924             608             689             872             972                     
Country 2 Sector 3 295             444             7                 828             929             535             367             257             890             429             641             26                        
Country 2 Sector 4 113             518             791             459             79               748             254             218             586             673             424             157                     
Country 3 Sector 1 46               457             552             572             632             680             730             607             796             186             15               958                     
Country 3 Sector 2 962             96               544             96               675             113             711             337             787             571             241             211                     
Country 3 Sector 3 531             190             686             191             374             615             788             738             351             32               565             622                     
Country 3 Sector 4 857             776             897             18               915             482             308             458             253             145             982             270                     
VA (or PI, Primary Inputs) block:
Country 1 Value Added 1,172          1,120          1,676          1,648          -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -                      
Country 2 Value Added -              -              -              -              1,019          4,730          401             471             -              -              -              -                      
Country 3 Value Added -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -              626             1,278          1,532          2,995                  
Total input 6,901          6,657          7,518          7,868          7,864          9,511          7,117          6,677          7,082          6,445          7,326          8,612                  
Satellite Accounts (Q): Q
Direct Emissions (Kt CO2) 300             320             280             400             400             320             200             150             400             230             400             500                     
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Figure A.2: Multi Region Input-Output Table: Final
Demand Table; Source: EORA26 MRIO Documentation
FD (or Y) block:
Year: 2000 Country 1 Country 1 Country 2 Country 2 Country 3 Country 3
Final Demand Final Demand Final Demand Final Demand Final Demand Final Demand Gross output Exports
T (or Z) Households Change in InventoryHouseholds Change in InventoryHouseholds Change in Inventory xout Total to companies 
Country 1 Sector 1 394                    0                         902                    0                         446                    0                         6,901               5,316           3,968               1,348               
Country 1 Sector 2 514                    0                         694                    0                         512                    0                         6,657               4,431           3,225               1,206               
Country 1 Sector 3 384                    0                         753                    0                         909                    0                         7,518               4,980           3,318               1,662               
Country 1 Sector 4 91                      0                         653                    0                         301                    0                         7,868               5,778           4,825               954                   
Country 2 Sector 1 630                    0                         565                    0                         857                    0                         7,864               5,300           3,813               1,487               
Country 2 Sector 2 847                    0                         209                    0                         37                      0                         9,511               7,173           6,289               884                   
Country 2 Sector 3 165                    0                         419                    0                         886                    0                         7,117               4,610           3,559               1,051               
Country 2 Sector 4 800                    0                         355                    0                         501                    0                         6,677               5,022           3,721               1,301               
Country 3 Sector 1 338                    0                         320                    0                         194                    0                         7,082               4,934           4,276               658                   
Country 3 Sector 2 479                    0                         14                      0                         608                    0                         6,445               4,027           3,535               492                   
Country 3 Sector 3 269                    0                         814                    0                         559                    0                         7,326               5,197           4,114               1,083               
Country 3 Sector 4 700                    0                         822                    0                         729                    0                         8,612               6,233           4,710               1,522               
89,578             
VA (or PI, Primary Inputs) block:
Country 1 Value Added
Country 2 Value Added
Country 3 Value Added
Total input
Satellite Accounts (Q): Q
Direct Emissions (Kt CO2) 30                      -                     50                      -                     10                      -                     
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